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The absence of contentious performance has led scholars to question the existence of social 
movements and to agree with the description of state-social group relations in China as state 
corporatism. However, defining social movement by confrontational performance is 
inappropriate to examine social organizing under repression regimes. Most western social 
movement theories assume that political space for organizing exists before the formation of 
social movement. My research challenges this assumption by extending the concept of political 
opportunity structure to conduct process-tracing  comparisons  of  two  women’s  and  one  lesbian  
groups’  respective  strategies  when  facing  interferences  from  the  central  authorities.  By  
conducting interviews with forty three major participants of women and lesbian organizing, 
including founders, activists, academic experts, governmental officers, and ministerial officers of 
ACWF, along with archive analysis, and participatory observations, this study looks specifically 
at the campaign against domestic violence from 1988 to 2013. 
 
This research has found that the political space is not assumed to be existed. Instead, it is created 
and expanded by women’s advocacy groups. Three groups have shared experiences of 
revocation or failure of registration, cancellation of events, difficulty of fund raising, constantly 
being invited to have tea with security department etc. However, each group develops their own 
strategies to survive and to further expand their political spaces gradually. Most importantly, 
they carry on their advocacy work national wide. I argue under a repressive regime, these 
achievements are indeed confrontational in nature. Therefore, the aforementioned assumption of 
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Chapter 1: Confrontational Strategies in Expanding Political Space:  
Three  Women’s  Groups  in  China 
 
“If  you  want  to  do  advocacy  work,  you  cannot  be  too  confrontational;; 
 If  you  are  confrontational,  you  cannot  work  on  advocacy.”    
An  activist  in  the  women’s  movement in China 
 
The absence of obvious contention has led scholars to question the existence of social 
movements in China and to agree with the description of state-social group relations in China 
as state corporatism1 (see for example, Florini, Lai, and Tan. 2012, p.95; Unger 2008). 
However, my study argues that we need to redefine the characteristics of a social movement in 
the context of a repressive regime, especially the characteristic of confrontation. Furthermore, 
my  study  proposes  the  term  “soft  confrontation”  to  describe  the  confrontation  movement  of  
women’s  advocacy  groups  in  China.  In  the  end,  my  study  presents  the  idea  of  interactive  
political liberalization as a better means of understanding the state-social group dynamic. 
After examining the confrontational  movement  of  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  
China, my study reaches these two conclusions for two major reasons. First, China, as an 
authoritarian regime, is adaptive and tolerant toward certain advocacy groups, and this trait 
redefines the confrontational characteristic of a social movement. Compared to social groups in 
democratic countries, advocacy groups in China have faced quite different challenges in 
confronting the state. These challenges include the efforts by the regime to marginalize and 
monitor the operation of advocacy groups. 
The opening quotation sheds some light on the reality of social movements in a repressive 
regime. Since most advocacy work is viewed by the central government as a potential challenge 
to  regime’s  legitimacy, social groups that aim for social change have encountered continuing 
interference from both the Party and the state in China. How to survive and to carry on their 
advocacy work has become a daily challenge for most organizers of advocacy groups in China.  
The adaptive government distinguishes advocacy groups from charity groups, and 
encourages the existence of charity groups. However, although the central government will 
include  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  certain  public  policy  making  processes,  it  will, at the same 
                                                 
1  “(I)n  which  the  state  allows  hierarchically  ordered  and  controlled  associations  to  play  limited  roles  as  a  way  to  
reconcile large  numbers  of  divergent  interests.” 
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time, continue its interference with the same groups.  
The second reason for redefining the characteristics of social movements in the context of a 
repressive regime is because the political space did not exist before the formation of social 
groups in China. Indeed, the expansion of the political space for social organizing and advocacy 
work was the result of the strategic choices made by advocacy organizers.  
My study argues that the state-advocacy group interaction is like dancing a tango, and it 
takes two to tango. My study has concluded that both advocacy groups and the state are adaptive. 
In other words, the political space for social organizing and advocacy work is expanded by every 
encounter between advocacy groups and the state. My study has identified two causal 
mechanisms of their adaptive reaction to each other. 
Most importantly, my study proposes a new definition of confrontation movements in an 
authoritarian regime that give a better understanding of social movements in China. I argue that 
advocacy groups that can maintain their survival while sustaining their advocacy work and 
participate further in the public policy area should be recognized as a confrontational movement.  
My study first finds that there exist state boundaries on advocacy  groups’  organizing,  and  
the  organizers’  strategies  have  successfully  expanded  their  political  space  for  advocacy  work.  In  
the  following  chapters,  I  will  show  how  three  women’s  groups  with  different  organizational  
goals, organizational capabilities, and advocacy strategies, have encountered four similar major 
forms of repression from the central government.  
In addition, my study shows how these three groups chose different strategies in the same 
campaign against domestic violence, and examines the resulting political opportunity or political 
constraint. In the end, the idea of interactive political liberalization is explained in order to 
further  demonstrate  the  confrontational  movement  of  women’s  advocacy  groups. 
In order to demonstrate the confrontational movement of advocacy groups in China, this 
dissertation will answer the following questions. What boundaries has the government set for the 
social organizing of advocacy groups? What kind of strategies have the organizers developed to 
expand these boundaries? Which factors have played a role in shifting these boundaries?  
Only by answering these questions can we gain a new understanding of social movements 
in China. In the past few years, there has been a lot of debate about the applicability of the social 
movement paradigm to Chinese politics. The lack of autonomy of social groups and the absence 
of confrontational movements are two main reasons to question the existence of social 
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movements in China. (Lu, 2007; Zhang, 2001)  
However, this argument ignores the multiple struggles of advocacy groups when facing 
interference from the state. The interactions between advocacy groups and the state provide us 
with extensive data for understanding the changing dynamics of social movements in China. 
These interactions also raise a series of intriguing questions. Why does the state allow these 
advocacy  groups  to  exist  if  these  groups  are  considered  to  be  a  threat  to  the  regime’s  legitimacy?  
Do these advocacy groups try to challenge the state? If not? Why not? 
My research project uses the definition of Linz and Stepan (1996) that civil society is the 
“political  space”  between  the  government  and  individual  households.  It  presents  a  new  model  of  
social movements that does not appear confrontational on the surface. My study also includes an 
evaluation  of  the  strategies  of  three  women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  
in order to deepen our understanding of these dynamic interactions between advocacy groups 
and  the  state.  In  March  2003,  the  “Domestic  Violence  Prevention  and  Intervention  Law”,  was  
submitted  by  30  national  people’s  representatives  to  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC). 
This  marked  a  unique  moment  in  the  history  of  China’s  legislation  because  this  was  the  first  
national legal proposition prepared by nongovernmental organizations, and thus, represented a 
new relationship between the state and social groups. However, while my study analyzed the 
interactions between the campaign against domestic violence and the central government, I 
found one phenomenon worth further probing, namely, tensions between advocacy groups in the 
campaign and the state. 
This phenomenon demonstrated a double-faced state that agreed to and encouraged parts of 
the work of the campaign, while at the same time, imposing repressive boundaries on several 
advocacy groups involved in this campaign. Why has the campaign to introduce the issue of 
domestic violence into the political discourse in China been successful, while at the same time, 
several  of  the  women’s  organizations  involved in this campaign faced severe repression from the 
central  authorities?  What  strategies  were  used  by  women’s  organizations  that  have  allowed  them  
to survive and to develop their capabilities?  
My study argues that the answer of these questions lies in  activists’  strategic  interaction  
with the central authorities. Specifically, this research extends the theory of political opportunity 
and political constraint to analyze the results of each chosen strategy.  
According to Jack Goldstone and Charles Tilly,  political  opportunity  is  “the  [perceived]  
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probability  that  social  protest  actions  will  lead  to  success  in  achieving  a  desired  outcome”  (2001:  
182).  “Thus,  any  changes  that  shift  the  balance  of  political  and  economic  resources  between  a  
state and challengers,  that  weaken  a  state’s  ability  to  reward  its  followers  or  opponents  or  to  
pursue a coherent policy, or that shift domestic or outside support away from the regime, 
increases  opportunities”  (pp.  182-183). 
In this study, I use the idea of political opportunity to refer to the extended political space 
for social organizing by advocacy groups, which is a result of the chosen strategies of the 
organizers. Political constraint refers to the relative retrenched political space for social 
organizing by advocacy groups that resulted from their actions. 
By analyzing the resulting political space for advocacy groups, this study aims at explaining 
the idea of a confrontational movement in a repressive regime. I begin by considering two related 
pieces in the literature,  namely,  both  Chinese  and  Western  scholars’  discussions  of  possible  
political changes and state-social group relationship in China. 
While these two schools of scholars offer insight into the relationships between the state, 
the Party and social groups, they are both insufficient in providing the whole picture for 
understanding the negotiations and adaptive reactions between the state and advocacy groups. 
Instead,  I  argue  that  the  multiple  strategies  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  when  encountering  the  
repressive forces from the state demonstrate the necessity of reconsidering the applicability of 
the  terms  “confrontational”  and  “social  movement”  in  defining  ground-level observations in 
China. 
To present the challenge that advocacy groups in China bring to social movement theories, I 
begin by compiling a list of repressive experiences faced by advocacy groups to find out the 
boundaries set by the state for advocacy groups. After presenting a list of major interactions 
between advocacy groups and the state, I then evaluate four driving forces in shifting these 
boundaries,  namely,  ensuring  the  regime’s  legitimacy;;  cooperative  relationships  with  local  
governments; pressure from the international community, and funding from international donors.  
These discussions lead to the conclusion that advocacy groups do expand the boundaries 
that have been set by the central authorities. From here, I present four major struggles of 
advocacy  groups  and  further  analyze  the  results  of  the  organizers’  chosen  strategies  in  two  
dimensions, namely, the degree of autonomy and the degree of empowerment.  
The four major struggles that advocacy groups have experienced are: failing to gain 
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registration status, trying to build a relationship with the government; encountering political 
forces that marginalize self-mobilized groups, and facing the prohibition against confrontational 
movements. Each struggle and challenge can result in the dissolution of the organization.  
The sustainability of each organization demonstrates both the success of  the  organizers’  
chosen strategies and the adaptive attitude of the central government. I conclude from the facts 
that  there  exist  similarities  between  the  social  groups’  responses  toward  repressive  interference.  
However, even while facing similar interference, the organizers have to choose between 
increasing  their  organization’s  degree  of  autonomy  and  increasing  their  organization’s  degree  of  
empowerment.  
Even  though  organizers  choose  strategies  based  on  their  organization’s  stage  of  
development as well as  their  anticipation  of  the  government’s  response,  this  research  has  found  
that  organizers  looking  to  increase  their  organization’s  degree  of  empowerment  will  choose  a  
more  cooperative  strategy,  while  organizers  who  emphasize  their  organization’s  degree  of 
autonomy will pick a more confrontational strategy. To verify these assumptions, I examined the 
strategies of three groups in the campaign against domestic violence. 
The three organizations that I have studied, namely, The  Maple  Women’s  Psychological  
Counseling  Center  (hereafter  the  Maple  Center),  The  Peking  University  Women’s  Law  Studies  
&  Legal  Aid  Center  (hereafter,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center) and The Common Language, 
have all chosen different strategies to expand their political space for advocacy work. 
My study identifies five major actors who play a role affecting each available strategy, 
namely, the central authorities, the organizers, the local governments, the international 
community, and the media. Facing challenges from the governance system, organizers will 
choose to ally with different actors in order to transform these challenges into political 
opportunities. But sometimes, organizers may accidentally choose a strategy that leads to 
political constraint instead. 
Based on field research, I have concluded that the strategies of the organizers to expand 
their boundaries vis-a-vis the central authorities can be described as the process of interactive 
political liberalization. By way of conclusion and to further explain the idea of political 
liberalization, I designed a two-by-two matrix, which will be presented in Chapter 6, to describe 
the dynamic relationship between the advocacy groups and the state. 
In other words, my study argues that the survival and the sustainability of the advocacy 
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work of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  have  
demonstrated a confrontational movement that faces repressive interference from an 
authoritarian regime.  
Furthermore, since these three organizations all focus on gender issues, the process of 
political liberalization that they have been involved with refers to not only the policy field, but 
also to daily cultural life. Facing double-marginalizing forces from both the regime and the 
patriarchal system, the organizers have chosen strategies that have proven successful in creating 
their own public sphere. 
In addition to attempting theoretical dialogue, the most significant contribution of my 
analysis is documenting the strategy of each activist in negotiating and confronting the central 
government  for  her  organization’s  political  space.  As  the  second  gender  in  the  society,  the  
struggles of women activists have attracted less attention from scholars. My field research and 
analysis attempt to fill this gap in order to reach a better understanding of the state-social group 
relationship.   
 
Why Analyze the Relationship with the Central Government? 
There  are  three  reasons  why  an  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  three  women’s  
advocacy groups-the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center and Common Language- 
and  the  central  government  has  been  chosen  over  an  analysis  of  the  groups’  relationship  with  
local governments. First, even though these three advocacy groups are all based in Beijing, their 
organizing and advocacy work are nationwide, and as reported by the three founders, they have 
all encountered multiple instances of interference from the central government. 
Second, even though local governments have enjoyed much more autonomy after Deng 
Xiaoping took power in 1978, most decentralized decision making power is still restricted to the 
area of social issues, for example, education and pollution. The central party-state still controls 
the  boundaries  of  political  liberalization  in  China,  which  as  a  result,  affects  the  organizers’  
choices of strategies.  
When Teresa Wright compares the Chinese student movement in 1989 with the Taiwanese 
student  movement  in  1990,  she  finds  significant  similarity  in  that,  “In  both  China  and  Taiwan,  
the  students’  behavior  largely  reflected  the  political  environment they faced” (2001: 5). She 
specifies the role of the central authorities in this scenario.  
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“In  particular,  official  prohibition  against,  and  past  punishment  of,  anti-Party activities, coupled 
with official discrimination against the political activities of certain groups above other, exerted a 
profound  influence  on  student  behavior  in  each  instance.” (1999: 144) 
The comparison between the student movements in China and Taiwan is valid because both 
governments had single-party monopolization during that period of time. The similarity of 
regime type explains the similar reactions and calculations of the activists cross strait, which 
further indicates the powerful influence of a repressive authoritarian regime upon organizers of 
social movements. Therefore,  the  “political  space”  which  is  discussed  in  this  thesis  is  determined  
by the interaction between social groups and the central party-state. 
Third, when discussing state-society relations, one of the most crucial factors is the great 
desire of the central authority to maintain its legitimacy. Yongshun Cai has argued that the 
interest  in  retaining  the  regime’s  legitimacy  has  led  to  differentiation  in  the  behavior  of  the  
central  government  and  local  governments.  Cai  states,  “Legitimacy  is  about  the  political 
system’s  worthiness  to  be  recognized.  Given  that  the  central  government  is  mostly  responsible  
for the operation of the political system or it largely represents the regime, it has a greater 
interest  in  protecting  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  In  contrast, local officials in China are more 
concerned with policy implementation and task fulfillment (e.g., maintaining social stability) and 
local issues; legitimacy is not their main concern” (2010: 5-6). 
Based on field research, this study found that the organizers of these three advocacy groups 
also,  as  Cai’s  statement  indicates,  were  able  to  identify  the  local  public  policy  concerns  of  local  
governments. And the organizers were successful in building their relationships with local 
governments by providing suggestions and practical models for solving local needs. These 
connections with local governments help activists to advance their own leverage when dealing 
with the central government.  
Because establishing a working relationship with local governments not only helps social 
groups to expand the governmental boundaries for social organizing, but also provides 
opportunities for social groups to demonstrate their capabilities in public policy, this strategy has 
become one of the major approaches taken by social groups to enable them to survive and 
promote their own advocacy work. This strategy will be further examined in the following 
chapters. 
Therefore, my field research and interview data show that local governments seldom 
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intervene in the daily operations of these three advocacy groups since the organizers are viewed 
as helpers for designing and implementing local public policies. There were some incidents 
where  local  police  officers  paid  visits  to  the  organizers’  relatives,  but  for  the  most  part,  these  
visits were paid as responses to concerns from the central authorities. 
In  other  words,  my  research  agrees  with  Teresa  Wright’s  argument  that  single-party 
domination plays the most significant role in shifting the decisions of activists. Furthermore, my 
research also shares the observations of social movement theorists (Tarrow 1998, Goldstone and 
Tilly 2001, Meyer 2004) that the outcomes of social movements are the results of calculations 
from both the state and the organizers. 
 
The  Definition  of  “the  Central  Government”  in  this  Research 
The Chinese polity has been ruled through a dual party-state system, and the leadership of 
the  Communist  Party  of  China  is  written  into  the  Constitution  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China.  
Since there are dozens of state agencies in  the  Central  People’s  Government  and  party  
mechanisms  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China,  the  term  “central  government”  needs  to  be  
clarified.  
For most of my discussion, the identification of which governance mechanism is being 
analyzed will be made. But for some specific discussions about multiple forces which all play a 
role,  the  term  “central  government”  will  indicate  both  state  mechanisms  and  party  institutions.  
To be more specific, these governmental mechanisms include, on the one hand, the National 
Security Department, the Police Department, and the Bureau of Civil Affairs of State 
Mechanisms,  and  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  the  All  China  Women’s  Federation,  and  the  
Central Political and Legislative Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
 
Why Analyze  These  Three  Women’s  Groups 
There  are  two  major  reasons  why  my  study  has  chosen  to  analyze  the  Maple  Women’s  
Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language.  First  of  all,  these  three  
groups share some similarities. They are viewed as the first-established and leading groups of 
shared-goal organizations.  
The  second  similarity  is  that  these  three  groups’  activists  both  negotiate  their  advocacy  
space with the central government and collaborate with local governments to carry out their 
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organizational missions.  
Third and most significant, the founders and organizers have all experienced severe 
challenges from both the state and the society, and yet they have chosen to stay in the movement 
and find a way to continue their work. In other words, their double marginalized status makes 
these gender groups different from other social groups, which provides additional insight into 
expanding the meaning  of  “confrontational”  in social movement theories, both culturally and 
politically. 
The second reason that  I  choose  to  study  these  three  groups’  interactions  with  the  state  is  
because,  compared  to  other  social  groups,  the  interactions  between  women’s  advocacy  groups  
and  the  state  present  the  most  contradictory  picture.  On  the  one  hand,  these  women’s  advocacy 
groups  successfully  submitted  the  “Domestic  Violence  Prevention  and  Intervention  Law”,  which  
marked a milestone in the state-social group relations. Both the Maple Center and the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  were  leading  organizations  in  preparing  this  2003 legal proposition, and 
they were later joined by Common Language in 2006.  
On the other hand, these three groups have continued to suffer repressive interference, 
including the abolition of their registration status by the state, questioning by the police 
department, and having their activities cancelled by the police department. In addition, all three 
have faced funding issues. In China, raising public funds for self-organizing groups is forbidden, 
and only GONGOs can seek subsidies from the state. 
These conflict-laden  interactions  between  the  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  the  state  have  
helped me to observe the adaptive characteristic of both sides. And my research has found that 
only by understanding the adaptive characteristics of the state, can we possibly predict possible 
political changes in the future. 
There  is  some  research  that  argues  that  the  success  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  the  
campaign against domestic violence occurred because of the non-confrontational nature of the 
issue of domestic violence. In other words, some scholars argue that, compared to other social 
movements, the campaign against domestic violence was able to make some progress because 
this campaign did not challenge the regime. 
To  the  contrary,  my  study  found  that  women’s  advocacy groups in the campaign against 
domestic  violence  not  only  questioned  the  state’s  responsibility  in  dealing  with  domestic  
violence,  but  also  challenged  the  patriarchal  ideology  that  has  penetrated  people’s  daily  lives  for  
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thousands of years. Furthermore, my research has also argued that organizers choose 
non-confrontational-on-the-surface strategies purposely in order to achieve the goals of this 
movement. 
Here  is  a  brief  description  of  three  women’s  advocacy  groups.  The Maple Center was 
established by Wang Xinjuan and other founders in 1988. Its mission is to provide psychological 
counseling and social services to women, children and families in both urban and rural areas. In 
addition, the organizers carry out gender-centered research and policy advocating work. The 
Maple Center was the first grass-root  women’s  group  established  in  China  and  the  former  U.S.  
first  lady,  Hillary  Clinton,  asked  to  visit  its  center  during  her  presence  at  the  Fourth  Women’s  
Conference in Beijing in 1995.  
After Hillary Clinton failed  in  her  attempt,  the  Chinese  government  abolished  the  group’s  
registration status and also put pressure on the landlord not to continue renting the group office 
space. The Maple Center survived these difficulties and as of today, it has trained more than 300 
volunteers.  More  than  200  of  these  volunteers  answer  its  women’s  hotline,  a  hotline  that  provides  
services for women throughout China. 
The founder Wang Xinjuan, white haired, is a vibrant woman at her 80s. Based on my 
interviews with activists, most organizers join the Maple Center because they admire Wang 
Xinjuan’s  efforts.  Since  one  of  main  tasks  of  the  Maple  Center  is  to  provide  psychological  
counseling, most of the organizers are middle-aged and spoke softly with a smile during our 
conversations, even when they shared their experiences of repression.  
The  Peking  Women’s  Center  was established by Guo Jianmei and other founders in 1995 
and has  volunteer  lawyers  fighting  for  disadvantaged  women.  The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
has three major tasks, namely,  providing  legal  aid,  protecting  women’s  rights,  and  promoting  
gender equality. It is the first public interest organization in China that specializes in providing 
legal aid for women, and has represented thousands of cases in 26 provinces, and several of these 
cases were against the state. 
As with the Maple Center, the Peking  Women’s  Law  Center has faced pressure from the 
government. Its affiliation with Beijing University was ended in March 2010. This was the 
second time that Guo Jianmei and her team lost their organizational registration status because of 
interference from the central authorities. 
Most  of  the  activists  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  are  lawyers.  During  our  
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interviews, they always talked fast with a firm tone. One shared concern of these lawyers is how 
to reform the governmental mechanism, especially the legal system. Even when they shared their 
experiences of repression or their personal motivation to become public lawyers, they 
emphasized their urge to reform governmental institutions .  
The last of my case studies, Common Language (CL), which was established by Xu Bin in 
2005, is a young lesbian group, and public activities of lesbian groups are forbidden by the 
Chinese government. Common  Language  is  China’s  leading  LGBT  rights  organization. Based on 
its  website’s  statement,  “Through  community  mobilization,  public  education  and  legal  advocacy,  
Common Language is dedicated to raising public awareness of the issues of gender and sexual 
diversity, combating violence and discrimination against LGBT persons, and advocating for 
equal rights” (Tongyulala). 
As a lesbian group in Beijing, Common Language has encountered double marginalization 
status since its establishment. The stigma of homosexuality is still pervasive in the society. Many 
people in China still connect homosexuality with AIDS. Furthermore, institutional repression has 
reinforced the stigma of homosexuality. 
Most activists in Common Language are in their early 20s. During our interviews, I could 
strongly feel their enthusiasm for the lesbian movement, even though they did not learn about the 
idea of a social movement before joining Common Language. Since most of them are students, 
they  use  their  leisure  time  to  work  for  and  to  participate  in  Common  Language’s  activities. 
Unlike the older lesbian generation, most of them have come out of the closet, and have felt that 
they should the same civil rights as heterosexual people.  
In  conclusion,  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  share  the  following  four  similarities: 
doing nationwide advocacy work; facing repressive interference, enjoying international 
reputations, and being leaders within similar goal groups. 
A  comparison  of  the  groups’  strategies  to  prevent  domestic  violence  has  been  chosen  for  
two reasons. First, the problem of domestic  violence  is  severe  and  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  
have made significant progress in bringing awareness of the issue to the state. Second, each of 
my case studies has chosen a different approach, namely, social service, awareness-awakening 
work, and alignment, in their campaigns against domestic violence. 
In fact, since the Chinese government hosted the Fourth United Nations World Conference 
on Women, as well as the accompanying Non-governmental Organization Forum in 1995 
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(hereafter the 1995 UN women’s  conference),  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  has  made  
significant progress.  
Even though there is an impression that leaders of the Communist Party of China, as 
Marxists, should pay a lot of attention to issues of gender equality, paternalism still penetrates 
people’s  daily  lives.  And  most  people  regard  domestic  violence  as  dirty laundry (a private family 
matter) and  won’t  discuss  it. 
My field research has found that there were only a few organizers who had heard the term 
“domestic  violence”  before  the  hosting  of  the  1995  UN  women’s  conference.  People  used  to  call  
this  kind  of  incident,  “husband  and  wife  bit  each  other”  in  China.    
As Wang Xingjuan recalled during our interview, a representative from the All China 
Women’s  Federation  (hereafter  ACWF), which is a mass organization representing all women in 
China, lashed out at Wang Xingjuan for hosting a NGO forum to discuss domestic violence 
issues. These delegates argued that incidents of domestic violence did not exist in China. 
Women’s  groups  were awakened to the seriousness of the issue of domestic violence during 
the  Fourth  Women’s  Conference.  (Zhang,  2009)  Since  then,  women’s  groups  have  made  
significant progress in forcing the state to recognize the issue of domestic violence. In April 
2009, the ACWF released a survey showing that 30 percent of the 27 billion families in China 
suffer from domestic violence. This is one piece of evidence that demonstrates the rising 
attention of the Party towards domestic violence issues. 
Before awakening the Party’s  attention  to  this  issue,  the  central  government  had  only  once  
paid attention to this issue. During the process of the revision of marriage law, the Standing 
Committee  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  announced  on  April,  28,  2001  that  domestic  
violence is prohibited and that the victims of domestic violence will be granted a divorce. 
However, there was no punishment for violation of this rule. 
Another sign of progress was the above-mentioned  success  of  women’s  groups  in  
submitting a national legal proposition to the NPC. This represented a new relationship between 
the state and social groups. Since 2012, the NPC has had on its working agenda the design of a 
law to prevent incidents of domestic violence. Moreover, there are more than ninety provinces 
and cities that have passed their own laws to prevent domestic violence incidents (ACWF’s 
Website). 
Recognition by both the central and local governments marks the achievement of the 
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campaign against domestic violence in expanding the political space of women’s  groups,  both  
culturally and institutionally. My research will further analyze the strategies used to break down 
the public/private division, as well as the provision of institutionalized social services that were 
traditionally viewed as family matters in China. 
 
The Causal Mechanism of Expanding Political Space 
The main argument of this research is that by a calculated choosing of their strategies when 
facing  repressive  interference  from  the  central  government,  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  
in Beijing have not only found a way to survive, but have also further expanded their political 
space for social organizing. My research describes the results of the strategies of the organizers 
in expanding their boundaries vis-a-vis the central government as the process of interactive 
political liberalization. 
Based on field research and interviews, my study has concluded that there are four driving 
forces  in  shifting  these  boundaries,  namely,  the  central  government’s  need  to  ensure  the  regime’s  
legitimacy; the NGOs’  cooperative  relationships  with  local  governments;;  the  NGOs’  
relationships  with  international  organizations  and  actors,  and  the  NGOs’  funding  from  
international donors. 
Moreover, there are two major considerations organizers face when picking the strategies 
available  to  them.  The  first  one  is  the  organizers’  anticipation  of  government  response.  The  
organizers  learn  from  both  the  experiences  of  other  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  from  the  
organizers’  personal  encounters  with  the  governance  system.    
The second consideration, which is also one of the major focuses of my research, is the 
developmental stage of the different organizations. My study evaluates organizational 
development stages from two dimensions, namely, the degree of empowerment and the degree of 
autonomy. 
In this research, the degree of empowerment is evaluated by the organizational ability to 
participate in the policy-making process. This dimension can include the following perspectives: 
establishing a professional reputation, gaining more popular support, generating attention from 
the media, and making connections with other social groups and funders nationally and 
internationally. 
Furthermore,  this  research  project  applies  Howell’s  definition  of  autonomous  to  define  the  
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degree of autonomy. According to Howell, an organization is autonomous if it meets the 
following conditions: first, it is able to set its own goals, determine its own priorities, and decide 
its own structures and principles of organization; second, it is able to appoint its own personnel 
and recruit its own members; third, it relies primarily on its own source of funding. (Jude 
Howell, 2000. p. 127) 
In addition to considering the anticipation of government reaction as well as the 
organizational development stage, my study also identifies five major actors who have influence 
on both how many strategies are available and on which strategy is chosen. These five actors are 
the activists, the central government, the local government, the media, and the international 
community. 
Based on field research and an evaluation of all the above-mentioned factors, my study has 
concluded  that  there  exist  two  causal  mechanisms  to  describe  the  organizers’  efforts  in  
expanding political space. The following is a description of the first mechanism. When an 
organization encounters repressive interference, the first step the organizer will choose is a way 
to survive. 
At this stage, the founders and the organizers will use all the connections they have, 
including connections with the central government, the local governments, the media, and the 
international community. After saving the daily operations, the founders and organizers will 
work on its capacity-building. 
In this research, capability-building is defined to include gaining more popular support, 
raising more funds, increasing recruitment, generating attention from the media, and making 
connections with other social groups and funders nationally and internationally. At this stage, the 
above-mentioned four actors also play important roles. 
For the three organizations that I have studied, after building their organizational 
capabilities, the founders and organizers further work on their organizational degree of autonomy 
in advocacy work. Conducting conferences, holding press conferences, speaking out in the 
media, running public events and public educational programs are some of the various strategies 
used to promote their advocacy work. 
It is also at this stage when the founders and organizers put effort into their advocacy work 
that they will again encounter repressive interference from the governance system. Since the 
organizers have developed manifold strategies to deal with interference, they will sometimes 
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successfully carry out their advocacy projects, but sometimes, they will fail in their efforts and 
have to cancel their original plans. And so, a new cycle of interactive struggle will begin. This 
causal mechanism is diagramed as below.  
 
Figure 1.1. The  Causal  Mechanism  of  Activists’  Reaction  after  Facing  Interference 
 
 
While the first causal mechanism tells us the reactions of the organizers and the central 
government  toward  the  other  side’s  actions,  the  second  causal  mechanism  emphasizes  how the 
development strategies of different organizers can result in the choice of different strategies. 
Here is the description of the second causal mechanism.  
First of all, my research has found that even though the three organizations that I have 
studied  are  at  different  developmental  stages,  there  exists  a  similarity  between  the  organizers’  
responses toward repressive interference. These similarities are results of two factors. The first 
factor is that there may only be one specific reaction that may be available for the organizers to 
choose. For example, when policemen show up at an organizational public event and refuse 
further communication, the organizers can only choose to end the event. 
The second factor is that the organizers learn from their own past encounters with the 
central  government  or  from  other  organizers’  experiences,  and  know  that  one  specific strategy 
will be the best choice to help carry out their mission.  
However, my research has found that there exist differences among the similarities. That is, 
facing similar interference, the organizers will make a choice between increasing the 
organization’s  degree  of  autonomy  and  increasing  the  organization’s  degree  of  empowerment.  
This  research  has  concluded  that  in  order  to  increase  the  organization’s  degree  of  empowerment,  
the organizers will choose a more cooperative strategy, while, when organizers emphasize their 
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organization’s  degree  of  autonomy,  they  will  pick  a  more  confrontational  strategy. 
In other words, the main consideration of the organizers for each chosen strategy is to 
sustain their own organizations and to further carry on their advocacy work. Confrontational or 
cooperative strategies are evaluated according to the best interests of their organizations. The 
organizers are not afraid to challenge the central government, but they will act only if they can 
ensure the survival of their organizations. I will argue that the attitude of the organizers redefines 
the  definition  of  “confrontational”  in  evaluating  the  existence  of  a  social  movement. 
Furthermore, based on historical analyses, my study is able to find a causal relationship 
between political opportunity or constraint and each chosen strategy. However, one point worth 
noting is that any event can create both political opportunity and constraint at the same time. The 
result depends on the strategies of social groups in utilizing those events. This causal mechanism 
is diagramed below. 
















It is worth noting is that each struggle and challenge can result in the dissolution of the 
organization. This is the main reason why my research has argued that the dynamical strategies 
of  organizers  have  redefined  the  word  “confrontational”  when  we  try  to  evaluate  a  social  
movement under a repressive regime. 
My research has  also  found  that  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  will  push  f  their  
advocacy strategies to increase their organizational degree of autonomy after they have ensured 
their  organization’s  survival.  In  other  words,  the  founders  and  organizers  have  carried out a 
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Noteworthy is the counterpart of this process of interactive political liberalization, namely, 
the central government. My research found that even though the central government does not 
trust advocacy groups and has made every effort to force these groups out of existence, there is 
one characteristic of the central government that works to the advantage of the process of 
interactive political liberalization. 
This characteristic is the adaptive nature of the central government. My research has 
concluded that the sustainability of each organization demonstrates both the success of the 
organizers’  chosen  strategies  and  the  adaptive  attitude  of  the  central  government.  Indeed,  the  
adaptive characteristic of the central government has had an impact on both results. 
On the one hand, this adaptive characteristic makes the central government easily adjust 
their repressive interference. My research has confirmed that officials of the central government 
will learn from their encounters with these advocacy groups and will then develop new strategies 
aimed at causing these groups to disband by themselves.  
Citing funding issue as an example, the governmental regulation only allows registered 
NGOs to seek public donations. Therefore, most advocacy groups that fail to register rely on 
international funding. However, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
promulgated the Circular of the SAFE on Relevant Issues Concerning the Administration of 
Donations in Foreign Exchange by Domestic Institutions on Dec. 30, 2009. This new act allows 
the central government to monitor every instance of international funding, which will be 
explained more on Chapter 3. 
On the other hand, this learning process also enhances the understanding of some officials 
about social groups, and most significantly, the central government has learned to identify and 
differentiate between different goal-oriented groups. Social groups are categorized by their 
functions and their goals.  
My research has observed the gradual increase of NGO-friendly bureaucrats within the 
government. I interviewed several of them. The shared experience of these officials in building 
partnerships  with  women’s  advocacy  groups  is  that  they  first  participated  in  training  programs 
that  were  hosted  by  women’s  advocacy  groups.  Then  these  officers  worked  with  women’s  
advocacy groups through some projects and became more sympathy regarding the struggles of 
women’s  advocacy  groups.  This  increased  interaction  has  helped  the  organizers  of women’s  
advocacy groups to have more alternative strategies to consider using in their relationship with 
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the central government. 
In addition, the attempts of the central government to categorize groups provide another 
advantage  for  women’s  advocacy  groups. That is, providing public goods and social services has 
allowed  women’s  advocacy  groups  to  establish  relationships  with  the  state  and  the  society.  This  
strategy will be further examined in the following chapters. 
A final observation is that the similarity of chosen strategies indicates that the boundary of 
the central government has become clearer, and therefore the possibility of extending this 
boundary has also become clearer. My research will further explain this process of interactive 
political liberation  by  comparing  the  different  strategies  employed  by  these  three  women’s  
groups in both their interaction with the state and in their campaigns against domestic violence. 
 
The Study 
The  empirical  context  of  this  study  is  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  Beijing. To give a 
foundation for our inquiry, the study opens with a general introduction of the relationship 
between the central government and social groups within the context of the dramatic social 
changes brought about by the economic opening in 1978. 
We observed a wave of emergence of social groups in the 1980s. Compared to other social 
groups,  the  uniqueness  of  women’s  groups  was  that  most  non-governmental  women’s  organizing  
was  in  the  form  of  women’s  study  centers  at  colleges.  The  only  grass-root  women’s  group that 
was established in 1988 was the Maple Center.  
Hence,  most  participants  in  women’s  organizing  during  that  period  of  time were middle 
class  scholars  at  the  universities.  It  was  only  after  China’s  hosting  of  the  United  Nations  Fourth  
World Conference  on  Women  that  we  witnessed  a  new  wave  of  women’s  grass-root organizing. 
It  was  also  this  world  conference  that  introduced  the  Western  term  “Non-governmental 
Organization”  (NGO)  to  the  women  organizers. 
Another  significant  difference  between  women’s  advocacy groups and other social groups 
is the progress organizers have made in the social policy field. After many years of effort, 
women’s  groups  have  been  included  in  the  policy-making process, even though repressive 
interference has continued. Explaining the  dynamic  interactions  between  women’s  advocacy  




I have collected data during a series of field trips I took to China from 2008 to 2013, as well 
as from my observations as a participant and coordinator of The Cross-Straits Network to 
Prevent Domestic Violence. This network was initiated by me when I was the organizer at the 
Garden of Hope Foundation, Taiwan, and was joined by the Maple Center, the Peking Women’s  
Law Center, The Network of Anti-Domestic Violence in China, and other three organizations in 
Hong Kong. 
I  interviewed  43  major  participants  of  women’s  and  lesbian  organizing,  including  founders,  
activists, academic experts, governmental officers, and ministerial officers of ACWF and local 
women’s  federations.  Along  with  archive  analysis,  and  my  participatory  observations  during  
seven conferences in Beijing, Taipei, New York and Manchester from 2008 to 2013, my study 
looks specifically at the campaign against domestic violence from 1988 to 2013.  
This research has conducted process-tracing analyses from 1988 to 2012 for two reasons. 
First, the Chinese regime began its economic liberalization in 1978, and since then, economic 
growth has brought the Western  idea  of  civil  society  to  China.  Second,  the  first  women’s  
grass-root organization, one of my case studies, the Maple Center, was established in 1988. This 
research has also documented the process of social liberalization during this period of time. 
The initial  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  understand  the  role  of  women’s  groups  in  shifting  
the dynamic political space when negotiating with the central government. In addition to 
providing the reality of ground observations and aiming to redefine several evaluations of social 
movements in China, my research also argues that the mobilization of advocacy groups should 
be considered when discussing possible political changes in China. 
As  Florini,  Lai  and  Tan  point  out,  “such  societal  organizing  is  key  to  understanding  China’s  
political future. How it develops will help to determine whether China develops the building 
blocks  that  could  make  a  meaningful  democracy  function  well” (2012: 89). Furthermore, a 
comparison  between  how  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  other  social groups each interact with 
the central government provides unique information for scholars who want to understand the 
possible political future of China. 
According  to  Margaret  Woo,  “women  arguably  make  up  the  subgroup  of  the  Chinese  
population with the most ambiguous relationship to the Chinese state” (2002: 309). My research 
has  a  similar  observation  regarding  the  relationship  between  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  the  
central government. This is one of the main inquiries of this study. 
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My research applies the process-tracing method to find the causal mechanisms behind the 
process of interactive political liberalization. The process-tracing method is an interactive 
process and assumes that each factor plays a particular role in the causal relationship. This 
approach helps to identify (1) the sequence of events and (2) perceptions of key actors in 
supporting or invalidating my causal assertions. 
Here is one example of how I conducted the process-tracing method to find out the causal 
mechanism of the organizers’  chosen  strategies.  One  of  the  common  struggles  of  the  three  
organizations that I studied was their inability to attain official registration status. This was one 
strict boundary that the government established in order to control the autonomy of social 
groups. However, social groups have developed various ways of obtaining formal status, for 
example,  registering  as  a  people’s-run-non-enterprise unit2.  
According to the Article 2 of the Provisional Regulations for the Registration 
Administration of People-Run non-Enterprise Units,  
“The  people-run non-enterprise units referred to in these Regulations mean enterprise 
institutions, societies and other social forces as well as social organizations established with 
non-state-owned assets by individual citizens for non-profit  social  services.” 
This regulation was announced on October 25, 1998 by the State Council. 1998 was also the 
year  when  the  central  government  employed  the  “dual  registration  system”  in  a  much  stricter  
revision  of  the  “Regulations  on  the  Registration  and  Management  of  Social  Organizations.”  In  
chapter three, I will explain in detail the significant decrease of the number of registered social 
groups after the implementation of this regulation. 
All three organizations that I studied are registered  as  people’s-run-non-enterprise units 
(hereafter private units). This makes me wonder why organizers have made this decision. After 
conducting the process-tracing method, my research concluded that the main reason is that this 
was the only choice available for maintaining the credibility of a social group when encountering 
repressive interference. 
Citing  the  experience  of  the  Maple  Center  as  an  example,  as  the  first  women’s  grass-root 
NGO  in  China,  it  struggled  for  a  long  time  before  other  women’s  NGOs  were established. As a 
result, the founder of the Maple Center, Wang Xingjuan, learned to pull many strings to help her 
organization survive.  
                                                 
2 This term is translated by the Chinese government and refers to the private unit. 
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The  Maple  Center  was  named  the  Women’s  Research  Institute  when  it  was  established  in  
1988 under the sponsorship of the China Academy of Management Science. It experienced the 
loss of its registration status in 1996 when the sponsorship was unexpectedly ended. This loss 
was  abrupt  since  the  Women’s  Research  Institute  had  maintained  a  good  relationship  with  the  
central government. 
Before  the  establishment  of  the  Women’s  Research  Institute,  Wang  Xingjuan  was  the  chief  
editor of Beijing Publisher Inc. She observed the emergence of the marginalization of women 
caused by the policy of economic opening, and decided to form a social group in order to 
discover solutions to this nuanced social issue. 
In  other  words,  the  mission  of  the  Women’s  Research  Institute  was  not  to  challenge  the  
state, but to provide supportive functions for the central government. In addition to its benign 
task,  the  Women’s  Research  Institute  also  enjoyed  the  connections  of  Wang  Xingjuan  within  
both the central government and the Party. 
However, it was also these two advantages that led to the loss of its registration status. 
Because of the good connection with the governments, the Maple Center was able to register as 
an  NGO  and  won  the  reputation  as  the  first  women’s  grass-root organization in China. This 
reputation  attracted  the  attention  of  the  U.S.  First  Lady  Hillary  Clinton.  Since  the  Women’s  
Research Institute won its reputation, Hillary Clinton asked to pay a visit to it during her 
participation in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. 
In chapter three, I have documented more details about the negotiations with the state 
regarding this attempted visit. In the end, Hillary Clinton was not able to pay this visit, and the 
Women’s  Research  Institute  lost  its  organizational  sponsorship  with  the  Academy  of  
Management  Science.  Then  came  Wang  Xingjuan’s  long  fight  to regain the  organization’s  
registration. 
Here  is  a  brief  description  of  the  organizers’  struggle.  The  organization  was  not  allowed  to  
register in Beijing. Wang Xingjuan decided to go to a village that is outside of Beijing to 
register. Moreover, Wang Xingjuan was afraid that the local government would recognize her, so 
she asked her father to register for her. However, all these struggles failed, and the only choice 
left was to register as a private unit. 
This story was one example of the use of my process-tracing method. The significance of 
this study is that it includes an in-depth  longitudinal  observation  of  the  women’s  movement  in  
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Beijing. I have obscured the identities of my interviewees; no real names have been used, except 
for  the  three  founders  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center, and the Common 
Language. The founders asked to be identified by their real names. 
The theoretical arguments developed in this dissertation are not intended to account for all 
activist groups in China, but to draw attention to the interactions between women’s  advocacy  
groups in Beijing and the central government, and the dynamic reality of political boundaries in 
ways  that  improve  our  understanding  of  adaptive  strategies  of  both  women’s  advocacy  groups  
and the central government. 
My research argues that women’s  and  lesbian  groups  are  one  of  the  major  forces  in  the  
process of liberalization of political space, since signal events may result in both political 
opportunity and constraints for self-organizing groups. As an example, the hosting of the 1995 
UN women’s  conference  has  created,  on  the  one  hand,  political  opportunity  for  women to 
organize. For  example,  Guo  Jianmei  stated  that  her  founding  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center was inspired by this conference. On the other hand, hosting the conference also resulted 
in political threats for already established organizations. The patronized registration status of the 
Maple Center was revoked in 1996, after the attempted visit of Hillary Clinton during this 
conference.  
In conclusion, the survival and the political space for advocacy work depend on the chosen 
strategy  of  women’s  and  lesbian  groups  when  facing  interference  from  the  central  authorities.  
Based  on  the  experiences  of  women’s  and  lesbian  groups  in  authoritarian  China,  this  research  
will prove the necessity of revising the traditional definition of a social movement, which has 
long argued for the importance of confrontational performance.  
My  study  argues  that  the  efforts  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  to  survive  and  carry  on  their  
advocacy work should be viewed as a confrontation movement in the context of a repressive 
regime. To be clear, the definition of a confrontational movement I discuss here is different from 
the one in the social movement school. According to the school of social movement, one of the 
major characteristics of a confrontation movement is contentious action. However, my study 
suggests  that  we  must  take  the  regime  type  into  consideration  and  argues  that  women’s  advocacy  
groups in China have created different kind of contentious movement that  I  call  “soft  
confrontation.” 
When  political  space  does  not  exist  before  social  organizing,  women’s  advocacy  groups  
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have had to first deal with the issue of their survival. And with great determination, the founders 
and  organizers  of  women’s  advocacy  groups have developed various strategies to expand their 
own political space. Along with the adaptive authoritarian regime, we can observe the process of 
interactive political liberalization. In the following chapters, we see the vivid strategies of the 
women’s  advocacy  groups  in  Beijing  in  redefining  our  understanding  of  the  word  
“confrontational”  in  social  movement  theories.    
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is arranged topically following the idea of interactive political 
liberalization. By  analyzing  the  activists’  negotiations  with  the  state,  Chapter  1  explains  the  
necessity to redefine the confrontational characteristic of a social movement in a repressive 
regime,  which  should  be  defined  by  the  survival  strategies  of  women’s  activists.  Most 
importantly, the adaptive characteristic of the authoritarian regime presents equal weight as the 
activists’  strategies  in  the  process  of  interactive  political  liberalization. 
The two causal mechanisms of the process of interactive political liberalization are 
presented in Chapter 1, and are discussed in the previous sections. These two causal mechanisms 
focus  on  the  actions  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  when  facing  repressive  interference  from  the  
government. Along with these two causal mechanisms, and governments’  evolving  strategies  
construct the process of the interactive political liberalization.  
Chapter 2 situates my study with one major theoretical school, namely, the discussions of 
changing state-societal relationships, especially in authoritarian regimes. The following three 
related  theoretical  frameworks  are  applied  to  analyze  the  confrontational  movement  of  women’s  
advocacy  groups:  institutionalization  versus  political  efficacy  in  explaining  women’s  groups’  
participation in the public policy area; a study of the relationship between the state, the political 
party and social groups in China; and a study of redefining the concept of the public sphere. 
Chapter  3  chronologically  documents  the  interactions  of  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  
with the state,  and  further  encapsulates  the  four  driving  factors  in  shifting  the  state’s  boundaries  
in  order  to  buttress  this  study’s  major  argument,  that  the  term  state  corporatism  is  insufficient  in  
explaining the state-social group relationship in China. These four  levers  in  shifting  the  state’s  
boundaries  are  the  central  government’s  need  to  ensure  the  regime’s  legitimacy;;  the  NGOs’  
cooperative  relationships  with  local  governments;;  the  NGOs’  relationships  with  international  
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organizations  and  actors;;  and  the  NGOs’  funding from international donors. 
Chapter  4  studies  the  four  major  struggles  of  women’s  advocacy  groups,  namely,  failure  to  
gain registration status, difficulties in building a relationship with the government; encountering 
political forces that marginalize self-mobilized groups, and facing the prohibition against 
confrontational  movements.  For  each  struggle,  women’s  activists  have  developed  three  to  four  
strategies to maintain their organizational survival and to further expand their organizational 
political space. My study argues that these movements redefine the characteristics of 
confrontation. 
My  study  has  observed  that  the  ability  of  activists  to  apply  the  “  kill  two  birds  with  one  
stone”  tactic  to  initiate  the  process  of  interactive  political  liberalization. Chapter 4 presents the 
major  achievement  of  the  activists’  confrontational  movement,  that,  activists  have  successfully  
raised  both  issues  and  the  organizations’  visibility  to  the  public.  This  achievement  is  significant  
considering the marginalized status  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  gender  issues  in  the  whole  
society. 
Chapter  5  compares  the  strategies  of  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  that  I  studied  in  
the campaign against domestic violence. It reveals the causal mechanism of the consideration of 
issues  of  women’s  activists  when  deciding  their  strategies  in  negotiating  political  space  with  the  
state.  Activists  will  choose  a  more  cooperative  strategy  if  the  organization’s  priority  is  to  
increase the degree of its autonomy, but will choose a confrontational strategy if the 
organization’s  aim  is  to  increase  the  degree  of  its  empowerment. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the campaign against domestic violence has successfully altered 
societal and governmental perspectives regarding domestic violence issues.  Women’s  activists  
have  witnessed  changes  in  the  legal  system  and  in  local  governments.  Furthermore,  women’s  
advocacy groups have been included in the public policy making process, a precedent experience 
for  most  women’s  activists. 
The conclusion summarizes the major findings of my study and presents a two by two 
matrix to explain the idea of interactive political liberalization. Chapter 6 points out that both 
women’s  advocacy  groups  and  the  government  learn  from  each  interaction  with  each  other.  In  
other words, my field trip has observed several governmental officials have grown more 
understanding  toward  women’s  advocacy  groups,  while  at  the  same  time,  some  governmental  
officials have developed new administrative tactics to govern NGOs. This chapter also discusses 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Why  have  women’s  advocacy  groups  successfully  expanded  their  organizational  political  
space? How does this expansion by women activists shape the state-social group relationship? 
Will the changes in the state-social group dynamic have an impact on future political changes in 
China? 
Existing theories provide insightful perspectives in answering these questions. Many studies 
look at the adaptive attitude of the central government in dealing with societal discontent, and 
conclude  that  the  term  “state  corporatism”  is  the  most  appropriate  term  to  describe  this  
state-social group relationship. Others have argued that activists’  framing  strategy  has  played  the  
key role in confronting the central government.  
Based  on  my  studies  of  three  women’s  advocacy  groups,  namely,  the  Maple  Women’s  
Psychological  Counseling  Center  (the  Maple  Center);;  the  Peking  University  Women’s  Law 
Studies  &  Legal  Aid  Center  (the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center),  and  Common  Language,  a  
lesbian/gay rights advocacy group, I argue that although current scholarship has touched upon 
several important aspects in explaining the dynamics between the state and social groups, the 
strategies  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  have  not  been  subjected  to  theoretical  examination.    
Furthermore, my research has found that, when analyzing social movements, the word 
“confrontational”  needs  to  be  redefined  in  the  context  of  a  repressive regime, and that the idea of 
“interactive  political  liberalization”  is  a  more  accurate  description  of  the  relationship  between  
women’s  advocacy  groups  and  the  state.    
My research follows the thoughts of one major theoretical school, which is the discussions 
of changing state-societal relationships, especially in authoritarian regimes. In the following 
sections, I will present three related theoretical frameworks: institutionalization versus political 
efficacy  in  explaining  women’s  groups’  participation in the public policy area; a study of the 
relationship between the state, the political party and social groups in China; and a study of 
redefining the concept of the public sphere. 
My theoretical focus is based on three major findings in my field research. First, the vivid 
strategies  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  have  
sustainably expanded the political space for social organizing, and this has presented us with a 
new understanding of the changing state-social group relationship.  
This  new  understanding  moves  beyond  the  idea  of  the  “state  corporatist”  model,  which  has  
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been the common term used by most scholars when analyzing state-social group relations in 
China. In other words, the trial and error strategies of these  three  women’s  groups  have  not  only  
sustained the survival of each organization, but have also challenged the assumed dominant role 
of the state when evaluating the state-societal relationships in an authoritarian regime.  
Second, the interactions between  these  three  women’s  groups  and  the  different  central  
authority mechanisms have aroused my curiosity regarding the process before the emergence of 
social movements. Because, although in most social movement discussions, the existence of 
political space for social organizing is assumed, this situation cannot be assumed in state-societal 
relations in China.  
The  experiences  of  women’s  groups  in  China  demonstrate  the  need  to  revisit  this  
assumption,  since  most  of  the  women’s  activists  in  China  have  put  most of their efforts into 
creating organizational political space. Furthermore, social movement theorists need to move 
beyond looking at contentious collective actions when analyzing the forms and contents of social 
movements in China.    
My analyses show that the daily struggle of activists demonstrates a different kind of 
confrontational characteristics as a way to present contentious actions in a repressive regime. 
Furthermore, every strategic movement of the activists is preparation for future confrontation. 
According  to  McAdam,  “a  movement  represents  a  continuous  process from generation to 
decline, rather than a discrete series of developmental stages” (1999: 36).  
Based on interviews and field observations, this research concludes that without confronting 
the constraints of social organizing, there is no way against the possibility of the destruction of 
advocacy groups. In other words, an examination of the continuing struggle of the three 
organizations that I have studied has proved that social groups face an endless process of 
establishing and maintaining political space for their advocacy work. 
In  addition,  by  raising  awareness  about  domestic  violence  issues,  these  three  women’s  
groups have also demonstrated the efforts of women activists to redefine the idea of public 
issues, and thus, present another angle to the discussion of the public sphere. This discussion of 
expanding the public sphere will be the third theoretical focus. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Substantive Focus 
This research project will conduct its analyses on the basis of four theoretical frameworks: 
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an analysis of possible political change in China; a discussion regarding the political process 
before the emergence of a social movement within an authoritarian regime; a study of the 
relationship between the state, the political party and social groups in China; and a discussion of 
the public sphere. 
 
2.1. Analyses of Possible Political Changes from the Perspective of the State-Society 
Relationship in China 
Since the launching of economic reform in 1978, there has been a lot of debate about 
possible scenarios of political transformation in China. Andrew Nathan argues that the Chinese 
system  has  “authoritarian  resilience.”  Minxin  Pei  believes  the  gradual  approach  that  the  Chinese  
leaders have taken  has  caused  a  “trapped  transition”  for  China.  Zakaria (2003) brings up the idea 
about  China  being  a  liberal  authoritarian  regime.  Jiang  Zemin’s  report  at  the  16th Party Congress 
called  China  a  “socialist  democracy,”  and  a  “people’s  democratic  dictatorship.”3 In addition, 
there are some discussions that point out that the Chinese regime will collapse eventually (See 
for example, Gordon Chang, 2001). 
This research does not aim at reaching a conclusion or predicting the most likely scenario of 
the political transformation in China. Rather, one of its two main purposes is to examine changes 
in state-social group relations. This attempt is based on the point that Charles Tilly makes that 
both democratization and de-democratization consist of changes in the relationships between 
states and citizens (2007, p.12). Therefore, this research aims at understanding the changing 
dynamics of the state-social group relationship in China. 
There are two reasons behind this attempt. First, China presents a unique case in discussions 
of changing state-societal relationships. First of all, the governance system in China is composed 
of  the  Communist  Party  of  China,  the  Central  People’s  Government,  and  their  counterparts  in  
local governance systems. China is a single-party authoritarian regime, and its governance 
system is a dual system of party-state. Moreover, as one can see from the rankings of the 
Politburo and the wording of the Constitution, the party is leading the state.  
As a result, when analyzing relationships between the state and the society, the dual 
governance system in China necessitates a much more complicated examination. For instance, 
                                                 
3 Jiang  Zemin’s  Report  at  the  16th Party Congress, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml, accessed on Sep.25, 2012. 
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based on field observations, this research has found that sometimes local governments have 
become the leverage for social groups when in encounter challenges from the central authority 
agencies.  In  other  words,  several  local  governments  have  cooperated  with  women’s  advocacy  
groups to implement the designated program of activists for social justice. 
Most importantly, my analysis has found the adaptive characteristic of the current regime, 
which significantly affects state-social group relations. Citing the campaign against domestic 
violence  as  an  example,  even  though  the  central  government  suspects  that  several  women’s  
groups in this campaign have their own political agenda, the central government still chooses to 
include these groups in discussing domestic violence policies. 
The second reason for this attempt is to provide another perspective on the recent views of 
state-social group relations in China. Many research projects have concluded that the post-Mao 
reforms have had a profound impact on state-society relations (see for example, Solinger 1992; 
White 1996). However, most studies agree with the conclusion that the central authorities in 
China  have  maintained  a  “state  corporatist”  model  in  dealing  with  social  groups.  Citing  one  
example,  Florini,  Lai  and  Tan  argue  that  the  state  corporatist  model  is  a  model  “in  which  the  
state allows hierarchically ordered and controlled associations to play limited roles as a way to 
reconciling large number of divergent interests” (2012: p.95). 
However, based on the interviews and field observations, this research has found this 
argument to be insufficient. Instead, the strategic responses of women’s  activists  against  
governmental constraints have revealed an unprecedentedly dynamic relationship between the 
state and social groups.  
In the following section, I will first briefly present the definition of an authoritarian regime, 
which will be followed  a  short  discussion  of  regime’s  adaptive  characteristics  by  analyzing  its  
openness in the public policy field.   
 
2.1.1. The Definition of an Authoritarian Regime 
The term authoritarian was viewed as too widely applied, making it too difficult to develop a 
theory of authoritarianism. Juan Linz (1970) made the first effort toward defining authoritarian, 
and developed four key elements: 
1. Presence  of  “limited,  not  responsible,  political  pluralism.” (p.255-256) For Linz, this limited 
political pluralism is the most distinctive feature of authoritarianism. 
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2. Absence  of  “elaborate  and  guiding  ideology”  and  instead  “distinctive  mentalities.”  (p.  
255-258) 
3. Absence  of  intensive  “political  mobilization  throughout  most  of  a  regime’s  history.”  (p.  259) 
4. A  “leader  (or  occasionally a small group) exercise power within formally ill-defined limits 
but  actually  quite  predictable  ones”  (p.255) 
 
O’Donnell’s  1973  classic  work,  Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies 
in South American Politics,  used  Linz’s  definition  of  authoritarianism.  O’Donnell  distinguished  
three types of authoritarian regimes, namely, the traditional, the populist and the bureaucratic. 
Differing  from  Linz,  O’Donnell’s  typology  was  linked  to  levels  of  modernization  rather  than  
mobilization. Current research tends to distinguish authoritarian regimes by the locus of 
"despotic power" (Mann 1988). This generally leads to coding authoritarian governments into 
three types: personal, single party, and military (Geddes 1999a; Huntington 1991; Peceny et al. 
2002). 
Applying  the  same  “decisive  political  power”  focus,  and  combining  indicators  of  Banks  
(2002), Freedom House, and Polity IV, Hadenius and Teorell present 14 types of authoritarian 
regimes: multiparty traditional, partyless, dominant party, military multiparty, military 
traditional, rebel regime, military no-party, no-party traditional, military one-party, one-party 
traditional, one-party monarchy, traditional monarchy, no-party monarchy, and multiparty 
monarchy. According to the typology of Hadenius and Teorell, China is a one-party traditional 
authoritarian regime. 
 
2.1.2. The Openness in the Public Policy Area: Institutionalization or Political Efficacy?  
In the discussions of democratization, China represents a unique case. With the largest 
population in the world and its enormous economic growth, many political theorists have tried to 
analyze  the  Chinese  government’s  strategy  for  maintaining  social  stability. Of all these attempts, 
my research pays special attention to the dynamics of the state-social group relationship. 
Even  though  my  major  discussions  focus  on  the  strategies  of  women’s  activists  ,  my  
analyses have also found the crucial role played by the state, especially the adaptive 
characteristic of the current regime in shaping state-social group relations. My examination has 
observed  that  the  regime’s  adaptive  characteristic  has  shaped  the  forms  of  contention.       
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One  major  hypothesis  of  my  analyses  is  that  state’s  desire  to  maintain  its  regime  legitimacy  
has  been  leverage  for  women’s  advocacy groups in expanding organizational political space. 
Currently, the increased participation of NGOs in the public policy area has been observed.  
In  fact,  openness  in  the  public  policy  area  has  not  only  been  for  women’s  advocacy  groups.  
As Andrew Mertha (2009)  observes  “the  increasing  pluralization  of  the  policy-making process in 
authoritarian  China…  That  is,  otherwise  marginalized  officials,  non-governmental organizations 
and activists of all stripes have managed to wriggle their way into the policy-making process and 
even  help  shape  policy  outcome.”    
The next important question is how these social groups have been able to get involved in the 
public policy making process. My analyses have reached a similar observation as Andrew 
Mertha’s  statement  that  “previously-excluded members of the policy-making process in 
China…have  successfully  entered  the  political  process  precisely  by  adopting  strategies  necessary  
to work within the structural and procedural constraints of the fragmented authoritarianism 
framework.”  (p.996) 
The  openness  and  inclusion  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  the  public  policy  area  has  led  
to  my  next  question:  does  the  success  of  women’s  activists  demonstrate  the  institutionalization  of  
political inclusion in the public policy area, or is the success  the  result  of  the  state’s  political  
efficacy?  
Some  women’s  activists  have  pointed  out  that  including  NGOs  into  the  policy- making 
process is a strategy of the Chinese regime to construct a sense of political efficacy for 
maintaining its legitimacy. In The Voter Decides, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) described 
the  concept  of  political  efficacy  as  “the  feeling  that  political  and  social  change  is  possible,  and  
that  the  individual  citizen  can  play  a  part  in  bringing  about  this  change.”  (p.187)  My  interviews 
with  some  women’s  activists  indicate  their  suspicion  that  the  openness  in  the  public  policy  field  
is  part  of  the  state’s  governance  strategy  to  dissolve  societal  discontent.    
However,  other  women’s  activists  believe  that  inclusion  in  the  public  policy field is the 
beginning  of  the  institutionalization  of  activists’  demands  for  participating  in  the  policy-making 
process. In other words, China has begun its process of political modernization.   
Indeed, from the perspective of the institutionalization theory, providing channels for NGOs 
to be involved in the policy-making process is a strategic approach of the Chinese government to 
answer the discontent of people that has resulted from the policies of economic openness. The 
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institutionalization thesis points out that social mobilization and economic development lead to 
political instability; therefore, economic modernization requires the state to relax its grip over 
society and to devise mechanisms to incorporate the views of various groups.  
Huntington (1968) studied the role of institutions in modernization and stated that political 
stability  in  the  face  of  political  modernization  requires  political  development  measured  by  “the  
creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to 
absorb  and  to  order  expanding  participation.”  (p.315)  However,  the  main  foci  of  the  
modernization theory and the institutionalization thesis are their connection with 
democratization. There has been less research studying modernization and political institutions in 
authoritarian regimes.  
My analyses try to fill this gap by examining changes in state-social group relations after 
the openness of the public policy area to see if the central government has successfully 
maintained its legitimacy through this governance strategy, or if the openness represents the 
success  of  women’s  groups’  expansion  in  political  space. 
 
2.2. The Changing Dynamics of the State-Society Relationship in China: from the 
Perspectives of Political Opportunity Discussions 
Recently, there have been many additional studies that discuss how the state-society 
relationship influences the political mechanism, especially in local contexts. The study by Lily 
Tsai  is  an  example.  Lily  Tsai’s  2007  book,  Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups 
and Public Goods Provision in Rural China, analyzes the way that community solidarity groups 
hold government officials accountable.  
Her book presents a practice in which government officials are not held accountable by 
citizens through a democratic mechanism but “governmental  performance  and  public  goods  
provision  may  still  be  good  when  officials  are  embedded  in  what  I  call  ‘solidarity  
groups’—groups based not only on shared interests but also on shared moral obligations (2007: 
4).”  Her  analyses  prove  that  government  officials  can  still  be  subject  to  informal  rules  and  
norms,  instead  of  “elections,  government  audits, and other formal institutions” (2007: 4).  
Lily  Tsai’s  theory  is  in  line  with  the  argument  of  Gungwu  Wang.  Wang  has  studied the 
influence of Confucianism on the political culture in China and he states that the fundamental 
ideas  of  Confucianism  “are  together  as  a  hierarchy  of  reciprocal  relationships,  [and]  they  also  
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imply rights that flow from the duties performed” (2003: 24). For  example,  “the  ruler’s  right  to  
loyalty depends on his fulfilling his own duties of being filial to his parents and kindly towards 
his people” (2003: 24) Wang believes that the Confucian expectation of rulers is rooted in the 
political culture of China. 
The studies of Tsai and Wang point to a unique state-society relationship. If one applies the 
definition  of  Charles  Tilly  that  by  “judging  the  degree  of  democracy,  we  assess  the  extent  to  
which the state behaves in conformity to the expressed demands of its citizens” (2007: 13), one 
can conclude that the responsiveness of some local governments has helped the central 
government  to  maintain  regime  stability  because  the  government  has  responded  to  the  people’s  
needs. 
From the many different state-society relationships, my research project aims to analyze the 
relationship  between  the  state  and  women’s  groups  in  general,  and  also  specifically  in  the  
campaign  of  women’s  groups  against  domestic  violence.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this  choice.    
First, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women that was hosted by China in 1995, made 
significant changes in the state-society  relationship.  As  Liu  Bohong  states,  “The  hosting  of  the  
Women’s Conference  was  the  historical  moment  for  the  development  of  women’s  NGOs  in  
China. It was due to this conference that the concept of NGO was introduced to China” (2001: 
142. See also Jin 2001; Howell 2000). One  of  my  case  studies,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center, 
was founded because of this conference. 
However, the affiliated registration status of another of my case study organizations, the 
Maple Center, was revoked in 1995. This abolishment was a result of interference from the 
central authority, and it was because of the attempted visit of the former U.S. first lady, Hillary 
Clinton,  during  the  UN  Fourth  Women’s  Forum.  In  other  words,  if  we  borrow  the  discussions  of  
political opportunity structure to examine the 1995 UN Conference, we would conclude that this 
event created both political opportunity and political constraints for women’s  organizing. 
To  be  more  specific,  the  host  of  the  UN  Forth  Women’s  Forum  created  a  political  
opportunity  for  activists  to  establish  women’s  organizations;;  however,  at  the  same  time,  this  
hosting also resulted in political threats to already established organizations in China. The 
definitions of political opportunity and threats are borrowed from the school of political 
opportunity  structure.  According  to  Goldstone  and  Tilly,  opportunity  is  “any  changes  that  shift  
the balance of political and economic resources between a state and challengers, or that shift 
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domestic or outside support away from the regime, increases opportunities” (2001: 182-183).  
Furthermore,  this  research  applies  Tarrow’s  definition  of  threats,  “which  are  often  seen  as  
only  the  ‘flip  side’  of  opportunities,  but  are  actually  analytically  distinct.  Threats  relates  to  the  
risks and costs of action or inaction, rather than the prospect of success” (2011: 183). This 
research  aims  at  studying  the  impact  of  the  1995  UN  conference  on  women’s  organizing in 
China. 
Second,  as  previously  mentioned,  women’s  groups  have  successfully  submitted  the  first  
legal proposition, which was presented by NGOs to the central legislative organ. This marks a 
new relationship between the state and social groups, and also implies possible political changes.  
Similarly, my research will borrow the theory of political opportunity structure to examine 
this preliminary success of advocacy work. The main question that will be asked is if this success 
of  women’s  organizing is a result of political opportunity or threat? Moreover, this research will 
analyze  the  impacts  of  different  strategies  chosen  by  women’s  groups  in  this  law-making 
campaign. 
In addition, this research will examine the interaction between my cases and local 
governments. Since the mid-1990s, and especially since 2002, many local governments have 
established domestic violence prevention acts. According to news reports, as of January 2010, 
there were 27 provinces that had passed domestic violence prevention acts and have set up 
institutions to deal with domestic violence. Two of my cases, namely, the Maple Center and the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  have  set  up  a  partnership  with  different  local  governments.  The  
responses of local governments toward domestic violence issues correspond to the theory of 
Huntington. 
Huntington’s  theory  states  that  political  stability  in  the  face  of  political  modernization  
requires  political  development,  measured  by  “the  creation  of  political  institutions  sufficiently  
adaptable, complex,  autonomous,  and  coherent  to  absorb  and  to  order”  expanding  participation 
(1968, p4, 47,55,89,315). My research will examine if the new institutions on the local levels for 
preventing domestic violence have some implications for the political development of China. 
 
2.2.1. Arguments concerning the Relationship between the State and the Social Groups in 
China 
As China has sustained high levels of economic development in recent years, there have 
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been a number of discussions regarding the influence of economic development on the 
state-society  relationship.  Feng  Xu  argues  that  even  though  China  “is  not  a  liberal  democracy,  it  
increasingly uses neo-liberal ways to govern” (2009: 55). The neo-liberal policy provides 
positive conditions for economic performance at  “minimum  economic  and  social-political cost” 
(2009: 55). 
Baogang He points out that economic reform not only has encouraged the development of 
the private sector, but has also created new problems of social control (1997: 8). As a result, the 
relationship  between  the  state  and  social  groups  has  changed.  As  Dorothy  Solinger  puts  it,  “what  
follows  in  the  wake  of  China’s  economic  reforms  is  not  so  much  the  separation  of  state and 
society,  but  their  ‘merger’” (1992: 4).  
Discussions of state-social group relationships divide these relationships into three topics, 
namely, social groups are strictly controlled by the state, the state and party corporatism theory, 
and a discussion of empowerment of social groups.  
My research aims to present findings that connect to this last group. This group of studies 
argues that social groups have developed their own strategies for participating in the 
decision-making process with the government. The following section will first present some 
statements of these three research groups.  
 
2.2.1.1. Social Groups are Strictly Controlled by the State 
One group of scholars believes that the Chinese regime has strongly controlled social 
groups.  As  an  example,  Jude  Howell  points  out  “the  role  of  the  state  in  actively  sponsoring  social  
organisations. As a result, the autonomy of particular organisations varies while the overall 
autonomy of this intermediary sphere is curtailed” (1998: 174). 
One type of control requires all registered NGOs to become GONGOs. According to the 
“Regulations  on  the  Registration  and  Management  of  Social  Organizations”  which  was  passed  in  
draft form in 1989 and was revised in its final version in 1998, if a social group wants to register 
as a NGO, it is required to have a sponsor from a government department.  
Moreover, as Da-hua  Yang  observed,  “in  order  to  ensure  monopoly  of  representation for 
state-sanctioned groups, ‘similar’ organisations are not allowed to exist at the same 
administrative level” (2004: 5). Yiyi Lu calls  it  a  “dual  management  system” (2007: 174). In 
Lu’s  article,  the  author  cites  the  closing  of  an  association  for  parents  of  autistic  children  as  an  
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example  of  the  state’s  control.  As  Lu  states,  popular  NGOs  lose  “their  autonomy  or  even  their  
own identity because of their fear of state retribution for operating outside its orbit” (2007: 201). 
The three organizations I study have all experienced repression from the central authorities. 
As a result of repression, the Maple Center lost its patronized registration status under The China 
Academy of Management Science in 1995. Under the threat of being invited to have tea with the 
security  department,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  faced  difficulties  recruiting  lawyers  from  
1998 to 2000. As for Common Language, LGBTI groups are not allowed to register as NGOs in 
China.  
In her article, Xiaopei He described an incident of queer-friendly participants of the UN 
Fourth  Women’s  Conference.  Activists  in  the  Chinese  queer  movement  hosted  a  gathering  
during the 1995 UN Conference, inviting foreign and domestic activists to get together. 
However,  “that  evening,  the  disco  was  full  of  plain-clothes and military police. Afterwards, Wu 
Chungsheng (the organizer of this gathering) was detained” (2001: 43). Even today, public 
activities of LGBTI groups are forbidden. 
However,  women’s  activists  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  
Common Language, all found ways to interact with the central authorities and empower 
themselves to gain political space and to advance their position, as can be seen in my two by two 
matrix in Chapter 6. My analyses will examine their strategies when facing repression from the 
central authorities. 
 
2.2.1.2. State and Political Party Corporatism 
The second group of discussions, which is the mainstream point of view of scholars, is that 
state corporatism is the major strategy that has been used by the state in dealing with social 
groups in order to maintain stability in China. The following section presents discussions of both 
embeddedness of the political party and state corporatism. 
  
2.2.1.2.1. The Communist Party of China Embeddedness 
In discussing the Chinese case, it is especially important to discuss the relationship between 
the political party and social groups. The leadership of the Communist Party of China (hereafter 
CCP) is written into the Constitution of China. The major role that will be discussed in my 
research is that of the Central Politics and Law Commission of the Communist Party of China.  
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This Commission is responsible for all political and legal affairs, and most importantly, it 
controls the police force. Based on the interviews and field observation, this research has 
concluded the important role of this Commission in state-social groups relations. 
There is a lot of research regarding the relationship between the CCP and social groups. 
According to Tony Saich, CCP is a Leninist party, and the Leninist party has a natural fear of 
organizational pluralism. In fact, the Leninist party views pluralism of social groups as creating 
potential for social unrest, and is thus concerned that pluralism will foster an opposition party 
(2000: 127).  As  senior  CCP  leaders  state,  “this  is  no  free-for-all for society to organize itself to 
articulate its interests” (2000: 126). 
My next question is: which strategies are applied by the CCP to maintain state control over 
social groups? Bruce Dickson provides a thorough analysis and presents the corporatist approach 
as a new institutional arrangement that the CCP has created to link the state and society (2003, 
83).  Based  on  Dickson’s  analysis, the CCP has adopted two strategies: the cooptation of new 
members and the creation of new links with outside organizations (2000-2001, 538-539). 
One  prominent  characteristic  of  the  CCP’s  strategy  is  that  the  CCP  “is  co-opting only those 
from the non-critical realm” (Dickson 2003, 27). Using this framework, Unger and Chan found 
out  that  industrial  unions  and  peasant  associations  all  served  as  “transmission  belts”  to  carry  out  
the orders of the state (1995, 37). Based on interviews and field observations, this research has 
concluded  that  women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  have  grasped  the  
opportunity  to  be  “transmission  belts”  for  the  local  governments.    
This chosen strategy has allowed activists to respond to the needs of domestic violence 
victims, and at the same time, to enhance their own capacity-building for their organizations. 
One  piece  of  evidence  is  that  two  of  my  three  cases,  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center, partnered with local branches of All China Women’s  Federation  during  the  creation  
of  institutions  to  prevent  domestic  violence.  The  All  China  Women’s  Federation  was  established  
by the Communist Party of China to be one of the mass organizations. 
 
2.2.1.2.2. State Corporatism 
Most studies agree that state corporatism is the best description of the relationship between 
the state and social groups in China. As Da-hua  Yang  states,  “The  model  most  often  invoked  to  
explain the current arrangement is that of state corporatism. According to this interpretation, the 
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current arrangement exemplifies a corporatist structure imposed by the state upon society in an 
effort to pre-empt the emergence of autonomous interest groups” (2004, 6) 
There are several strategies of state corporatism that are discussed by scholars. One strategy 
is to regulate the functions of social groups. Jonathan Unger states that until the mid to late 
1990s, only intellectual, enterprise and professional associations were able to have input by 
members (2008, 10). Now the operation of associations depends upon the nature of their 
functions.  Unger  points  out  that  the  government’s  “Guideline  for  the  Development  of  Charities”,  
“stresses  the  positive  role  that  purely  charitable  associations  can  play  in  augmenting  China’s  
welfare  system” (2008, 11). 
Henry Rowen (2007) also notes that different social groups receive different treatment by 
the state. He points out that under the same monitor, health organizations, education groups, 
environmental protection groups, and organizations for disabled people enjoy more de facto 
leeway. Rowen further analyzes the reason behind the tolerance of the state, namely, the benefit 
that these groups bring to the state since they are helping the state to solve problems. By contrast, 
“groups  that  focus  on  human  rights  and  cultivate foreign ties have suffered increasing official 
harassment over the past two years” (Rowen 2007). 
Another strategy incorporates social groups by restricting their registration status. Both 
Bruce Dickson (2003) and Tony Saich point out that the 1998 “Regulations  on  the  Registration  
and  Management  of  Social  Organizations”  is  a  clear  example  of  the  governmental  attempt  “to  
incorporate social organizations more closely with existing party-state structures” (2000, 129).  
A study of Merle Goldman concludes that,  “most  of  China’s  growing  business  and  
professional communities in the late twentieth century were co-opted into the official 
establishment” (2005, 228). David Wank explains that a corporatist order emerged when the 
state created new organizations to control the new groups. The state nurtures peak associations in 
ways that buttress the power of government agencies that have jurisdiction over social groups 
(1998, 71). 
Based  on  these  studies,  my  research  will  analyze  the  different  paths  three  women’s  
advocacy groups have taken to build their capabilities under state corporatism. As Lu Zhang 
stated,  “In  the  Chinese  context,  the  state  is  a  crucial  influence  on  the  Chinese  women’s  
movement” (2009, 70). Nevertheless,  it  was  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  that introduced the 
term  ‘violence  against  women’  to  the  Chinese  state’s  policy  discourses” (Lu 2009, 70). 
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Women’s  groups  not  only  bring  the  attention  of  the  government  to  the  issue  of  domestic  
violence, but also partner with local governance systems in combating domestic violence. Based 
on field observations, this research has found that this cooperation with local governance systems 
has  helped  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  have  studied  to  expand  their  own  political  space  for  
women’s  organizing  and  advocacy  work.  
This  finding  corresponds  to  Baogang  He’s  argument  is  that  “the  government  now  relies  on  
social organizations to exercise effective social control, while social organizations draw on the 
power of the state to develop themselves” (1997, 9). Based on my analyses, local governments 
rely  on  the  effort  of  women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  to  learn  about  
domestic violence issues and to provide social services for victims.  
 
2.2.1.3. Empowerment of Social Groups  
The third group of studies holds a much more optimistic observation. Scholars indicate that 
many social organizations have been effective in negotiating with the state to influence the 
policy-making process or at least to bring key issues to the public domain.  
Based on interviews and field observation, my analysis has come to a similar conclusion as 
this group. More specifically, my analysis has found that there were two significant 
achievements  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  in  
the campaign  against  domestic  violence.  First,  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  have  
successfully raised awareness of political rights among their organizers and volunteers. Second, 
the  activists’  efforts  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  have  also  broken  the traditional 
view of domestic violence as a family matter. 
The first finding confirms the argument that the development of social groups will 
contribute to the process of political liberalization in the society. Gordon White sees the 
emergence of new associations as the first step in the development of civil society in as much as 
they involve the devolution of power away from the central state (1996, 203). 
Furthermore, Merle Goldman suggests that the growth of civil society will begin the process 
of constructing a democratic sense of citizenship and rights (2005, 67). Goldman notes that there 
is now a growing sense of political rights consciousness (2005, 2). Qiusha Ma also indicates that 
NGOs empower ordinary people by providing opportunities for participation in public affairs and 




In addition to the awareness of political rights, social groups also introduce many new 
perspectives on the traditional values of the society. As Alex Inkeles (1998) observes.  “[M]any  
fundamental values are being challenged and reformulated, basic human relationships are 
redefined and reordered, and numerous traditional ways of thinking and behaving are undergoing 
a great transformation.”    
Based on interviews and field observations, my analysis has concluded that the efforts of 
the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  have  resulted  in  
both changes in political rights and traditional values. The  activists’  achievement  has  been,  as  Lu  
Zhang  states,  to  force  the  state  to  recognize  domestic  violence  “as  a  legitimate  ‘women’s  
question’  and  to  introduce  the issue into public discourse” (2009, 70. See also Liu, 2001, 146).  
In addition, there is the wide variety of strategies used by social groups in interacting with 
the  state,  including  the  central  government,  local  governments  and  the  Communist  Party’s  proxy,  
Fulian  (Chinese  pinyin  of  All  China  Women’s  Federation).  As  mentioned  in  the  previous  
section, the Chinese state tolerates some social groups in order to bolster its authority. For 
example,  after  analyzing  a  peasants’  movement,  Jean  Oi  (2003) concludes  that,  “the  state  has  
made a conscious decision not to use its full coercive powers to stop demonstrations. The airing 
of peasant grievances has become an accepted part of local politics.”  
This de facto leeway provides an opportunity for social groups to build up their capabilities. 
In  his  analysis  of  rural  protests,  O’Brien  presents  the  strategies  of peasant activists and notes, 
“Savvy  ‘peasant  leaders’  have  been  quick  to  seize  opportunities,  and  in  some  instances  have  
expanded the size of openings, helping to nudge once-forbidden types of claims into the realm of 
the acceptable” (2009, 26).  
Here is  another  example.  Building  upon  the  “Fragmented  Authoritarianism”  paradigm,  
Andrew Mertha (2008) analyzes three campaigns that resisted the construction of various dams. 
These three campaigns occurred in the same region; however, the outcomes of these three 
campaigns were very different. Mertha uncovered the reason behind the success of the 
Dujiangyan  case,  namely,  that  the  resistance  focused  on  the  dam’s  adverse  effect  on  China’s  
“cultural  heritage.”  Mertha’s  study  also  shows  how  forces  outside  the  government can participate 
in the decision-making process. 
Based  on  interviews  and  field  observations,  my  analysis  has  concluded  that  women’s  
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groups in the campaign against domestic violence have also seized every opportunity to 
empower their organizational capabilities, especially when facing repression from the 
government.  The  activists’  interaction  with  the  state  has,  at  some  point,  changed  the  political  
mechanism, and this has led to the establishment of new institutions to combat domestic 
violence. The strategies of the women’s  activists  will  be  further  analyzed. 
 
2.3. Political Process before the Emergence of a Social Movement 
Social movement theories have focused on the appearance of contentious collective actions, 
and have developed three interpretive models, namely, the resources mobilization model, the 
framing process model, and the political opportunity model. However, these three schools have 
one common omission, namely, a discussion regarding political space in a repressive regime. 
In other words, most scholars assumed the existence of political space before the emergence 
of social movements. The important role of a repressive regime is ignored. Without a discussion 
of the existence of political space, most research only focuses on the actions of members and 
challengers upon the changing exterior and interior dynamics. Therefore, an analysis of the 
political space will be my first examination. 
This research aims to explore the political process of expanding political space by the 
efforts of social groups before the emergence of contentious collective actions. This research 
applies the definition of political space from Cheeseman Nicholas (2006). According to 
Nicholas, “the  concept  of  political  space  here  refers  to  the  arenas  within  which  political  actors 
engage  in  political  activities  in  the  absence  of  coercive  pressure.”  
The  focus  of  my  second  analysis  is  to  redefine  the  confrontational  characteristic  of  women’s  
advocacy groups, because, for most discussions regarding political space in China, the main 
focus has been on collective contentious action. For example, Cai Yongshun argues that 
“political  space  for  popular  contention  does  exist,”  and  “collective  resistance  has  remained  an  
important mode of political participation in China” (2010, 186&198).  
However, based on interviews and field observations, my analysis has found that the daily 
survival of advocacy groups has been a crucial confrontational demonstration that gradually 
challenges the repressive interference from the state. In other words, the political space for social 
organizing  has  become  a  priority  task  for  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  have  studied  to  fight  
for.  The  survival  of  women’s  advocacy  group  is  dependent  on  the  strategies  of  the  activists  in  
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responding  to  the  central  government’s  marginalizing forces. 
Therefore, the study of the strategies of advocacy groups in expanding their political spaces 
has become significant. This research believes that understanding the way that advocacy groups 
fight for the survival of their own political space will contribute to the discussions of possible 
political changes in China. This research plans to present the following two arguments. 
First, this study will verify the argument that political space needs to be created by 
advocacy groups in authoritarian regimes before the emergence of contentious collective actions 
is possible. Second, this study will demonstrate that a social movement is a continuing process, 
and therefore, the confrontational characteristic of a social movement needs to be redefined in a 
repressive regime.  
According  to  Tilly,  “Instead  of  a  short-run generation of strain, followed by protest, we find 
a long-run transformation of the structures of power and of collective action” (1975, 254). 
McAdam  also  maintains  that  “social  movements  are  an  ongoing  product,”  and  he  points  out  that  
this ongoing product results from the interaction between external and internal sets of factors 
(1999, 40).  Tilly  and  McAdam’s  arguments  point  to  the  second  purpose  of  my  research. 
Based on interviews and field research, this study has found that political space that are 
expanded  by  advocacy  groups  are  in  fact  the  result  of  the  organizers’  evolutionary  strategies.  
And  the  transmutation  of  the  organizers’  strategies  are  ongoing  revisions  that  are  learned  from 
each interaction with different central authorities.  
My  analysis  applies  the  model  of  political  opportunity  structure  to  examine  each  strategy’s  
chosen process. There is one point worth noting about this application, namely, that most of 
time, advocacy groups in China experience threats instead of opportunities when encountering 
interference from the central authorities. 
When the school of political opportunity structure analyzes the results of changes in 
political circumstances, theorists assign equal weight to opportunity and constraint. Both 
opportunity and threat are viewed as stimulants to contentious collective action. However, 
according  to  McAdam,  “over  the  years,  threat  has  given  way  to  opportunity  as  the  analytic  sine 
qua non of many social movement scholars” (1999, x). 
My  analysis  applies  Tarrow’s  definition  of  threats  that  was  discussed  in  the  previous  
section.  The  major  goal  of  this  study  of  women’s  organizing  in  China  is  to  examine  Tarrow’s  
argument  that,  “threats  relate  to  the  risks  and  costs of action or inaction, rather than the prospect 
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of success” (2011, 183).  
In  other  words,  instead  of  pursuing  policy  success,  the  major  challenge  of  women’s  
advocacy groups is to survive every threat against them from the central government because 
every threat can lead to the destruction of their groups. Based on interviews and field 
observations, this research has found that threats from central authorities leave advocacy groups 
without any other alternatives but to take action. This point will be further discussed in the 
following sections.  
At the end of this study, this research attempts to argue that the way advocacy groups fight 
against threat has demonstrated a new understanding of the definition of social movement. This 
attempt aims at bringing discussions with theorists who have argued that a social movement must 
include  contentious  collective  actions.  In  fact,  it  is  Tarrow  who  has  stated  that,  “But  all  are  part  
of the broader universe of contentious politics, which emerges, on the one hand, from within 
institutional politics, and can expand, on the other, into revolution” (2011, 7). 
In  other  words,  the  success  of  women’s  activists  in  maintaining  their  daily  organizational  
operations and strategies in expanding organizational political space have demonstrated a new 
form of confrontational movements. 
 
2.4. Expanding the Discussions of Public Sphere  
One  finding  of  my  analysis  is  that  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  
domestic violence have shifted the distinction between public and private spheres and 
successfully  increased  women’s  participation  in  political  affairs.  This  finding  confirms  Anne  
Phillip’s  statement  that,  “feminists  have  always  challenged,  and  will  continue  to  challenge  the  
way that particular divisions between the public and private secure the exclusion and oppression 
of women” (1993, 108-109). 
After interviewing Wang Xingjuan, the founder of the Maple Center, Virginia Cornue states 
that  the  establishment  of  a  women’s  hotline  at  the  Maple  Center  is  a  sign  of  women’s  “breaking 
new  social  ground.”  The Maple Center is also one of my case studies. And  Cornue’s  reasoning  
behind her argument is that the hotline of the Maple Center is the first one that was ever set up. 
Moreover,  this  effort  deals  with  “problems  women  face  from economic restructuring in the 
post-Mao era” (1999, 71). Following  Cornue’s  theory,  my  study further examines the way 
women’s  groups  construct  a  public  space  that  is  more  inclusive  and  diverse. 
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Habermas is the major theorist who initiated discussions of the public sphere. In his 
Structural Transformation, Habermas describes the growth and ultimate decomposition of a 
“bourgeois  public  sphere”  growing  out  of  mixed  class  crowds  at  London  coffee  houses  and  
Parisian salons. Habermas defines the public sphere as the  “sphere  of  private  people  [who] come 
together as a public” (1962, 27), and where citizens can have meaningful dialogue on topics of 
public interest. 
However,  Habermas’s  idea  of  a  public  sphere  has  faced  challenges  from  feminist  scholars.  
Iris Young criticizes  the  Enlightenment  concept  of  public  space  as  “exclusionary”  and  “too  
rounded  and  tame  an  ideal  of  public.”  Young  believed  that  Habermas’s  idea  of  public  space  is  
based on opposition between the public and private dimensions of human life. Differing with 
Habermas, Young presents an idea of a more heterogeneous public that includes the recognition 
of difference and would be more democratic (1987, 76).  
Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser and Iris Young have shifted the conceptual framework of the 
public sphere  to  one  that  is  more  flexible.  Both  Benhabib’s (1992) idea  of  “associational  public  
sphere”  and  Fraser’s  idea  of  “strong  publics”  describe  the  public  sphere  as  composed  of  multiple,  
alternative  publics.  Benhabib’s associational public sphere is composed of private people, and 
these publics sometimes struggle against state policy and sometimes work with the state to 
promote  certain  policies.  Fraser’s  “strong  publics”  function  in  both  opinion  formation  and  
decision-making (1997, 90).  
Since Confucianism emphasizes family roles and harmony in both family and society, it is 
especially  difficult  for  women’s  groups  to  raise  awareness  of  domestic  violence  and  to  construct  
a  public  space  for  women,  as  well  as  to  encourage  women’s  participation  in  discussions  of  
policies  to  prevent  domestic  violence.  However,  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  I  have  
studied,  joining  with  the  efforts  of  other  women’s  groups,  have  altered  this  situation  and  have  
successfully brought discussions of domestic violence into local communities. My research 







Chapter 3 : Shifting  the  State’s  Boundaries:  Experiences  from  Women’s  Social  Activist  
Groups 
 
My research reexamines the assumption of most social movement theories that political 
space for organizing exists before the formation of a social movement, and further argues that 
securing political space for social organizing should be regarded as one kind of confrontational 
act in an authoritarian regime. As part of this undertaking, this research project also presents the 
idea  of  “interactive  political  liberalization”  to  demonstrate  that  there  are  women’s  and  lesbian  
groups in China that go beyond the idea of state corporatism. 
Much of my dissertation is devoted to challenging the thesis of state corporatism, and it 
provides  documentation  of  the  confrontational  movement  of  women’s  advocacy  groups.  Since  
research  on  women’s  advocacy  groups  has  not  been  one  of  the  foci  of  the  school  of  social  
movement, this documentation makes a significant contribution to understanding the state-social 
group relationship in China,. My study has also gone beyond the existing materials and applied 
the research method of participatory observation for my field research. 
Two significant findings are presented in this chapter. First, there exist state boundaries 
regarding  the  political  space  for  social  organizing  of  advocacy  groups.  Secondly,  women’s  
advocacy groups have successfully expanded these boundaries. In other words, my research on 
three grass-root  women’s  organizations  has  found  lively  and  dynamic  relationships  between  
social groups and the state in China.  
 Of all the aspects of the state-social group relationship in China, the most important and yet 
least  understood  is  the  state’s  boundaries on the advocacy work of social groups. These 
boundaries  are  described  as  vague,  or  “a  grey  area.”  Indeed,  my  field  research  has  confirmed  that  
there are boundaries to the government in monitoring the activities of social groups. Furthermore, 
my research has found four factors that play significant roles in shifting these boundaries. These 
are: the legitimacy of the regime; cooperative relationship with local governments; pressure from 
the international community; and funding from international donors. 
In other words, interference from the government has continued; however, the social groups 
that I have studied have applied different strategies to resist these repressive forces. Sometimes, 
their efforts have failed, but sometimes they have successfully expanded their political space for 
advocacy work. Rather than emphasizing a one way reaction from either the central government 
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or a social group on the other side, the central question driving this chapter is as follows: what 
kind of interaction between the central government and a social group could result in expanding 
governmental boundaries for social organizing.  
Furthermore, why have the central authorities not chosen to crush these three organizations? 
There are several social organizations, which have disbanded after facing marginalizing forces 
from the government. As noted in Chapter 1, failure to register can have a significant influence 
on the operation of a social group. According to one news report, several social groups have had 
to disband their organizations since the organizers were unable to register because of 
governmental pressure (Iqilu News). 
Only by first addressing these questions can we begin to understand how these advocacy 
groups could survive in a repressive authoritarian regime and could continue carrying out their 
work  for  social  change.  As  emphasized  in  Chapter  1,  the  struggles  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  
have redefined the confrontational characteristic of social movements in the context of a 
repressive regime. My study has suggested the  term  “soft  confrontation”  as  a  better  description  
of the ground-level  movement  of  women’s  advocacy  groups. 
This  chapter  analyzes  the  confrontational  movement  of  three  women’s  advocacy  groups,  
namely,  the  Maple  Women’s  Psychological  Counseling  Center  (the Maple Center); the Peking 
University  Women’s  Law  Studies  &  Legal  Aid  Center  (the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center),  and  
Common Language, a lesbian/gay rights advocacy group. 
 The hypothesis of this chapter is that facing similar governmental interference, women’s  
groups can transfer this interference into political opportunity that allows them to develop their 
organizational capabilities4 and expand their political space. The dependent variable of this 
study  is  the  relationship  between  the  three  women’s  advocacy groups and the central government. 
The  independent  variable  is  the  interaction  between  these  three  women’s  groups  and  other  
institutions, including other mechanisms within the party, the local governments, the media, and 
international donors. By analyzing  each  move  of  the  three  organizations,  my  concept  of  “the  
boundaries  of  political  space”  is  introduced,  followed  by  an  examination  of  each  driving  force  in  
shifting these boundaries of the state. 
This chapter will first present a brief introduction of the changing state-social group 
                                                 
4 In this research, capability-building is defined as including gaining more popular support, raising more funds, 
increasing recruitment, generating attention from the media, and making connections with other social groups and 
funders nationally and internationally. 
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relationship  since  the  economic  opening  in  1978,  especially  the  emergence  of  women’s  
organizing.  Three  key  agents  in  affecting  the  women’s  movement  are  identified,  namely,  the  All  
China  Women’s  Federation  (hereafter,  ACWF),  the 1995 UN Conference, and the Ford 
Foundation. 
The  confrontational  movement  of  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  will  be  demonstrated  
by chronological documentation of the continuing harassment from the central government as 
well  as  the  organizers’  strategies of response, with an emphasis on how the organizers utilized 
four factors to increase their own leverage. 
 
3.1. The Changing State-Society Relationship and the Emergence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs)  
The year 1978 marked a milestone in the societal transformation of China. A series of 
economic reforms was launched that year which also had a significant political and social impact. 
Based  on  my  observations  during  field  research  and  interviews  with  the  organizers  of  women’s  
groups, the dissolving of state-owned enterprises and the decentralization of decision-making 
power on social issues expanded the political space for social organizing.  
The 1980s is the period of time in which we observed a wave of emergence of social groups. 
Most importantly, the aims of these groups were quite different from the purposes of traditional 
Chinese associations. In other words, these emerging social groups aimed at social change. 
According to an interviewee who was the ministerial officer at ACWF, “There  have  been  two 
waves  of  women’s  organizing  in  China.  The  first  movement  happened  during  the  80s.  Most  of  
the organizers at that time were feminist scholars. And  four  women’s  study  centers  were  
established before 1995. MWPCC was also established during this period of time, and was 
named WRI. The formation of these women study centers was the result of the impact of 
economic  reform.”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 16, 2009). 
Wang Xinjuan,  who  is  the  founder  of  the  Maple  Women’s  Psychological  Counseling  Center, 
and is in her 80s, explained  the  reason  why  she  wanted  to  form  a  women’s  group.  “WRI  was  
established in 1988. During that period of time, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang were still in 
power; therefore, the political circumstances were more open. And it was easier to register an 
NGO.  I  was  retired  and  found  that  there  was  no  institution  to  work  for  women’s  issues.  This  is  
the first reason that I wanted to form a social group. Secondly, because of policies of the State 
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Council, there were more and more laid-off female workers. Many female laid-off workers went 
back home and suffered discrimination in society. Some media reported suicides by these 
women. These reports raised my concern that the cost of social development was one generation 
of women”  (interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Sep. 10, 2010). 
Economically, the privatization of state-owned enterprise meant the dismantling of the iron 
rice bowl5, and as a result, more and more social problems appeared, such as an increase in the 
number of laid-off workers and a phenomenal jump in internal migration across the country. 
Facing  increasing  pressure  from  people’s  discontent,  the  central  authority  decentralized  a  certain  
degree of decision-making power to local governments in order to make local governments 
responsible for social stability. Based on my observations, this decentralization process also 
provided political opportunity for social organizing. 
Along  with  China’s  increased  openness  to  foreign  influence  in  the  economy,  the  Western  
idea of civil society has also been introduced to China. It was not until the late 1970s that NGOs 
were allowed to form in China (Florini, Lai and Tan, 2012, 16). The number of NGOs has 
increased dramatically after the launching of openness in 1978. According to statistics of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, as of the summer of 2012, there were 259,000 registered social 
organizations; 209,000 civil non-enterprise institutions, and 2,711 foundations.  
 
3.1.1. The Tension between the State and Social Groups 
The majority of registered social organizations are membership organizations (Ministry of 
Civil Affairs). In addition, the number of registered NGOs is far fewer than the estimated one, 
since the central authority has always been skeptical about the existence of NGOs. As Wang 
Xinjuan points out, “From  my  point  of  view,  the  reason  that  central  authorities  suspected  all  
NGOs was because the NGO was a new form of organization in China. The central authorities 
viewed all NGOs as threats to the regime” (interviewed by author, April 25, 2011).  
According  to  Tony  Saich,  “The natural Leninist tendency to thwart organizational plurality 
is compounded by the fear of the potential for social unrest and the opposition that the reforms 
have created. There has been a consistent fear that social organizations might become covers for 
                                                 
5 "Iron rice bowl" ( tiě  fàn  wǎn)  is  a Chinese term used to refer to an occupation with guaranteed job security, as 
well as steady income and benefits. The Chinese term can be compared to the similar (but not identical) English 
concept of a breadwinner with cradle to grave socialism. Traditionally, people considered to have iron rice bowls 
include military personnel, and members of the civil service, as well as employees of various state run enterprises 
(through the mechanism of the work unit). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_rice_bowl, accessed 2013/09/20. 
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groups engaging in political activities or to represent the interests of disgruntled workers and/or 
peasants” (2000, 126). 
The revised and much stricter regulations on NGOs in 1998 are one recent and good 
example of this concern. After the emergence of NGOs in the 90s, the central government 
promulgated a more efficient system to monitor NGOs, and required “re-registration”  for  all  
NGOs. According to the “Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations” which was passed in draft form in 1989 and was revised in its final version in 
1998, if a social group wants to register as a NGO, it is required to have a sponsor from a 
governmental ministry or a party affiliation. Furthermore, after obtaining the sponsorship, social 
groups need to seek approval from the local Civil Affairs Bureau. 
This dual registration system makes it difficult for social groups to register, and the 
requirement  for  “re-registration”  has  caused  some  NGOs  to  lose  their  registered  status.  As 
presented in the following table, 1998 was the first year that we observe a significant decrease of 
the number of registered social organizations, and the number continued to drop in the following 
three years. Moreover, 1999 was the first year that data on the registration of non-profit 
institutions could be seen by the public. The difficulty of registration has resulted in a huge 
number of NGOs in China whose legal status is vague.  
 
Table 3.1. Numbers  of  Different  Kinds  NGOs’  Registration  Status 
 





Number of Registered 
Non-enterprise 
Institutions 
 Number of 
Registered 
Foundations 
Before 1988 There  was  no  requirement  for  NGOs’  registration 
 
1988 4,446 4,446 None None 
1989 4,544 4,544 None None 
1990 10,855 10,855 None None 
1991 82,814 82,814 None None 
1992 154,502 154,502 None None 
1993 167,506 167,506 None None 
1994 174,060 174,060 None None 
1995 180,583 180,583 None None 
1996 184,821 184,821 None None 
1997 181,318 181,318 None None 
1998 165,600 165,600 None None 
1999 142,665 136,764 5,901 None 
2000 153,322 130,668 22,654 None 
2001 210,939 128,805 82,134 None 
2002 244,509 133,297 111,212 None 
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2003 266,612 144,167 124,491 954 
2004 289,432 153,359 135,181 892 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, National Administrative Bureau of Non-governmental Organizations 
http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/2201/20151/yjzlkindex.html 
 
As a result, most social groups have no better choice than to register as a for-profit 
enterprises. Some social groups manage to be sheltered under a government unit, a mass 
organization, or other social organization that has registered. In Chinese, this sheltered status is 
called gua kao, which means  “patronized  groups.”  As  of  2005,  it  is  estimated  that  there  are  three  
million NGOs in China, and a majority of them are not registered (Chan, Qiu and Zhu 2005, 
145). 
 
3.1.2. The Enhancement of Management and Control 
2005 was another challenging year for social groups. Because the central authority believed 
that  foreign  foundations  were  the  force  responsible  for  the  “Color  Revolutions”  in  Georgia,  
Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Ukraine, the central authority scrutinized foreign funding of social 
groups whose work focuses on human rights issues. 
Qi  Zhi’s (2005) statement  reveals  the  worries  of  the  Chinese  authority.  “[They]  disseminate  
propaganda about democracy and freedom, so as to foster pro-Western political forces and train 
the backbones for anti-government activities….All  that  the  NGOs  have  done  is  play  a  crucial  
role  in  both  the  start  and  final  success  of  the  ‘Color  Revolutions.’” 
The challenge was even worse in 2010. On Dec. 30, 2009, the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) promulgated the Circular of the SAFE on Relevant Issues Concerning 
the Administration of Donations in Foreign Exchange by Domestic Institutions. According to 
this new act, all NGOs that were foreign sponsored needed to open special bank accounts. And 
according to Article One of this  Act,  “Donations  in  foreign  exchange  by  domestic  institutions  
must be conducted in compliance with the laws and regulations and other relevant administrative 
rules of the Peoples Republic of China, and shall not be in violation of social morality, nor be 
detrimental  to  the  public  interest  and  legal  rights  and  interests  of  other  citizens.”  This  article  
provided the authorities with great power to decide whether foreign donations are acceptable or 
not. 
This new act is a serious challenge to the survival of advocacy groups, since, for most 
advocacy groups, if they fail to find governmental sponsorship, they also fail to register. Without 
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registration status, these advocacy groups are not allowed to conduct public fund-raising. Based 
on my field observations, these advocacy groups rely heavily on foreign donors. Facing 
increasing governmental interference with foreign sponsorship, the Maple Center, the Peking 
Women’s Law Center, and Common Language have found it is much tougher to maintain their 
daily operations. As an example, one interviewee from the Peking Women’s Law Center 
expressed,  “Sometimes,  I  worry  that  if  our  center  cannot  survive,  I  will  lose  my  job.”  And  also  a 
senior activist from Common Language said,  “There  are  not  many  foundations  that  will  support 
our  work;;  therefore,  I  worry  whether  our  organization  can  sustain  itself.” 
One additional point worth noting is that governmental scrutiny is mostly applied to 
advocacy groups. For most associational style groups and groups which provide social services, 
there is much less governmental interference. In fact, the central authority has publicly 
recognized the role of social groups in providing services. 
In  March  2011,  the  National  People’s  Congress  adopted  its  12th Five-Year Plan on 
Economic and Social Development. The main theme was social stability. This plan called for an 
increased role for social organizations in providing social services, while at the same time it 
allocated  more  funding  for  “upholding  stability,”  and  asked  for  more  effective  government 
supervision of social groups. These two policies seem to contradict each other. However, the 
seeming contradiction of the two policies reveals a more strategic attitude of the central authority 
in dealing with social groups. 
 Concerning the ambivalent situation of the authorities in their relationship with AIDS 
groups,  Florini,  Lai  and  Tan  point  out  “the  authorities  know  that  the  country  needs  organizations  
like  AIDS  Care  China  to  focus  on  China’s  enormous  social  and  environmental  problems….,  but  
they fear their potential capacity to organize politically in opposition to the existing system. As a 
result, social organizing is simultaneously permitted and constrained” (2012, 88-89). 
 
3.1.3. Beyond  the  Concept  of  “State  Corporatism”    
Many studies have applied  the  idea  of  “state  corporatism”  to  describe  the  relationship  
between the state and social groups. However, this study has found that the strategies of the three 
organizations that I have studied help organizations to avoid being compromised by the state. 
But, at the same time, the state also has categorized social groups and has developed various 
attitudes towards them in accordance with the categories it has defined. 
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In other words, the attitude of the central authority toward social groups is differentiated. It 
depends  on  the  scale  of  threat  that  social  groups  can  cause  to  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  On  the  one  
hand,  advocacy  groups  are  viewed  as  a  possible  force  in  challenging  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  On  
the other hand, the services provided by these groups  help  to  reduce  people’s  discontent,  and  are  
viewed  as  playing  a  supporting  role  in  maintaining  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  My  study  on  three  
women’s  organizations  has  found  that  the  organizers  have  strategically  combined  advocacy  
mission with service providing tasks, which give the organizers leverage when negotiating with 
the government.  
 
3.1.4. The Continuing Harassment Experiences 
However, this strategy of using the advantage of providing social services does not protect 
them from intervention by the government,  and  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center, and the Common Language have all experienced repression. Citing the issue of 
registration as an example, the Maple Center lost its registration status in 1995. The Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center’s  sponsorship relationship with Beijing University was revoked in 2010. 
As for the Common Language, advocacy groups for LGBTI rights are not allowed to register as 
NGOs in China.  
Registration is not the only challenge for these three groups. Inability to rent office space, 
difficulty raising funds, cancellation of events, and invitations to have tea with police offices as 
well as other examples have become routine challenges for these organizations. Furthermore, for 
these organizers, their physical safety has often been threatened. Here is one example. In her 
article, Xiaopei He described an incident of queer-friendly  participants  at  the  Fourth  Women’s  
Conference.  “That evening, the disco was full of plain-clothes and military police. Afterwards 
Wu Chungsheng,  “the  organizer  of this gathering, was detained” (2001, 43). Up to now, public 
activities of LGBTI groups have been forbidden. 
However, despite all these challenges, the three organizations that I have studied not only 
have found ways to interact with the central government, but have also found ways to empower 
themselves  to  gain  political  space  for  advocacy  groups.  The  organizers’  strategies  have  not  only  
increased  their  organizations’  degree  of  autonomy,  but  have  also  fueled  their  degree  of  




3.2. A  Brief  Introduction  to  the  Emergence  of  Women’s  Groups 
It  was  not  until  the  1980s  that  we  saw  a  resurgence  of  women’s  NGOs  organizing  in  China  
“both  within  and  beyond  the  established  framework  of  the  official  Women’s  Federations” (Judd 
2002, 4). However,  the  majority  of  these  organizations  were  women’s  studies  centers  in  colleges.  
It was only after 1995, when the central government hosted the official United Nations Fourth 
World Conference on Women and the NGO Forum in the Huairou district of Beijing, that one 
could observe the emergence of Chinese women organizing. 
According  to  an  interview  with  a  ministerial  officer  of  ACWF  (All  China  Women’s  
Federation), who is also among the few leaders of ACWF who pay attention to women’s  issues  
and  have  participated  in  women’s  organizing,  “There  was  a  wave  of  formations  of  women’s  
organizations  before  the  hosting  of  the  Fourth  UN  Women’s  Conference.  These  formations  were  
encouraged by the government because the parallel NGO forum was a routine arrangement for 
all  UN  Women’s  conferences,  and  at  that  time,  there  were  not  enough  women’s  NGOs. 
Therefore,  most  of  these  women’s  organizations  were  established  by  the  government  and  the  
party, and included the Association of Chinese Women Lawyers, the Association of Chinese 
Women  Procurators,  and  similar  organizations” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 24, 
2011). 
However,  she  further  explains,  “Most  women’s  associations  which  were  formed  by  the  
government after hosting the Fourth World Conference on Women did not pay attention to 
gender issues” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 24, 2011). It  was  other  women’s  
organizations  that  were  established  by  participants  in  the  UN  Women’s  Conference  that  
continued their efforts on women’s  issues.  For  example,  Guo  Jiamei,  the  founder  of  PUWLSLA,  
indicated in the interview that she was inspired by the discussions of this conference and made a 
decision to leave her government position and form a new organization.  
Guo attended this conference as a reporter for a governmental newspaper. She is a lawyer 
and is full of energy. Every time, when she recalled her experiences at this UN Conference, I 
could  still  feel  her  excitement.  She  told  me,  “I  was  amazed  by  all  the  talks  from  the  participants. 
I learned so many new things by participating at this conference. My original plan was to return 
home after the first day of interviewing. But I ended up staying there for the whole conference”. 
(interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Sep. 9, 2010). 
PUWLSLA  is  not  the  only  women’s  group  whose  founder  was  inspired  by  the  1995  women’s  
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conference.  Thus,  one  can  conclude  that  the  1995  UN  Women’s  Conference  played  an  important  
role  in  encouraging  the  establishment  of  women’s  organizations. 
 
3.2.1. Key Roles in  Women’s  Organizing:  ACWF,  The  1995  UN  Conference,  and  the  Ford  
Foundation 
In  fact,  when  discussing  the  development  of  women’s  groups  in  China,  there  are  three  
important  groups  and  events  that  must  be  considered.  They  are  the  All  China  Women’s  
Federation (hereafter, ACWF), the Fourth  Women’s  Conference,  and the Ford Foundation. The 
ACWF  is  the  premier  organization  in  the  field  of  women’s  issues.  The  ACWF is considered a 
“mass  organization”  and  is  funded  and  supervised  by  the  Communist Party of China.  
ACWF was established in 1957. But prior to 1949, the Communist Party had set up the All 
China  Democratic  Women’s  Federation  to  be  in  charge  of  women’s  mobilization.  The  task  of  
ACWF is to be a transmission belt of the Communist Party and is, at each level of the 
bureaucratic  system,  to  carry  out  the  Party’s  policies.  However,  to  be  a  transmission  belt  means  
that the main mission of the ACWF is to help the party to maintain social stability rather than to 
respond to the interests of women.  
Moreover, the staffs of ACWF are civil servants and are assigned by the Party. As Jude 
Howell  states,  “Since  its  resurrection  in  1978  ACWF  has  developed  extensive  roots,  with  
representation  down  to  the  village  level….It  has  full-time staff down to the civil level, all paid 
for and appointed by the state” (2000, 128).  
In  field  research,  I  have  observed  the  powerful  status  of  women’s  federations  in  villages.  In  
villages,  officers  of  these  women’s  federations  also  are  put  in  other  positions.  Therefore,  many  of  
them enjoy multiple resources to help women in need. I think this is why the Maple Center, the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  the  Common  Language  have  made  efforts  to  build  up  
different degrees of partnership with ACWF.  
The campaign against domestic violence works with ACWF  as  well  as  with  local  women’s  
federations. Furthermore, in some local areas, construction of new institutions to prevent 
domestic violence has depended on efforts by ACWF. As will be discussed in the following 
section, the relationship with ACWF has affected the degree of autonomy and empowerment of 
many  other  women’s  groups  besides  the  three  organizations  that  I  have  studied. 
However, ACWF is not the only group to consider when analyzing the changing dynamics 
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of state-society relationships in China. Based on interviews with organizers, the UN Fourth 
World Conference on Women played an important role in introducing the Western idea of 
NGOs6 to  Chinese  women.  Several  founders  of  women’s  organizations  pointed  out  that  they  did  
not  learn  the  term  “non-governmental  organization”  until  they  participated  in  the  UN  Fourth  
World Conference on Women. In fact, the idea of social organizing had been viewed as a threat 
to  the  regime’s  stability.  And  it  was  not  until  the  launch  of  economic  openness  in  1978  that  
Chinese society became much open to embracing some Western ideas, including the idea of civil 
society. 
As  Judd  points  out,  prior  to  the  1980s,  “there  has  been  little  in  the  way  of  an  independent  
women’s  movement,  since  the  ground  for  legitimately  organizing  in  the interest of women was 
occupied by  the  official  women’s  movement” (2002, 18) The  women’s  conference that was held 
in Beijing in 1995 was a milestone  in  the  development  of  women’s  groups  in  China.  As  Tamara  
Jacka  points  out,  “The  term  ‘non-governmental organization’  was  not  widely  used  in  China  until  
the Fourth World Conference on Women” (2006, 596).  
As previously discussed, when the Chinese government was granted the opportunity to host 
the  Fourth  Women’s  Conference,  more  women’s  groups  were  established  for the purpose of 
joining  the  NGO  Forum  at  the  Fourth  Women’s  Conference.  As  one  of  organizers  of  this  event,  a 
ministerial level officers of ACWF recalled  of  the  emergence  of  women’s  organizing  before  the  
Fourth  Women’s  Conference,  “At first, there were twenty-two NGO forums applied for by 
Chinese  associations,  but  in  the  end,  the  total  number  of  Chinese  women’s  NGO  forum  was  
forty-seven.  I  categorize  these  women’s  associations  which  were  formed  around  the1995  
Women’s  Forum  into  three  groups,  namely,  academic, service-oriented and 
friendship-associated” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 16, 2009). 
In addition, at the forums gender issues and terms were presented to the Chinese women 
and the forums inspired many of them to set up their own organizations. As Lu Zhang points out, 
it  was  this  conference  that  “brought domestic violence into local consciousness, and stimulated 
the  growth  of  a  group  of  women’s  NGOs” (2009, 68). Not only were gender issues introduced to 
Chinese women, but also women in China were introduced to the world.  
One interviewee of only a few activists who participated in the first wave of lesbian 
                                                 
6 Several organizers indicate that  they  prefer  not  to  use  the  term  “NGO”  because  this  term  will  be  misunderstood  as  
“anti-government.”  See  also  Spires  2011,  34. 
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organizing,  recalled  that,  “In  1995,  I  went  to  NYC  and  met  the  director  of  an  international  
lesbian foundation. She told me that they would give me money as long as I established a lesbian 
organization. I did not ask for the money because I thought the organizing work we were doing 
did not need money” (interview by author, July 16, 2012). 
A third important influence on Chinese women organizing has been the Ford Foundation, 
whose presence was approved of by Deng Xiaoping and that was introduced to Chinese women 
during the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. Since then, the Ford Foundation has funded 
a  number  of  women’s  groups  and  their  projects in China (Jacka 2006, 585). For example, one of 
organizations  that  I  studied,  the  Peking  University  Women’s  Law  Studies  &  Legal  Aid  Center  
(the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center),  was  set  up  because  the  founders  gained  financial  support  
from the Ford Foundation.  
Funding from the Ford Foundation played an important role during the early period of time 
when  newly  established  women’s  organizations  struggled  for  survival.  As  discussed  previously,  
only registered foundations are allowed to seek donations from the society.  Moreover,  it  wasn’t  
until 2011 that several local governments, for example Beijing, began to subsidize NGOs for 
their provision of public services.  
As  a  result  of  these  limitations,  seeking  external  funding  is  an  alternative  way  for  women’s  
groups  to  sustain  their  operations.  As  Lu  Zhang  points  out,  “One  of  Chinese  NGOs’  notable  
features is their considerable economic dependence on foreign donors, especially institutional 
ones” (2009, 78). In addition to their funding resources, training programs provided by foreign 
foundations  or  international  women’s  organizations  also  help  local  women’s  groups  to  build  up  
their capabilities. 
As for the campaign against domestic violence, funding by international donors supports the 
efforts  of  many  women’s  groups in  combating  domestic  violence.  As  Lu  Zhang  states,  “Many 
international  donors  in  China,  including  the  Ford  Foundation,  have  funded  women’s  NGOs  
generously to address the issue of gender violence, especially domestic violence” (2009, 79). The 
three organizations that I studied all gained financial support from the Ford Foundation for their 
domestic violence projects, and my research project examines the influence of this support on the 




3.3. Three Case Studies and their Relationships with the Central Authority 
The  three  organizations  that  I  studied  are  the  Maple  Women’s  Psychological  Counseling  
Center (the Maple Center, Beijing hongfeng funü xinli zixun fuwu zhongxin), which was founded 
in 1988; the Peking University  Women’s  Law  Studies  &  Legal  Aid  Center  (the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center, Beijing daxue falüxuexi funü falü yanjiu yu fuwu zhongxin ), which was established 
in 1995; and Common Language ( tong yu), which was organized in 2005. 
These three groups share some similarities. First of all, they are advocacy groups for 
women’s  rights  and  lesbians’  rights.  Second,  their  advocacy  and  mobilization  work  is  nationwide.  
And third, they constantly face repression from the authorities, such as the negation of their 
registration status, cancellation of their events, and interviews by the police and security 
departments. In addition, all three groups have faced the problem of raising funds and recruiting 
organizers because in China, raising public funds for self-organizing groups is forbidden, and 
only GONGOs can seek subsidies from the state. 
These difficult experiences made me wonder about their survival strategies. Also, how could 
they continue their advocacy work and why does the government allow these groups to exist at 
all? This research project aims to answer these questions by comparing the different strategies of 
these  three  women’s  groups  both  in  their  interaction  with  the  state  and  in  their  campaigns  against  
domestic violence. 
 
3.3.1. Case  One:  The  Maple  Women’s  Psychological Counseling Center (Beijing hongfeng 
funü xinli zixun fuwu zhongxin) 
By applying the process-tracing method, seven significant changes in relations between the 
authorities and the Maple Center can be identified. This study will explain these changes 
chronologically and will discuss them by using the model of political opportunity and political 
constraint. 
The predecessor of the Maple Center, Beijing, was the Women's Research Institute (WRI), 
China Academy of Management Science (zhong guan yuan). It was established in October 1988 
by Ms. Wang Xingjuan and a group of women intellectuals dedicated to women's issues. Most 
importantly,  it  was  the  first  grassroots  women’s  group  set  up  before  the  1990s. 
Wang Xingjuan, in her 80s, white-haired, is a vibrant woman who has influenced many 
women’s  activists.  One  organizer  in  a  remote  area  of  China  told  me,  “We  learned  the  way  of  
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women’s  organizing  by  observing the actions of Wang Xingjuan” (interviewed by author, China, 
April 21, 2013). Another activist who has  dedicated  herself  to  the  women’s  movement  for  more  
than  20  years,  stated,  “Whenever  I  see  Wang  Xingjuan  with  her  grey  hair,  and  still  working  so  
hard, I know I cannot stop my work” (interviewed by author, China, March 18, 2013). 
As discussed previously, dramatic social changes made Wang Xingjuan decide to form a 
social group for women. These social changes were the results of economic reforms that were 
launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. And in 1985 the central authority started further reforms of 
state-owned enterprises. During this period of time, state-owned enterprises began to lay off 
workers, and were no longer a safety net for workers. Women were the first group of victims of 
this new direction of the country.  
According to a WRI report in 1988, 70 percent of the laid-off workers were women. 
Observing the increase in the number of women who were forced to leave their jobs and to go 
back  home  to  household  work,  the  founders  of  WRI  decided  to  take  action  for  women’s  rights.  
Wang Xingjuan stated at the opening  ceremonies  for  the  WRI  in  1988,“Intense  social  
competition…[leads  us]  to  have  no  choice  but  to  recognize  that  our  sisters  who  are  independent  
enough to successfully adapt to the overwhelming challenges in the face of the competitive 
market are only a  fraction  of  those  who  are  struggling  to  survive….Therefore,  what  the  WRI  
strives towards is to help women gain their own rights, to develop their own abilities, and to not 
only adapt to, but also succeed in the face of the rapidly developing society” (Cornue 1999, 71). 
In other word, dramatic social changes created a political opportunity for WRI to organize. 
WRI provided the first hotline service in China, and its grass-root  work  for  women’s  issues  also  
gained recognition from the UN ECOSO. The WRI became  the  first  grassroots  women’s  NGO  to  
enjoy consultation status with the UN ECOSO. As a result, this research has concluded that WRI 
was able to increase its degree of its empowerment from 1988 to 1995.  
During this period of time, organizers gradually learned  how  to  build  WRI’s  capacities  such  
as fund-raising  activities,  while,  at  the  same  time,  WRI’s  activities  helped  it  to  build  up  its  
reputation internationally.  
 
3.3.1.1. Facing the first Repressive Force 
This international recognition also brought attention and interference from the Beijing City 
Political and Legislative Committee of the Communist Party of China, and caused WRI to lose 
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its registration status in 1996. During the time period of the UN Fourth World Conference on 
Women, many international organizations and international media sought to visit the WRI. The 
most famous figure was the former U.S. first lady, Hillary Clinton.  
However, this enthusiasm brought out the suspicions of the authorities. Wang Xingjuan 
recalled the pressure from the central authority at that time, “When  Hillary  Clinton  attempted  to  
visit our center, the pressure was enormous. The central authorities had doubts about our 
connections with foreign countries. I was told that this issue had been brought to Li Peng, prime 
minister from 1987 to 1998. Our deputy director was invited twice to the Zhongnanhai, which is 
the Communist Party headquarters. I did not think I did anything wrong. The central authorities 
also  couldn’t  find  any  wrongdoing  by  my  center.  They  just  kept  asking  why  Hillary Clinton 
requested to visit only your center”. (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 25, 2011.)   
“They  did  not  let  us  to  respond  to  the  request  from  Hillary  Clinton.  The  central  authorities  
told us to ask permission from the Foreign Affairs Department. However, when I asked the 
Foreign Affairs Department, they answered that they did not have any opinion about this issue 
because they did not view visiting our center as part of foreign affairs. In the end, Hillary Clinton 
did not visit our center. However, this incident has caused damage to our center. The central 
authorities mistrust us, and we lost our patronized registration connection. Even though the 
central authorities did not find any evidence to prove the center was a threat to the regime, the 
central authorities decided to let the center dissolve. But, how to dissolve the center? The central 
authorities asked the Institution (China Academy of Management Science) to revoke their 
sponsorship relation with us” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 25, 2011). 
In 1996, the China Academy of Management Science revoked its sponsorship of the WRI. 
After several failed attempts at re-registration, WRI was renamed the Maple Center and is 
currently registered as a people-run non-profit enterprise unit. Its abolished registration was only 
the beginning of challenges that the Maple Center has encountered.  
 
3.3.1.2. The Wave of Interference after the Revocation of Registration Status 
After the revocation of its registration status, the Maple Center continued to encounter more 
interference from the government. For example, finding office space has always been a tough 
task for organizers. Wang Xingjuan described the challenging situation, “Along  with  the  
revocation of registration status, our landlord also received a phone call and was asked to cease 
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the housing tenancy. We were kicked out by the landlord, and then we were unable to find 
another office space for a long time. It happened several times that we got a phone call from the 
landlord after signing the lease,  and  they  said  that  they  could  no  longer  rent  the  space  to  us”  
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 25, 2011). 
Examining the results of political opportunity and political constraint presented on the 
matrix, the revocation of the registration of WRI in 1996 marked a significant drop of its degree 
of autonomy. One point worth noting is that, contracting to the perspective that a registered NGO 
is controlled by the government, my field research has found that a registered NGO which aims 
for social change could benefit from legitimacy and protection of its sponsor institution (see also 
Saich 2000).  
This is the reason why this research considers registration status to be an important factor in 
determining the degree of autonomy and organization has.. Facing loss of registration status, the 
organizers of the Maple Center decided to focus on their capacity-building work. They adopted a 
strategy of seeking support from international donors.  
This strategy successfully helped the Maple Center to survive interference from the 
governance  system,  and  further  created  political  opportunity  for  the  Maple  Center’s  advocacy  
work. This strategy brought a significant change in 1998. Because Wang Xingjuan continued 
submitting proposals for international funding and because organizers of the Maple Center 
carried on their hotline services despite all the challenges, in 1998 the Ford Foundation 
sponsored Wang Xingjuan to join a conference in India to discuss issues of gender violence. This 
experience shifted the focus  of  the  Maple  Center’s  efforts  towards  working  on  domestic  violence  
issues, and with the efforts of its organizers, the Maple Center has built up its nationwide 
reputation as a professional organization on issues of domestic violence. 
In other words, the wave of repressive interference did not stop the mission of the founder 
and organizers of the Maple Center. Instead, the organizers of the Maple Center have confronted 
each incident of interference by using different strategies to create their own political 
opportunities. 
 
3.3.1.3. Creating Political Opportunities for its Advocacy Work 
Since 1998, the Maple Center has steady increased its organizational capacity. At the same 
time, the organizers also made every effort to get involved in the policy-making process. These 
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efforts achieved a significant result in 2001. The year 2001 marked the fifth significant change 
for the Maple Center. The Maple Center began its collaboration program with Tianjin  Women’s  
Federation that year, and as a result, was given the political opportunity to join in the 
decision-making process of the local authorities. From 1998 to 2001, the  Maple  Center’s degree 
of autonomy increased along with its degree of empowerment. 
The sixth development happened in 2004, when Peiyun Peng, the honorary chairperson of 
the  All  China  Women’s  Federation,  visited  the Maple Center, and gave high acknowledgement 
to the works of the center. That year, the degree of autonomy of the Maple Center reached a 
significant level, and most importantly, this visit brought an opportunity for the Maple Center to 
work with the governmental media, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
Recently, the Maple Center has tried very hard to extend its participation into the 
policy-making process. And current notorious domestic violence incidents, namely the Li Yang 
incident, brought media attention nationwide to the work of the Maple Center (Beijing Review). 
Li Yang, the founder of a popular English school, was accused by his wife of physical and 
psychological abuse. Li Yang admitted his abusive behavior and claimed that his behavior was 
normal in Chinese families.  
This incident attracted media attention and provided an opportunity for the Maple Center to 
present its expertise on domestic violence issues. Furthermore, this incident also awakened 
people’s  concern  regarding  the  law-making process of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. 
As a result, according to my research, the Maple Center has strengthened both its degree of 
empowerment and autonomy, which will be discussed more in Chapter 4. 
The degree of autonomy and empowerment of the Maple Center was further increased in 
2012. Over all, the degree of its empowerment has increased steadily, but the degree of its 
autonomy has dramatically changed. As one can see from the two-by-two matrix, when the 
Maple Center was first established, its degree of autonomy was high. This was because the open 
attitude of the central authorities toward social groups at that time.  
However, we observe a dramatic drop in its degree of autonomy in 1996. This abrupt 
decrease was caused by government interference, including the revocation of the Maple Center’s  
registration status and the withdrawal by the landlord of its rental contracts, even after deposits 
were paid, as a result of phone calls to the landlord from the police department.  
Despite these problems, the organizers of the Maple Center chose strategic action to counter 
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each episode of interference and treated each obstacle as an opportunity to empower itself, with 
the result that the degree of its empowerment has increased. Thus, despite the ups and downs in 
the degree of its autonomy, the strategies of the Maple Center organizers have successfully 
resulted in the empowerment of the organization.  
In addition, funding resources have been scant. Nonetheless, the Maple Center survived 
these difficulties and as of today, it has trained more than 300 volunteers. Wang Xingjuan further 
expressed  this  achievement,  “Many people here are touched by my personal experiences. Some 
of our volunteers have been here since our first training program. This kind of cohesive force is 
not easy to achieve” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 17, 2009). 
The Maple Center has set up six hotlines to help women nationwide in 24 years and more 
than 200 trained volunteers  are  answering  its  women’s  hotlines.  The  slogan  of  the  Maple  Center  
is,  “Women  study  women’s  issues,  women  educate  women,  and  women  help  women.”  the  Maple  
Center’s  working  model  carries  out  this  slogan;;  the  Maple  Center  learns  about  women’s  issues 
from its hotlines, and organizers follow up on these issues by deploying in-depth research.  
As  of  today,  the  Maple  Center  has  published  various  research  results  about  women’s  issues,  
including women and law, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and women in communities. 
Despite all the interference from the police department and both the central and the local political 
and legislative committees, the organizers do not only do research and provide services for 
women,  but  also  do  advocacy  for  women’s  rights. 
Hence,  the  Maple  Center’s  relationship  with  the  central  authority  has  enjoyed  certain  degree  
of autonomy. Based on field research and secondary materials, it can be seen that events held by 
the Maple Center seldom face interference by the police department, and most of the time, the 
government-owned  media  reports  on  the  Maple  Center’s  events.  One  organizer  of  the  Maple  
Center,  who  does  not  learn  about  social  organizing  before  joining  the  Center,  states  that,  “I think 
the media reports most of our events. The media often put our events under the category of 
public interest activities. If our events interest them, they will also send a reporter to cover our 
events” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011). 
 
3.3.2. The  Peking  University  Women’s Law Studies & Legal Aid Center (Beijing daxue 
falüxuexi funü falü yanjiu yu fuwu zhongxin ) 
Unlike  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  not  only  experienced  
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dramatic changes in the degree of its autonomy, but also in the degree of its empowerment. 
Based on field research and interviews, this study has concluded that these two significant 
changes are correlated, which will be explained in Chapter 5. 
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  was  established  in  1995  after  the  founder,  Guo  Jianmei,  
was inspired and encouraged by the Fourth UN World Conference on Women. Guo Jianmei is 
described  by  an  activist,  “She  combines  her  lifelong  goals  with the pursuit of gender equity” 
(interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 7, 2011). Another  women’s  expert  told me,  “Guo  
Jianmei dedicates herself to legal reform. She never takes a rest. And she is willing to go to any 
remote area for a lawsuit” (interviewed by author, China, March 18, 2013). Since its 
establishment, the founders and organizers of the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  have  
encountered persecution from the central authorities, but they have been able to change each 
incident of repression into a political opportunity. 
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  volunteer  lawyers  fighting  for  disadvantaged  women,  
and it is the first organization that aims for both reform of the legal system and an increase in 
women’s  rights.  The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  carries  out  its  goals  by  providing  legal  aid7 
service for marginalized women, while, at the same time, representing violations  of  women’s  
right in courts to promote reform of the legal system. Since its establishment, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  has  represented  thousands  of  cases  in  26  provinces  and  several  of  these  
cases were against the state. 
According to Guo Jianmei, three historical milestones have inspired the founders to 
establish  this  first  legal  aid  center  which  focuses  on  women’s  rights,  namely,  the  passage  of  
Women’s  Rights  Act  in  1992;;  the  establishment  of  the  Chinese  legal  aid  system  in  1994,  and  the  
UN Fourth  Women’s  Conference  in  1995.  During  our  interviews,  Guo  Jianmei  concluded  that  
there have been three key periods in the development of her organization.  
 
3.3.2.1. The Period of Development: Political Opportunities and Political Constraints 
The first period was from 1995 to 1997. During this period of time, the main tasks of the 
organizers  were  to  develop  a  working  model  and  to  establish  the  organization’s  reputation.  A  
                                                 
7 This paper borrows the definition of legal aid from a research document of the Asia Foundation that legal aid (the 
current Chinese usage is: fa lu yuan zhu) has a simpler and more restricted definition, meaning the provision of 
professional legal services to a deserving party free or at a reduced or subsidized rate, usually in litigated 
proceedings. Allen  C.  Choate,  “Legal Aid in China”,  Program  Development,  China,  The  Asia  Foundation, Working 
Paper #12, April 2000. 
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dramatic decrease in its degree of autonomy in 1996 was observed on the two-by-two matrix. 
This  was  because  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  faced  considerable political constraints that 
year. According to Guo Jianmei, 
“We  almost  closed  our  center  in  July  1996,  because  I  had  asked  my  connections  in  the  media  to  
publish  our  center’s  announcement  on  March 8. As a result, every newspaper, including People’s  
Daily, published our small advertisement, and another founder and I were questioned by the 
Beijing Legislative and Political Committee. They asked who was behind this idea, and who 
asked us to do this” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 8, 2011). 
The  consequence  of  this  public  education  activity  was  serious.  Guo  Jianmei  added,  “Our  
center was registered under a law firm. The head lawyer of this law firm asked us to leave 
because the Justice Department and Beijing Legislative and Political Committee came to see 
him” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 8, 2011). Leaving the law firm where the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  was  gua kao (affiliated) meant that the Center lost the protection 
from this law firm to develop its advocacy work. 
Facing her first experience of political repression, Guo Jianmei did not stop her movement. 
She  tried  other  personal  connections  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  was  finally  registered,  
and from 1996 to 1997 increases in both the degree of autonomy and degree of empowerment 
were observed. There were only four full time organizers, and between them, they counseled 
more than 1,000 marginalized women. Moreover, during this period of time, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center represented marginalized women in more than one hundred and forty 
separate cases. 
One  organizer  who  joined  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  right  after  the  establishment  
recalled that there were crowds every day at the center. Marginalized people came from all over 
the  country  to  seek  legal  help.  She  described  the  center  as  becoming  a  hot  spot  for  “letters  and  
visits”8 for  ordinary  people  that,  “many  people  who  came  to  seek  help  and  who  had  nothing  left  
after their travel expenses slept outside the center” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 
26, 2011). 
                                                 
8 According to the Article 2 of Regulations on Letters and Visits, [The  term  “letters  and  visits”  in  these  Regulations  
means that citizens, legal persons or other organizations give information, make comments or suggestions or lodge 
complaints  to  the  people’s  governments  at  all  levels  and  the  relevant  departments  of  the  people’s  governments  at  or  
above the county level through correspondence, E-mails, faxes, phone calls, visits, and so on, which are dealt with 
by the relevant administrative departments according to law.] http://xinfang.shaanxi.gov.cn/0/1/6/23/294.htm, 
accessed on May 2, 2013. 
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Guo  Jianmei  also  described  her  feelings  at  that  time.  “In  2000,  I  felt  tired  again.  Our  center  
gained a nationwide reputation, and people from different provinces all came to our center. Our 
center became  one  stop  on  their  “letters  and  visits”  trips.  Our  center  was  surrounded  by  waves  of  
tired and impatient people, who had not taken a shower for many days because of the travel. But 
we  did  not  have  enough  staff  to  cover  all  their  requests” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
April 26, 2011). 
Guo  Jianmei  continued  describing  the  pressure  during  that  period  of  time.  “Since  we  were  
unable to give a hand to every visitor, people became angry with us. Some of them even accused 
us of being unwilling to help because we had already achieved a good reputation” (interviewed 
by author, Beijing, China, April 26, 2011). 
This overwhelming experience made organizers rethink the role of the center and undertake 
its transformation. This created the second period of development  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center, which lasted from 1998 to 2002. Guo refers to this period of time as a speed-up of 
development  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  All  the  organizers  transformed  their  major  
task from providing legal assistance to as many marginalized women as possible to representing 
some significant cases which both are representative of similar cases and present a strong 
challenge  to  both  the  legal  system  and  the  status  of  women’s  rights. 
According  to  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  chronicle,  cases which have been 
represented by the center involve important and difficult issues such as gender discrimination in 
the workplace, labour rights of women, sexual harassment in the workplace, violence against 
women, the rights of female migrant workers, and land rights of rural women. This 
transformation helped the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center build its capabilities. We can observe 
from the two-by-two matrix that the degree of empowerment was increasing at that time. 
 
3.3.2.2. The Development of Advocacy Work: Repression and Growth 
With  the  transformation  of  the  organization,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  began  to  
focus on advocacy work and building up alliances across the country. In December 2000, the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  set  up  a  “Chinese people’s  legal  aid  task  force” (Chinese Women 
Legal Aid). And later in July 2002, there was the formation of the “Chinese  women’s  legal  aid  
task  force.”  This  women’s  network  brought  in  more  than  100 lawyers from all over the country. 
According to the Peking Women’s  Law  Center,  as  of  2007,  this  task  force  represented forty 
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cases, one third of them leading to nationwide repercussions. The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
also submitted more than forty law proposals to judicial departments and implementation 
institutions. Some of them have been adopted. During this period of development, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  began  to  build  its  reputation.  
In  2002,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center was named one of the ten most influential NGOs 
by China Finance and Economics. One point worth noting on the two-by-two matrix is the 
significant drop in the degree of its empowerment in 2001. This is because Guo Jianmei took a 
leave of absence for a period of time.  
Guo  Jianmei  explained  this  situation  during  our  interviews.  “I  got  serious melancholia at 
that time. I felt so depressed for three reasons. First of all, I had heard a lot of tragedies and I was 
traumatized too. Second, I faced so much repression. Third, people criticized the shift in our 
working method. People questioned why we could not help all of them. Everyone was saying 
that Guo Jianmei was finished” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 8, 2011.) 
Facing this challenge, Guo Jianmei took some time to rest, and at the same time, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  formed  its first board committee. In addition, the society has become more 
accepting of NGOs. The years 2003 to 2009 represent the third period of time in which the 
uniqueness  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  was  distinguished.  According  to  the  Peking  
Women’s  Law  Center, this period of time marked the maturation of organizational construction.9 
After the transformation it undertook in the second period of its development, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  initiated  another  transformation  during  this  later  period,  and  decided to 
dedicate itself to the construction of a legal aid system in China. 
In  2007,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  invited  other  legal  aid  lawyers  and  founded  the  
Public  Interest  Lawyers’  Network  for  Women’s  Rights.  In  2009,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center expanded the services of this network and changed its name to China Public Interest 
Lawyers’  Network.  Through  the  present  time,  this  network  has  recruited  more  than  three  
hundred lawyers from more than twenty provinces and cities. The aim of this network is to 
provide legal aid for marginalized and vulnerable people.  
It  was  also  during  this  period  of  time  that  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  began  to  
reconstruct  its  own  organization.  In  early  2003,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  formed  its  first  
board committee, while at the same time starting a three-year capability-building program for its 
                                                 
9 The Development of  Chinese  Women’s  NGOs,  my  translation. 
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organizers. As it stated in its ten-year review statement, it was during this time period that its 
organizational culture was built. As a result, a steady increase in the degree of its empowerment 
since 2002 on the two-by-two matrix has been observed. 
However, along with the growth of its reputation and services, interference from the police 
department and the Central Politics and Law Commission has become increasingly severe. But, 
contrary to expectations, facing interference from the central government can force organizers to 
further  develop  their  capabilities.  As  Guo  Jianmei  stated,  “After  our  Centre  started  its  operation,  
we had attracted some social attention and the officers of Politics and Law commission came to 
ask us what exactly we intended to do. We were very skillful in handling that enquiry: we said 
that the Centre was an important classroom and foundation for teachers and students of Peking 
University’s  Law  Department to participate in the realization of the rule of law” (Hsiung, 
Jaschok, Milwertz and Chan 2001, 227). 
This statement is one piece of evidence that supports my argument that registration status 
provides protection for advocacy groups in China. In other words, being able to register implies a 
different meaning for advocacy groups than for other types of NGOs. In the case of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  its  registration  status  has  been  used  as  a  strategy  to  expand  its  political  
space for advocacy work. 
As  can  be  seen  from  this  example,  the  organizers  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  when  
facing extraordinary political constraints in 2010, handled them with steady steps. As discussed 
previously, it is difficult for social groups to retain sponsorship from a governmental ministry or 
a party affiliation and then get approval from the local Civic Affairs Bureau for registration. But 
the  two  founders  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  are  graduates  of  the  Law  Department  of  
Beijing University and this connection helped them to become affiliated with Beijing University.  
However, Beijing University ended this affiliation in March 2010 when the organizers of 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  refused  a  request  to  keep  its  distance  from  sensitive  women’s  
legal cases. This  revocation  of  affiliation  brought  a  distinct  impact  on  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center,  both  on  its  organizers  and  on  the  center.  As  the  founder,  Guo  Jianmei,  stated,  “To  an  
entity that has been single-minded in purpose and enterprise for the last 15 years, expulsion from 




The  sentence  “single-minded  in  purpose”  can  be  read  as  the  organizers’  statement  to  the  
Central Politics and Law Commission of the Communist Party of China that challenging the 
regime’s  legitimacy,  which  was  believed  to  be  the  main  reason  for  the  revocation,  was  never  an  
agenda  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  After  discussions  with  friends  and  supporters,  the  
Peking  Women’s Law Center was renamed the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and 
Service Center. Zhongze is a Chinese term that can be translated as people will be benefited. At 
the same time, Guo Jianmei and her team also funded the Qian Qian Law Firm. As a result of the 
revocation of its registration status, a significant drop in the degree of autonomy on the 
two-by-two matrix was observed in 2011. 
Based on field research and secondary materials, this research has concluded that the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  currently enjoys a high degree of empowerment, and a relatively lower 
degree of autonomy. There are several observations that account for this status. On the one hand, 
based on interviews with Guo Jianmei and other organizers, we understand that the police 
department and the Commission of Politics and Law have put serious pressure on the daily 
operations  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  which  will  be  further  discussed  in  the  following  
chapter.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  applied  its  various strategies to get 
itself involved in the policy-making process. One example is that since its establishment, the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  voluntarily  sent  its  legal  suggestions  to  various  ministries,  
hoping that its perspective would be incorporated into the policy-making processes. After several 
years  of  trying,  some  institutions,  including  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  All  China  Women’s  
Federation,  have  begun  to  invite  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  join  their  legislative  
consultative meetings.  The  organizers’  strategies  will  be  discussed  thoroughly  in  the  following  
chapters. 
 
3.3.3. Case Three: Common Language (CL) 
Of  three  organizations  that  I  studied,  Common  Language’s  use  of  vivid  strategies  in  
confronting its double marginalization buttresses my thesis of advocacy groups constituting a 
                                                 





confrontational movement.  
 
3.3.3.1. Dual Pressures: Stigma and Governmental Interference 
Common Language (CL), which was established on January 23, 2005, is a young lesbian 
group. As a lesbian group in Beijing, Common Language has encountered double 
marginalization status since its establishment. First of all, the stigma of homosexuality is still 
pervasive in the society. Based on interviews with lesbian organizers, many people in China still 
connect homosexuality with AIDS. Furthermore, institutional repression has reinforced the 
stigma of homosexuality. 
Before 1997, homosexual practice was criminalized in China (USA Today 2010). In 
addition, it was not until 2001 that homosexuality stopped being classified as a mental illness by 
the Chinese Psychiatric Association. Even now, strict censorship is still applied to any 
homosexual content in the media (Time 2011).  
Moreover, public activities of lesbian groups are often curbed and suspended by the police 
department. The founder of Common Language, Xu Bin (also known as Xian) stated during an 
interview with USA Today,  “If  something's  different  and  you  publicly  promote  it,  (the  authorities)  
worry it could get out of control and threaten their harmonious society” (2012). According to a 
news report by Time magazine,  “The  state’s  approach  is  sometimes  called  the  Triple  No  Policy:  
no approval, no disapproval, no promotion” (2011). 
Based on interviews with lesbian organizers as well as secondary materials, the first 
appearance of queer activity in Beijing took place on 1995, when a UN staff member, Susie, 
began  to  host  parties  and  salons  in  her  apartment.  As  He  Xiaopei  states,  “Beijing  tongzhi activity 
spaces first appeared in the summer of 1995” (2001, 50). He Xiaopei was the co-host of these 
gathering with Susie. During my interview with He Xiaopei, she recalled that they did not know 
how  to  invite  queers  to  join  the  gathering.  People  just  “spread  the  word  to  other  queer  friends  one  
by  one,”  and  as  a  result,  she  and  Susie did not know most of the people who showed up at their 
salons. 
However, in 1999, police officers raided and disrupted the first lesbian cultural festival and 
the queer gathering was abruptly dismissed. It was not until the return of the funder of Common 
Language, Xu Bin, that lesbian organizing appeared again. During my interviews with several 
other young lesbian leaders, they all indicated that Xu Bin is the one who introduced them to 
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other lesbian organizers. Talking softly and always with a smile, Xu Bin was described by an 
women’s  activist,  “She  is  constantly  in  working  mode;;  even  when  we  hang  out  at  bars,  she  still 
talks or thinks about work” (interviewed by author, China, March 18, 2013). 
Xu Bin recalls her first attempts at community organizing, “I  posted  an  announcement  on  a  
lesbian website, and asked if there was anyone who wanted to form a group to please contact 
me” (interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Sep. 8, 2010). Xu Bin shared the memory of the 
first  gathering  day  with  us.  “Many  people came that day. Some of them knew each other. But the 
majority had not met each other before this gathering. Or we had met each other before, but we 
never had the chance to discuss lesbian issues. We asked everyone to suggest what tasks she 
would want this new group to focus on” (interviewed by author, China, April 23, 2011). 
One participant of lesbian organizing since 1995 describes the important role of Common 
Language.  “The  work  of  Common  Language  is  very  important  to  lesbians  in  China  because  it  
organizes many activities and many people. Xu Bin has organized a group of students and 
professional people. Common Language provides a platform for every one of us to express our 
passion  and  to  contribute  our  abilities.  We  all  participate  in  its  activities” (interviewed by author, 
Nov. 14, 2012). 
A senior organizer of Common Language joined this gathering and has worked first as 
volunteer  and  now  as  an  organizer.  She  remembers  that  “people  had  various  ideas  for  different  
missions for this new group. However, I remember that the majority opinion was to publish a 
lesbian magazine. Some people wanted to form a hotline. Common Language did set up a hotline 
and we have sustained this service until now. There were also some wishes for training programs. 
Common Language has carried out this mission too” (interviewed by author, Aug. 12, 2011).  
 
3.3.3.2. From Community Building to Advocacy Movements 
According to Xu Bin, there have been two periods of development for Common Language. 
The first period was from 2005 to 2007. The major tasks of Common Language during these 
three years were training activists, supporting other grassroots lesbian organizations nationwide, 
and most importantly, eliminating discrimination against LGBTI people in the society. To 
eliminate the public idea of the connection between homosexuality and AIDS, Common 




One senior activist of Common Language shared the motivation behind the Lesbian Health 
Research.  “Common  Language  had  just  formed, and we set up a project to let college students 
carry out their dreams. This project was initiated by these students because they were eager to 
understand the life experiences of other lesbians. The reason why they named it health research 
is because we could only get financial support from an AIDS institute” (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
From 2005 to 2008, Common Language conducted various projects to develop its own 
capabilities. By training volunteers, it also helped Common Language to sustain its human 
resources.  As  one  interviewee  shares,  “I  felt  busy  conducting  that  research  project,  but  at  the  
same time, I felt that I had learned a lot. Therefore I stayed on to be a volunteer after the end of 
this  research  project” (interviewed by author, Oct. 15, 2012). 
One senior activist shares her observation of the development of Common Language during 
this  period  of  time.  “We  began  to  conduct  larger  scale  research  projects  in  2007.  Several  of  our  
key organizers joined us in 2007 as volunteers on these research projects. At the same time, we 
helped with the formation of lesbian groups in other provinces” (interviewed by author, Beijing, 
China, Aug. 12, 2011). As  a  result  of  the  organizers’  efforts,  we  can  observe  significant  increases 
in both the degree of autonomy and the degree of empowerment from 2005 to 2008. 
The second period of development is from 2008 to the present day. Since 2008, Common 
Language has dedicated itself to advocacy work for lesbian rights in China. During my interview 
with Xu Bin, she explained the reason why Common Language has shifted its focus to advocacy 
work. After three years of effort, there are more and more organizations that also spend their 
efforts supporting other LGBTI groups nationwide. In contrast, there has been less advocacy 
organization for LGBTI rights. 
During this period of time, Common Language has used various strategies in its advocacy 
work. First, Common Language has tried to get involved in the policy-making process. Common 
Language joined other  women’s  groups  in  providing  another  perspective  when  studying  the  issue  
of domestic violence. From 2007 to 2009, Common Language organized volunteers and put the 
organization’s  resources  into  its  study  of  the  “Lesbian  Anti-Domestic  Violence  Program.” By 
working  on  this  project,  Common  Language  also  has  build  up  alliances  with  other  women’s  
groups. 
Also from 2007 to 2009, Common Language worked on another project, the Blood 
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Donation Law Research. At that time, gays and lesbians were both not allowed to donate blood. 
Common Language publicized the findings of this research and also tried to lobby the Health 
Department. The great news is that recently the Chinese government announced that it has made 
changes to its blood donation laws, and since July 2012 has lifted the ban on blood donation 
from lesbians. 
In addition to its work involving policy, Common Language has also inaugurated vivid 
cultural  events  to  raise  the  public’s  awareness  of  queer  issues.  On  Valentine’s  Day  2009,  
Common Language launched a same-sex marriage event that was held at Qianmen. Qianmen is a 
commercial district and is also a tourist hotspot. Two dressed-up brides and two grooms took 
pictures with passengers while organizers distributed roses and flyers about gay marriage issues.  
This event attracted several news reports from the international media. Most importantly, 
the government-owned China Daily also reported this event. This was the first time that a 
state-owned newspaper reported on a public lesbian event. However, this does not mean that the 
central and local authorities have loosened their censorship regarding lesbian organizing.  
In  answer  to  a  question  during  my  interview,  Xu  Bin  said,  “We  will  only  inform  a  very  few  
friendly news reporters in advance. For most of the media, we call them after the event is carried 
out. Otherwise, we will face the risk that the event will be called off by the police department 
before being brought into operation” (interviewed by author, China, April 16, 2013). 
Another pilot cultural task is called the Beijing Lesbian Community Development Oral 
History Program. This was started in 2009, and can be traced back to 1995. This project 
encompasses a variety of the lesbian movement in Beijing.  
In summary, the relationship between Common Language and the central authority in 2013 
was marked by increases in both the degree of empowerment and autonomy. But, as a relatively 
young organization, Common Language still works on organizational development while its 
organizers try to build up channels for participating in the policy-making processes. However, 
the stigma of homosexuality as well as monitoring by the police department have made it tough 
for Common Language to host public events. As a result, Common Language has not enjoyed 
great degree of autonomy. 
Interactions between the government and social groups can result in political opportunity or 
political constraint, and it seems that the chosen strategy of the organizers will decide whether it 
is possible to expand the political space of each group. In the next section, this research will 
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discuss the factors that play important roles in affecting the attitude of the central authorities 
toward social groups. These factors are derived from my field research, secondary materials and 
my interviews with major  participants  of  the  women’s  and  lesbian  movements. 
 
3.4. Driving Forces in Shifting Boundaries Set by the Central Authorities 
At the 17th National Congress of Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao asked leaders of the 
government  and  the  party  to  make  “building  a  harmonious  society”  the  first  priority  of  his  
agenda (People. cn). This talk was in response to the increased social conflicts that resulted from 
the acceleration of economic growth.  
The goal of this research is to evaluate if the relationship between the central authorities and 
the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  have  changed  after  
the 17th National  Congress  as  Hu’s  statement  can  be  viewed  as  a  political  opportunity  for  
collective action. 
Indeed, the relationship between the central authorities and various social groups sometimes 
changes dramatically. Based on field research, this research has concluded that there are four 
factors which play significant roles in the relationships between the three organizations that I 
studied  and  the  central  authority:  steps  to  ensure  the  regime’s  legitimacy;;  pressure  from  the  
international community; cooperative relationships with local governments; and funding from 
international donors. 
 
3.4.1. Ensuring  the  Regime’s  Legitimacy    
Maintaining  the  regime’s  legitimacy  has  been  the  first  priority  of  the  Chinese  central  
authorities. This research has concluded that there are four factors that engender tension between 
social groups and the central authorities: the suspicious attitude of the central authorities; the 
gathering of a significant number of people; the gathering of several famous figures; and events 
which attract media attention. 
The suspicious attitude of the central authorities toward social groups is a prevailing factor. 
One governmental  officer  shared  his  observation  during  our  interview,  that  “our  government  
controls every charity group because it is afraid that NGOs will obtain control of resources if 
they join in charity work. Furthermore, another reason to forbid most NGOs is because the 
government feels that it cannot control each of them. As a result, the government makes 
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registration  tough  for  NGOs.”    
My field research also confirms the above statement. Only registered foundations are 
allowed to accept public donations, but the requirement for registering, as a foundation is too 
high a barrier for most social groups. Therefore, social groups rely mostly on international 
funding. It was only after 2011 that the Beijing city government began to contract services from 
social groups. In other words, if a social group provides social services for citizens, this group 
will receive subsidies from the city government. However, the prerequisite for receiving 
subsidies is to be a registered group, which has proven to be a challenge for the three 
organizations that I studied. 
This research concludes that there are two kinds of actions that attract the most attention 
from the central authorities. The first is the gathering of a significant number of people or several 
important public figures. Several organizers from different lesbian groups have shared this 
experience. Some of them were paid a visit at their homes by police officers because they were 
contact persons for events. It is frightening that these organizers only revealed their pseudonyms 
on event contact information, yet the police could find their real names and home addresses, 
indicating that they were under intense surveillance.  
Moreover, almost every activity where a sizeable number of people gather has been 
cancelled by the security departments. Some examples of cancelled events are queer art activities 
in Beijing and Shanghai, the Independent Queer Film Festival, and the anti homophobia event 
that college students from several universities organized. 
The second kind of activity that has attracted concern from the central authorities is those 
that result in a considerable amount of media reporting. Several organizers of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  have  pointed  out  that  they  believe  their  organizing  work  for  the  Chinese 
Women’s  Legal  Aid  Task  Force and  the  Chinese  People’s  Legal  Aid  Task  Force  were  the  cause  
of the revocation of their affiliation by Beijing University.  
According  to  the  organizers  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  there  are  two  reasons  why  
their organizing work  attracts  the  media’s  attention  and  then  the  attention  of  the  authorities.  First  
of  all,  the  mission  of  legal  aid  lawyers  is  to  fight  for  people’s  rights.  Secondly,  there  were  more  
than  one  hundred  lawyers  who  joined  the  Chinese  Women’s  Legal  Aid  Task  Force, and more 
than three hundred lawyers with the Chinese People Legal Aid Task Force nationwide. One 
organizer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  said,  “This  kind  of  assembling  has  attracted  media  
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reporting, and as a result, it also drew attention from the central authorities” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China. Aug. 17, 2011). 
However, the alliance of legal aid has crossed the boundaries of the central government, and 
as  a  result,  the  Peking  Women’s Center was suffered more repressive interference. There are 
three reasons which explain this cross of line. First of all, organizing is always viewed as a threat 
to the regime. As described in a news report in Newsweek,  “As with other groups, official 
opposition to gays occurs only when the government feels threatened by solidarity activities or 
organizing.” 
Second, for all kinds of organizing, legal aid lawyers have become a primary target of 
repression.  According  to  Tony  Saich,  during  Hu  Jintao’s  administration,  “A  new  target  of  this  
repression has been urban lawyers and activists who tried to defend local protestors in class 
action suits against the local government” (2007, 36). 
Third, the nationwide media reports of these kinds of gatherings also elicit interference from 
the  central  authorities.  Cai’s  research on public resistance identifies two factors that increase the 
likelihood of state intervention in public protests, namely, that a protest that involves casualties 
or that garners significant media exposure (2008, 169).  
The media has always been strictly  overseen,  as  Jonathan  Hassid  states,  “…economic  
liberalization has not translated into much political freedom. Beijing has made clear that it will 
continue to exercise very tight control over the news media in the short and medium term” (2008, 
147). Therefore, it is possible that the central authorities might feel threatened by nationwide 
news reports of the organizing activities of legal aid lawyers. 
Based on my interviews with the founders of the three organizations I studied, all of them 
independently emphasized that challenging the regime is not one of their goals for organizing. 
This emphasis reveals their understanding of the boundaries of tolerance of the central 
government.  As  Guo  Jianmei  stated,  “We  do  not  want  to  challenge  the  socialist  system,  neither 
do we want to challenge the one-party system” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China. Nov.18, 
2009). Moreover, this emphasis also illustrates a dilemma for their organizing efforts. This study 
has found that sometimes the organizers will restrict themselves from various ways of protesting 
which might lead the central authorities to feel threatened.  
Furthermore, this kind of self-censorship also undermines their mobilization of more people. 
Teresa Wright presents a similar observation after comparing student movements in China and 
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Taiwan.  “This  suggests  that  protesters  in  illiberal  contexts  face  a  conundrum:  narrow  
mobilization that is the ultimate outcome of state repression may be insufficient to propel real 
change, yet mobilization that includes groups which the regime finds threatening is likely to 
provoke repression” (2008, 53). 
Anthony  Spires’  research  on  China’s  grassroots  NGOs  found  the  similar  situation.”It  is  also  
to the benefit of grassroots NGOs that many express no antistate, antiparty political agenda” 
(2011, 34. See also Keech-Marx 2008). However, based on my field research, I will argue that 
this kind of self-restriction helps an advocacy group to expand its political space for social 
organizing and for social changes. The survival of the organization is the first priority before the 
emergence of political liberalization. 
In conclusion, based on interviews and field research, this study has found that the founders 
of these three organizations are aware of these limitations that have been set up by the central 
authorities. At the same time, these organizers have developed different strategies to balance 
their advocacy work and their relationship with the government. In continuing their advocacy 
work, these social groups have expanded their political space for social organizing. 
 
3.4.2. Cooperative Relationships with Local Governments 
Connections with the government has been recognized as an important factor when 
discussing social organizing in China (see for example Spires 2011). However, rather than 
emphasizing the connections with the central government, this research argues that building 
cooperative relationships with local governments is even more crucial for advocacy groups in 
expanding their political spaces because this cooperative relationship allows advocacy groups to 
get involved in and carry out public policy. This is important since it will win credibility for 
advocacy groups from the central government and from the society. 
Even  before  the  establishment  of  the  People’s  Republic  of China, local policy experiments 
to try out various ways to solve problems had been encouraged by the central leaders (Heilmann 
2011).  The  term  “experimental  points”  and  “model  experiences” are frequently applied by local 
governments when they announce an innovative policy.  
In fact, the most important institutional reforms were carried out by single or several 
provinces or even sub-provinces before being implemented nationwide. The most significant 
example was the economic reform in 1978, which was first tried out in Shenzhen and was called 
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the Special Economic Zone.  
As previously discussed, the launching of economic reform brought dynamic changes to 
China. One feature has been the decentralization of policy-making decisions. As Florini, Lai, and 
Tan state,  “The  state  structure  itself  has  become  far  more  decentralized,  allowing  for  local  
government initiative and transforming the dynamic between central authority in Beijing and 
local provincial and sub-provincial levels of party and government” (2012, 3). 
By decentralizing the decision-making power on social issues, such as education, 
environmental protection, and city planning, the central government has retained the power to set 
the overall objectives, while at the same time being the arbitrator whenever there is a conflict of 
interest between ordinary people and the local governments. According to Florini, Lai, and Tan, 
“This  style  of  reform  has  been  called  ‘experimentation  under  hierarchy,’  requiring  a  tricky  
balance between control and freedom” (2012, 5). 
As a result of this policy, local governments are responsible for the welfare of local people, 
which has brought political opportunities for social groups. Based on interviews, this study has 
found a high degree of collaboration between local governments and both the Maple Center and 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.    
Building  working  relationships  with  local  governments  by  cooperating  with  local  women’s  
federations is the major strategy of the Maple Center. There are several significant examples. 
From 1992 to  2004,  the  Maple  Center  worked  with  the  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  to  carry  out  
an experimental project, called the Community Intervention into Family Problems, in a Tianjin 
municipal community.  
In addition, the Maple Center cooperated with the Beijing Xuanwu District Women's 
Federation in 1998, to run the Ark Family Center, which offers psychological and social services 
to single-parent  families.  The  Maple  Center  and  Beijing  Xuanwu  District  Women’s  Federation  
further developed this program in 2004, and expanded the services to providing group therapy 
for single mothers. Up to the year 2013, this expansion of services covers eight neighborhood 
committees in this district. 
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  cooperates  on  its  project  through  the  channel  of local 
women’s  federations.  For  example,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  worked  with  the  Hunan  
Provincial  Women’s  Federation  for  the  design  of  the  Domestic  Violence  Prevention  Act  in  
Hunan Province. Hunan was the first province in China that passed an act to prevent domestic 
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violence. Florini, Lai and Tan explained the intention of local governments to choose to 
cooperate  with  social  groups,  since  local  governments  can  “explore  ways  of  harnessing  non-state 
actors to deal with social issues and complement weakness in state-led approaches” (2012, 6). 
The cooperation between local governments and social groups benefits both sides. For local 
governments,  different  cooperation  projects  may  attract  the  central  authority’s  attention  to  their  
work. For social groups, this cooperation provides them with freedom and a platform to practice 
their  aim  of  social  change.  According  to  Cai,  “In  the  case  of  China,  despite  the  nondemocratic  
system, local governments, which are most commonly targeted by protesters, face constraints in 
dealing with popular resistance, which creates the possibility for protesters to achieve successful 
resistance” (2010, 186). 
Hence,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  all  
have tried very hard to build working relationships with local governments. However, unlike the 
Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  Common  Language  has  not  built  up  
collaborative relationships with local governments. The stigma of homosexuality is one major 
reason. According to a staff member  of  one  local  women’s  federation  who  is  a  supporter  of  the  
lesbian  movement,  “I  talked  to  several  leaders  of  women’s  federations.  Some  of  them  said  there  
was no single lesbian in their province. Some of them stated that they never met any lesbians. 
There was also one officer that said that lesbian issues did not qualify for help because lesbians 
depraved themselves” (interviewed by author, China. April. 17, 2013). 
However, Common Language has not given up its efforts to build connections with local 
governments. One new strategy of Common Language that was observed is to build up 
relationships  with  local  governments  by  working  with  women’s  groups  in  collaborative  projects.  
Furthermore, this study has found that a personal connection is an important factor that affects 
the possibility of building a relationship with local governments. The founders of the Maple 
Center and the Peking Women Law Center, Wang Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei, both worked for 
the government before they set up their organizations, and their experiences provided them with 
connections to governmental officers.  
Wang Xingjuan was a member of the first group of female journalists. After 1949, Wang 
joined the Xinhua Daily (Chinese:  Xīnhuá  Rìbào).  Xinhua Daily is owned by the Communist 
Party of China and  was  the  first  public  newspaper  published  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China.  
During her journalistic career, Wang got an exclusive opportunity to write a bibliography of Mao 
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Zedong’s  second  wife,  He  Zizhen.  Wang  retired  from  the  Beijing  Publishing  Group  in  1988.  As  
for Guo Jianmei, she previously worked at the Ministry of Justice, The All China Federation of 
Women, and The All China Association of Lawyers.  
Compared  to  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  the  organizers  of  
Common Language lack personal connections with either the party or local governments. This is 
why Common Language has tried for many years to build up relationships with local 
governments  or  local  women’s  federations. 
There is one recent development worth noting that might change the working relationship 
between social groups and local governments. In March 2011, Beijing municipality announced 
that the local government would purchase more than three hundred social services from social 
groups.  Based  on  the  social  groups’  experiences  in  Taiwan,  this  purchasing  might  enhance  the  
relationship between local governments and social groups, and as a result, there might be more 
service provider groups and many fewer advocacy groups. The main reason behind this possible 
scenario is the lack of financial resources. This study will explain this more in the following 
section. 
 
3.4.3. Pressure from the International Community 
This study proposes a second factor that has influence on the relationship between social 
groups and the central authorities, namely, the pressure from the international community. Most 
importantly, this factor is also the answer to one of the major questions behind this study, that is, 
why have the central authorities not chosen to crush the three organizations?  
Even though the three organizations I studied enjoy different degrees of nationwide renown, 
they are still considered small NGOs in terms of their human and financial resources. Most 
critically, all of them focus on advocacy work and from time to time their actions are viewed as 
dangerous and have attracted interference from the police department and the Politics and Law 
Commission.  
This study argues that the pressure of the international community plays an important role 
in helping these three groups to maintain a certain degree of autonomy. Even though some news 
reports argue that the pressure from the international community is not a major concern of the 
Chinese government, this study finds contrary evidence. 
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According to my interviews with organizers, one of their common experiences is to be 
invited to have tea with a representative from the police department or the Politics and Law 
Commission after a visit from important figures from foreign countries. The government 
representatives are always curious about the conversation between the organizers and their 
foreign visitors.  
In addition to the  Maple  Center’s  experience  of  being  questioned  as  to  why  Hillary  Clinton  
only asked to visit them, there are other examples that demonstrate the suspicious attitude of the 
government towards the connections between social groups and foreign groups. For example, the 
opening ceremony of the Beijing LGBT center had to be canceled after pressure from the police 
department, and this pressure was applied after the LGBTI center of Los Angeles, California, 
visited the Beijing LGBT center.  
According to several of my interviewees, the more interest that Western society shows 
towards an organization, the more scrutiny the government will impose on the organization. One 
of  major  leaders  of  lesbian  organizing  in  Beijing  shared  her  observation  that  “When  foreign  
media reported our activity or when foreigners participated in our activities, we were questioned 
by the police. The reason is simply that they think you are part of anti-government organizations. 
The government accuses them of holding the flag of lesbian activities while actually trying to 
challenge the authority of the government” (interviewed by author. Oct. 15, 2012). 
In addition, based on observations of several organizers, the government increased its 
degree of scrutiny and interference after the 2008 Olympic Games. According to one organizer 
who  has  participated  in  the  lesbian  movement  since  the  first  wave  of  social  organizing,  “Our  
government cleans up any suspicious activities before the start of international events which are 
held in China; for example, the Yuanmingyuan artist village was cleaned up in 1995 before 
China  hosted  the  Fourth  UN  Women’s  Conference.  At  that  time  (2008)  the  scrutiny  lasted  even  
after the Olympic Games were over. Our government thinks this is a way to present a better 
image of itself for the foreign media”  (interviewed by author. Nov. 14, 2012). 
Chen  Dingding’s (2009) research  confirms  that  the  concern  of  China’s  leaders  involves  the  
pressure from the international community. Chen points out that after the late 1970s, the Chinese 
leaders  reconstructed  the  state’s  identity  to  that  of  a  modern  socialist  state,  and  this  redefinition  
of  the  state’s  identity  has  led  to  an  increased  willingness  of  Chinese  leaders  to  abide  by  the  
norms of international human rights.  
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Daniel  Lynch’s  study  on  the  Chinese  elites’  responses  to  the  norm  of  “democracy”  reached  a  
similar  conclusion.  “Democracy  as  a  global  norm  does  influence  the  Chinese  discourse.”  
Lynch’s  research  explains  the  influence  of  global  constitutive  norm.  “They  (elites)  cannot  simply  
ignore democracy and pretend it to be completely irrelevant to Chinese conditions” (2007, 718). 
The elites that Lynch studies include Party officials and experts of governmental think tank. 
These elites pay attention to the international community and make suggestions based on the 
need of Chinese government. 
The  founders  of  the  three  organizations  that  I  studied  understand  the  government’s  attitude  
toward the international community. And therefore, since their establishment, the Maple Center, 
the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  have  all  worked  very  hard  to  win  an  
international reputation. To cite a few examples, in 2007, Wang Xingjuan won the Global 
Women’s  Leadership  Award  from  Vital  Voice. In 2010 Guo Jianmei was awarded the Simone 
De Beauvoir Prize,  and  during  the  same  year,  she  was  named  China’s  first  anti-AIDS 
discrimination ambassador by the International Labor Organization. In 2011, Guo Jianmei was 
awarded the International Women of Courage Award by the United States Department of State. 
As for Common Language, the organization  won  the  Netherland  Mama  Cash  “She  Changed  the  
World”  Award  in  2008. 
In conclusion, building connections with international communities has created both 
political  opportunities  and  political  constraint  for  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Center,  
and  Common  Language.  One  the  one  hand,  the  organizers’  connections  with  foreign  groups  or  
foreign political figures have led to interference from the government. On the other hand, these 
connections have created leverage for these three organizations to negotiate their political space 
with the government. This leverage includes participating in training programs, learning 
international norms in order to deepen their advocacy work. Based on field research, this study 
has concluded that despite increased repression and monitoring by the government, these three 
organizations have benefited from international recognition. 
 
3.4.4. Funding from International Donors 
One crucial factor for expanding political space for advocacy groups is support from 
international donors.  Financial  resource  plays  an  important  role  in  sustaining  social  groups’  
autonomy. In addition, a registered group has to pay maintenance fee to its gua kao(sponsor) 
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agency. Furthermore, a social group without NGO registration status is not allowed to hold 
public fund-raising activities, nor is it exempt from taxes, and local governments will only 
purchase services from a registered NGO. Therefore, financial resources from international 
donors have played an important role in maintaining the daily operations of advocacy groups in 
China. 
Support from the Ford Foundation was the first financial resource that helped the 
establishment  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  it  was  a  grant  from  the  Global  Foundation  
that gave the Maple Center a big hand in 1992 in  setting  up  the  first  women’s  hotline  in  China.  
As for Common Language, international foundations have been the only financial resource for its 
advocacy work. 
However, as previously discussed, because of perceived threats resulting from the Color 
Revolutions of Central Asia, the central authorities have squeezed the channels for international 
funding. The changing requirement for donations in foreign exchange is one example. Wang 
Xingjuan was interviewed by a Chinese newspaper, Huaxia, and she mentioned that after this 
requirement change, the sponsorship of US $100,000 from the Ford Foundation was returned and 
needed to be reapplied for. 
Interviews with organizers also confirm the tougher situation in getting international 
funding.  Guo  Jianmei  stated,  “The central authorities categorize most international donors. I 
would use a metaphor here that the government marks each foreign foundation as red light, 
yellow light, and green light. The red light international foundations are believed to support the 
anti-government activities in Tibet and Xinjiang, and we (social groups) cannot accept money 
from these organizations. This categorization system is fluid, which means some green light 
foundations could become yellow light foundations, for example, the Ford Foundation” 
(interviewed by author. Beijing, China. July 8, 2011). 
The Ford Foundation used to be an exceptional case. Obtaining approval from Deng 
Xiao-Ping in 1979, the Ford Foundation secured an unusual sponsorship from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, which is viewed as the highest intellectual governmental institution. 
Based on interviews, this study has found out not only that in recent years, the government holds 
a different opinion about the Ford Foundation, but that the Ford Foundation has also gradually 
shifted its policy in making grants. Recently it has focused more on poverty and social 
development  in  African  countries,  which  has  caused  some  women’s  groups  in  China  to  lose  their  
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major financial support. 
In fact, the background of international donors affects the relationships between social 
groups and local governments. One high-level  officer  of  a  local  women’s  federation  stated,  “We  
know  we  cannot  accept  the  money  of  some  foundations’.  Our  government  does  allow  us to 
accept  it.  We  won’t  take  it” (interviewed by author. April 17, 2013). Both organizers of the 
Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  indicate  that  local  women’s  federations  ask  
the background of international sponsorships before considering collaborating on a project.  
Furthermore,  the  organizers  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  have  experienced  that  
projects were called off several times in the preparation stage because of the concerns of higher 
levels of local governments or local women federations regarding international sponsorships. 
One  governmental  officers  points  out  that  “the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  should  not  receive  
money from foreign donors which are viewed as a dangerous threat by our government. They 
(the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center)  are  creating  their  own  trouble” (interviewed by author. 
Beijing, China. Aug. 18, 2011). 
How to gain financial support from international donors, while at the same time, 
maintaining its relationship with both the central authorities and the local governments has 
become one important strategic  question  for  each  women’s  group  in  expanding  its  own  political  
space. This study will further discuss their strategies in the following chapters. 
 
3.5. Shifting Boundaries of the Central Authorities and the Changing State-Society 
Relationships 
This research has found that political space cannot be assumed to exist before the formation 
of  social  groups.  The  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  
have shared experiences of revocation or failure of registration, cancellation of events, difficulty 
of  fund  raising,  and  constantly  being  invited  to  “have  tea”  with  security  departments.    
However, each group has developed its own strategies to survive and to further expand its 
political space gradually. Most importantly, they carry on their advocacy work nationwide. I 
believe that under a repressive regime, these achievements are indeed confrontational in nature. 
Therefore, the aforementioned assumption of social movement theory should be reconsidered. 
The real challenge for social groups is to figure out how much more the boundaries of the 
central government can be extended. A founder of a lesbian group outside Beijing who has been 
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paid visits by policemen several times since 2005 and still insists on lesbian organizing, stated, 
“Until  now, I have not learned the boundaries of our government. And I have tried to understand 
the  boundaries.  Once  when  I  was  asked  to  have  the  ‘tea  talk’  with  the  local  government,  I  told  
them I would like to have more opportunities to communicate with them. The reason why I did 
so  is  because  I  want  to  learn  their  boundaries” (interviewed by author. April 22, 2011). 
An  academic  expert  who  also  participates  in  women’s  organizing  shared  her  observations.  
“I  think  everyone  knows  there  is  a  limit  to  what  our  government will tolerate in the activities of 
social groups. But I think most people imagine this limit as a narrow boundary. From my 
perspective, I think we need to try every possibility before we say that our government will not 
agree” (interviewed by author. Nov. 25, 2012). 
This statement indicates not only the dynamic relationship between the governments and 
social groups, but also a movement formed by social groups to expand each possible boundary. 
Founders and organizers are always trying to find the boundaries of the central authorities. And 
learning from each interaction with the central authorities, they have tried to expand their own 
political space. 
In other words, it is crucial to understand the reactions of the central government in order to 
develop strategies  for  the  organizations’  survival  and  sustainability.  Based  on  field  research,  I  
have concluded that the Chinese government is a quite adaptive institution, and organizers have 
developed some strategies in communicating with the central government over the years.  
There are four kinds of leverage that are commonly applied by the social groups: the 
regime’s  desire  to  retain  its  legitimacy;;  pressure  from  the  international  community;;  building  
cooperative relationship with local governments; and support from international donors, to 
counter the repressive interference of the central authorities. How the organizers grasp every 
political opportunity and develop varied strategies will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Autonomy or Empowerment? Comparative Analysis of Organizational 
Strategies 
 
In Chapter 3, I proposed the argument that there exist clear governmental boundaries for the 
advocacy work of social groups. However, these boundaries are not fixed, but can be shifted by 
strategically applying four sources of leverage: the regime’s desire to maintain its legitimacy; 
cooperative relationships with local governments; pressure from the international community; 
and funding from international donors. 
This chapter generalizes from my field observations of the similar struggles faced by the 
Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language.  These  struggles  
includes failure to gain registration status, difficulties in building a relationship with the 
government; encountering political forces that marginalize self-mobilized groups, and facing the 
prohibition against confrontational movements. 
For each struggle, my study has identified three to four strategies used by the activists to 
survive and to further expand their organizational political space. With respect to these strategies, 
the  central  question  of  this  chapter  is:  what  kinds  of  strategies  have  helped  these  three  women’s  
advocacy groups to survive and to expand their political space? And furthermore: what 
considerations did the organizers weigh in choosing their particular strategies? And what has 
been the impact of each chosen strategy? Only by answering these questions can we see the 
whole picture of this confrontational movement.  
One significant finding is that the organization’s  developmental  stage  plays  a  decisive  role  
in determining whether the activists will pick a confrontational or a cooperative strategy. My 
study  has  reached  the  conclusion  that,  in  order  to  increase  its  organization’s  degree  of  
empowerment,  women’s  activists will choose a more cooperative strategy, while organizers who 
emphasize  their  organization’s  degree  of  autonomy  will  pick  a  more  confrontational  strategy.    
In my analyses, an increase in the degree of empowerment is defined as including gaining 
more popular support, raising more funds, increasing recruitment, generating more attention 
from the media, and making connections with other social groups nationally and internationally. 
As to the definition of degree of autonomy, my study borrows the idea of Jude Howell, that 
an organization is autonomous if it meets the following conditions: first, it is able to set its own 
goals, determine its own priorities, and decide its own structures and principles of organization; 
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second, it is able to appoint its own personnel and recruit its own members; and third, it relies 
primarily on its own sources of funding. (Jude Howell, 2000. p. 127) 
By analyzing the repressive interference these three groups have faced as well as the 
activists’  strategic  responses,  this  chapter describes the confrontational nature of the advocacy 
movement  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language.  This  
definition  of  the  confrontational  nature  of  an  advocacy  movement  differs  from  Tarrow’s  
definition of a confrontational movement, previously discussed in Chapter 1 as an intended direct 
disruptive confrontation of authority. 
In Chapter 3, the  severe  intervention  of  and  repression  by  the  government  that  women’s  
advocacy groups have encountered at every level of their organizational development was 
chronologically  documented.  By  presenting  the  history  of  the  activists’  struggles,  Chapter  3  
provided  evidence  of  the  confrontational  nature  of  these  three  women’s  groups,  and  this  history  
will be further analyzed in this chapter. 
My  study  proposes  to  apply  the  term  “soft  confrontation”  to  describe  the  daily  survival  
strategies  of  women’s  advocacy  groups      as  well  as  their  strategies  to  develop  organizational  
advocacy work. As was earlier noted and analyzed in Chapter 3, these groups have also 
expanded the boundaries that the government set for their political space.  
According to the school of political opportunity structure, changing political opportunities 
and constraints will trigger the incentives for contentious collective actions (Tarrow 2010, 6). 
My research borrows this idea of political opportunities and constraints but applies it in a 
different dimension. My study focuses on the resulting political opportunities or constraints that 
result  from  the  activists’  chosen  strategies. Furthermore, the results of each chosen strategy can 
be double sided, creating both political opportunity and setting up constraints for the political 
space of advocacy work. 
In other words, there is no political openness or constraint that will cause a specific result in 
the  political  space  of  an  advocacy  group.  Rather,  the  result  depends  on  the  activists’  reactions  
when  faced  with  changing  political  circumstances.  As  James  Mittleman  points  out,  “Rather, 
democracy in China today is regarded as a way to resolve problems and to make adjustments in 
politics. Not easily amenable to an abstract theoretical model, the content of democracy in China 
is an ongoing negotiation while the regime strives for legitimacy and other actors seek political 
space” (2011, 174). 
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Studying the considerations of the activists for each chosen survival or confrontational 
strategy helps us to understand the dynamics of the state-social group relationship. Based on 
field research, this chapter is able to conclude that there is a causal relationship between political 
opportunity or constraint and the organizational degree of autonomy and empowerment of 
women’s  advocacy  groups.    
The main argument of this chapter is that if the degree of organizational empowerment is 
their major concern, activists will pick a cooperative strategy. However, if activists want to 
increase their organizational autonomy, a much more confrontational strategy will be used.  
This chapter first presents the four main struggles and confrontational strategies of the 
activists  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language.  For the 
struggle  to  gain  registration  status,  the  organizers’  strategies  were  multiple and included going 
through  the  Party’s  internal  channels  to  explain  their  situation as well as trying to register in 
other counties. Despite all their efforts, in the end, the organizers could only choose to register as 
a people-run non-enterprise unit (hereafter private unit). 
Their second struggle was trying to build a relationship with the government. This struggle 
underscores the uniqueness of the dilemma of advocacy groups in an authoritarian regime. The 
dilemma is how to achieve a balance between being involved in the public policy area and 
maintaining a challenging attitude. This chapter concludes that for this struggle, the activists 
have relied on four strategies: figuring out the boundaries of the government, building up 
communication channels, submitting professional suggestions during the law-making process, 
and building a working relationship with the local government. 
The  third  struggle  was  encountering  political  forces  that  aimed  at  marginalizing  women’s  
advocacy groups. Here the activists used three different strategies. First, the organizers solved 
the problem of the lack of economic and human resources by recruiting volunteers and by 
extending their connections in the society. Second, in order to ease governmental pressure on the 
organizers,  the  women’s  groups  held  programs  to  train  the  trainers.  Their third confrontational 
strategy was to build  up  their  groups’  relationship  with  the  media.    
The  fourth  struggle  of  the  women’s  advocacy  groups  was  facing  the  prohibition  of  
confrontation with the authorities. To break through this boundary, women activists first build 
alliances with other social groups. Second, the organizers empowered other grassroots groups to 
do advocacy work. And finally, women activists built up their own communities in order to 
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promote their goal of social change. 
In summary, my study found out that every  time  women’s  activists  tried  to  expand  their  
political space for social change, they encountered repressive interference. Each struggle and 
challenge could have resulted in the dissolution of each organization. However, the survival of 
each  women’s  advocacy  group  demonstrates  both  the  success  of  the  organizers’  chosen  strategies  
and the adaptive attitude of the central government. Furthermore, the similarities of the chosen 
strategies indicate that the boundaries of the central government have become clearer. Because 
the similarities indicate the effectiveness of strategies, and further confirm the boundaries.  
Facing  these  severe  challenges,  these  three  women’s  groups  did  not  choose  to  drop  their  
advocacy work. Instead, the evidence has shown that the organizers learn from every disruptive 
force, and develop vibrant strategies,  which  are  identified  as  “soft  confrontation”  in  this  study. 
 
4.1. Struggle 1: Failure to Gain Registration Status 
My study uses the  term  “degree  of  autonomy”  to  describe  an  organization’s  ability  to  
independently decide its daily operation. In this context, failure to gain registration status has 
caused  a  significant  backlash  for  the  degree  of  autonomy  of  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups.  
In general, gaining registration is so important because it is recognition of legal status of social 
groups and means protection for an advocacy group in a repressive regime. 
The  Maple  Center  encountered  this  challenge  in  1996.  The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
twice suffered revocation of its registration status, first in 1996 and then in 2010. Finally, 
Common Language has never tried to register as an NGO, and has only recently registered as a 
private unit. 
There are four significant results of a failure to gain NGO registration status. First, activists 
have experienced police inquiries regarding their legal status, including tax issues. Second, 
without registering as an NGO, social groups are not allowed to fundraise nor to receive 
governmental subsidies. 
Third, a social group with registration status means its credibility is guaranteed by the 
government. This is especially important for advocacy groups in China. Being registered means 
an advocacy group can get protection from its sponsoring agency to carry out its agenda for 
social change. 
As an example,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  twice  encountered  challenges  that  led  to  
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the revocation of its registration status. The first time was in October 1996, and the second time 
was on March 25, 2010, when Beijing University announced the end of its sponsorship of the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.    
The  reason  for  the  first  revocation  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  registration  status  
resulted from a decision of the founder, Guo Jianmei, that attracted the attention of the 
government. As a journalist, Guo Jianmei,  decided  to  run  the  center’s  advertisement  in  almost  
every  newspaper  on  March  8,  1996  in  order  to  build  up  her  organization’s  visibility.  However,  
after  this  action,  the  law  firm  that  provided  the  sponsorship  for  Guo  Jianmei’s  organization  got  
phone call from both the Beijing Legislative and Political Committee and the Justice Bureau, and 
as  a  result,  stopped  their  affiliation  with  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  The  second  incident  
happened in 2010 and attracted attention from the central government. 
After suffering the first cancellation of sponsorship, it took a long while and much effort 
before Guo Jianmei was able to gain sponsorship from Beijing University. However, Beijing 
University revoked their relationship after encountering governmental pressure. One organizer of 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  shared  her  understanding  of  this  challenge.  “Representatives  of  
Beijing University asked to have a meeting with us. In the meeting, they asked us to stop our 
advocacy work. They said we can only maintain this affiliation if we focus only on research. We 
refused” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 9, 2011). 
Guo  Jianmei  shared  the  sequences  of  this  revocation.  “Before  this  revocation,  our  center  
had just received a grant from National Legal Aid Foundation. The amount was not much, but 
this grant meant a lot for us. This grant was the first financial resource we got from the 
government. But ten days after the revocation, we got an official letter, saying that after research, 
they decided to withdraw this grant” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 8, 2011). 
Guo  continued.  “The  impact  of  revocation  is  international.  Our  center  was  invited  to  join  a  
conference about legal aid practices. This conference was held in Singapore. The Chinese 
government also sent their representatives to participate in this conference. After the revocation, 
they told me that our center did not need to be there” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, July 
8, 2011). 
In other words, losing registration status also meant that the credibility of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  was  also  weakened.  It  is  especially  true  that  in  a  repressive  regime,  most  
governmental  institutions  will  be  hesitant  to  work  with  an  advocacy  group  that  doesn’t  have  
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registration status, since most governmental institutions won't want to attract any additional 
attention from the central authorities. 
Fourth, losing registration status also causes international institutions to be more cautious 
when working with an advocacy group, since most international institutions  
emphasize their priority of carrying out their mission in the repressive country. From the 
perspectives of international donors, the revocation of registration status is an critical signal 
referring that the government has concerns regarding one particular advocacy groups.  
Each advocacy group has adopted different strategies for dealing with the issue of losing 
their registration status. For example, Wang Xingjuan, the founder of the Maple Center, pointed 
out the problem of losing registration  status.  “I think being unable to register as an NGO has 
caused a serious problem for our center. All levels of government have begun to purchase 
services from NGOs, and the first criterion for receiving governmental subsidies is possessing 
registration status.” 
The registration status of the Maple Center was revoked in 1996, after the attempted visit of 
the U.S. former first lady, Hillary Clinton, during the Fourth UN World Conference on Women 
in 1995, which was held in Beijing.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the China Academy of Management Science revoked its 
patronized relationship with the WRI (the predecessor of the Maple Center), and the WRI could 
no longer use the China Academy of Management Science in its title. Wang Xingjuan tried many 
ways to register as a not-for-profit  organization.  and  stated,  “I  even  asked  my  father  to  go  to  a  
village remote from Beijing to register. Because I was afraid governmental officers there would 
recognize me, therefore, I asked my father to do it for me. He successfully registered our 
organization However, this successful registration only lasted several days after a phone call 
from a higher authority ended it”  (interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Sep. 10, 2010). 
Wang Xingjuan had no other alternative but to register her organization as a people-run 
non-enterprise  unit,  and  to  change  the  title  of  this  organization  to  the  Maple  Women’s  
Psychological Counseling Center (MWPCC). During the interview, Wang explained the 
reasoning behind the choice of a new title. Wang recalls,  “It  was  fall  when  I  had  tried  every  
possibility to register my organization as a NGO. While I was feeling so upset, I looked around 
and saw the beauty of maple trees. Maple trees are full of vitality and this encouraged me a lot. I 
decided to name the  organization  the  Maple  Women’s  Psychological Counseling Center” 
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(interviewed by author, Taipei, Taiwan, Sep. 10, 2010). 
 
4.1.1. Strategies to Solve the Problem of Losing Registration Status 
As previously mentioned, activists have chosen different strategies in dealing with 
registration  issues.  Here  are  the  explanations.  Even  when  the  results  of  the  activists’  strategy  is  
the same, namely,  registering as a private unit, Guo Jianmei and Wang Xingjuan have chosen 
quite different strategies when facing the crisis of losing their registration status.  
One similarity of their strategies is to make use their personal connections. Both Wang 
Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei worked for the government before they founded their organizations 
and therefore, they have maintained good connections with some officials in the central 
government.  
However, Wang Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei made use of different strategies in utilizing 
their connections. When the registration of the Maple Center was revoked in 1996, many 
representatives of the foreign media asked for interviews with Wang Xingjuan. Wang refused all 
of  them  because  “I wanted to appeal within the system. I am a member of Communist Party of 
China, and I believed I could make the authorities understand our center was not a threat” 
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April. 25, 2011). 
Wang Xingjuan approached the Party many times to explain the mission of her organization, 
with  an  emphasis  on  not  challenging  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  Wang’s  effort  received  a  response  
from the  government.  “The  Ministry of State Security received my letter. They made a phone 
call and informed me that the National Security Law does not forbid contact between citizens 
and  citizens  of  foreign  countries’.  They  said,  ‘Everything that you were doing was very good.’ I 
informed the Beijing security chief about this conversation. He agreed to meet with me and also 
arranged a meeting for me with the Bureau of State Security. I thought the crisis was over. But it 
was not. The central authorities already had the impression that our center was politically 
questionable” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April. 25, 2011). 
Applying personal connection is also one of main strategies for Guo Jianmei to deal with 
the registration crisis. When her organization was kicked out by a law firm, Guo Jianmei chose 
to use her own personal connections and successfully registered under the Law School of Beijing 
University.  This  strategy  was  similar  to  Wang  Xingjuan’s  approach. 
However,  when  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s patronized relationship was revoked in 
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2010, Guo Jianmei did not try to register as a NGO anymore; instead, she renamed the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  the  Zhong  Ze  Women’s  Legal  Aid  Service  Center,  and  registered  as  a  
private unit.  
Most importantly, while Wang chose to maintain silence with the media; Guo Jianmei chose 
to speak out in front of the media. Facing the revocation of registration, the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center issued  a  statement  and  spread  it  widely.  The  statement:  “Farewell,  Beida!  Statement  
by  Guo  Jianmei  and  Her  team”11 was written in Chinese and was translated into English, and 
was sent out to the e-mail  lists  of  many  international  women’s  groups. 
Guo Jianmei chose a much more confrontational strategy to resolve the registration issue. 
She explained  her  reasoning  during  our  interview.  “I  do  not  think  maintaining  a  registration  
status is the first priority for our center” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April. 26, 2011). 
On the contrary, Wang Xingjuan kept silent in front of media with the hope of regaining 
registration status.  
As for Common Language, its organizers have not tried to register. According to one 
organizer,  “I  do  not  care  if  Common  Language  is  registered  or  not.  What  I  am  concerned  with  is  
the task of Common Language, and what I can do here. Besides, we are not sure what kind of 
attitude the government has towards lesbian groups” (interviewed by author, Oct.15, 2012). 
Based on field observation, in addition to the unclear governmental attitude, lesbian groups in 
China are not eager to register because most international donors understand the special situation 
of LGBT groups, and do not require official registration in order to obtain grants.    
 
4.2. Struggle 2. Trial and Failure: Building a relationship with the government 
Trial  and  failure  is  the  best  term  to  describe  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center  and  Common  Language’s  efforts  when  they  tried  to  build  a  relationship  with  the  
government. It is indeed a process of political struggle. However, under a repressive regime, 
maintaining a certain relationship with the government is crucial for self-mobilized groups in 
order to get involved in the policy-making process. 
Charles  Tilly  once  stated,  “National regimes strongly shape available performances and 
repertories through top-down controls over claim making mediated by political opportunity 
                                                 
11 
http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2010/06/farewell-beida-statement-by-guo-jianmei-and-her-team.h
tml, accessed on May 5, 2013. 
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structure” (2008, 208). Based  on  field  research,  Tilly’s  statement  is  even  more  applicable  for  the  
situation  in  authoritarian  regimes.  One  expert  of  women’s  issues,  who  has  studied the behavior 
of social groups for more than two decades, shared her point of view during our interview. Of 
course, the government will foster and strengthen the capabilities of social groups, but the major 
premise is to make sure the Party is leading” (interviewed by author, Nov. 7, 2011). 
One  ministerial  officer  of  All  China  Women’s  Federation  (ACWF)  has  observed  that,  “I 
think there is one significant change of the relationship between social groups and the 
authorities. From my point of view, social groups spent most of their time in the past criticizing 
the government. Nowadays, social groups have learned the way to cooperate with the 
government in order to earn their credibility” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 18, 
2009). 
Based on field research, one major approach of these three groups is to grasp every political 
opportunity to build up their relationship with the governments. As was previously mentioned, it 
is difficult to tell if similar political opportunities will have the same influence on the political 
space of social groups.  
For example, the attempted visit of the U.S. First Lady, Hillary Clinton, to the Maple Center 
in  1995  caused  the  Center’s  registration  status  to  be  revoked  by  the  government.  However,  the  
visit of Hillary Clinton  to  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  in  1998  brought  nationwide  attention.  
Building  upon  this  attention,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  received  several  critical  lawsuits  
and made them into model examples of progress towards gender equity in China. 
Nevertheless,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  
all have figured out certain patterns of government reactions after so many years of struggle. For 
example, several activists have indicated the significance of international events, which are held 
in China.   
As an example, a lesbian activist who has participated in the queer movement since the very 
beginning of queer activity in Beijing, pointed out that the central government cleans up the 
organizing sites whenever there may be international eyes watching. For example, the Summer 
Palace, which was a gathering place for artists and social discontents, was cleaned up before the 
1995  Fourth  Women’s  Conference.  The  government  also  took  similar  actions  towards  social  
groups before the 2008 Olympic Game.  
As  a  result,  women’s  advocacy  groups  have  learned  to  stay  low  key  whenever  there  will  be  
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international attention. Hence, figuring out the pattern and the boundaries of the government is 
the  first  strategy  for  women’s  advocacy  groups  when they try to build up their relationship with 
the government. 
Furthermore, the relationship with the central government also depends on how close an 
organizer  is  with  the  government.  A  leader  of  one  women’s  group  has  stated,  “We  know  how to 
play the government game” (interviewed by author, March 18, 2013). According to one 
organizer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  most  of  the  time,  the  connections  of  their  leader,  
Guo Jianmei, helps their organization to get support from the government. 
One leader of a lesbian group has good connections with the government, and she is very 
optimistic  about  the  relationship  between  the  government  and  the  social  groups.  She  says,  “The  
government will finally loosen up its control over social groups because the government will 
understand that social groups have helped the society in many ways that the government has 
failed  to.”  She adds,  “The  only  matter  is  time” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 
2011). Still, she agrees that the boundaries for not organizing any anti-governmental activity will 
remain. 
 
4.2.1. Strategy 1. Figuring out the boundaries of the government 
Based on my interviews with the founders of the three organizations that I studied, Wang 
Xingjuan from the Maple Center; Guo Jianmei from the Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Xu  
Bin from the Common Language, the boundaries which are set by the central government, are 
fluid and can be changed at any time in various directions. From their points of view, 
maintaining governmental legitimacy is the major factor that will decide the attitude of the 
central authorities toward social groups. 
As  a  ministerial  officer  of  ACWF  shares,  “The government has tried so many ways to 
maintain the stability of the society. If one social organization is viewed as political sensitive, it 
will be paid much attention by the government. When the society is harmony, there is less 
restriction. We can do anything we want. However, when the society is tense, the government 
becomes much sensitive. The government will prevent any occurrence of events and will be 
afraid of people’s  gathering  on  the  street” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 16, 
2011). 
Therefore, it depends on each social group to figure out the attitude of the governments and 
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the way to interact with the governments. These three founders gave me different answers when 
asked: how will you describe the relationship between your organization and the central 
government? Wang Xingjuan thinks the central government does not trust them and believes that 
the Maple Center has some connection with international donors that might cause damage to the 
regime.  
Guo Jianmei believes that the central government has the wrong idea about the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center.  When  Guo  Jianmei  was  asked  to  have  a  tea  chat  with  government 
officials12,  they  advised  her  to  “abolish  sensitivity.”  Guo  Jianmei  pointed  out  that  from  the  
government’s  perspective,  her  organization  is  involved  in  multiple  sensitive  issues,  namely,  
international donors, human rights law cases, and the promotion of reform of the legal system.  
From  Xu  Bin’s  point  of  view,  it  is  a  little  bit  difficult  to  describe  their  relationship  with  the  
government.  She  adds  that,  “it  is  a  grey  area,  and  we  are  not  sure  what  is  the  government  
perspective regarding queer organizations” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug.12, 
2011). But Xu believes that the government has watched Common Language and pays attention 
to the nationwide lesbian movement. She has also experienced the appearance and questioning of 
policemen at her house. 
Even though each group has different views about its relationship with the government, 
based on field research, most of interviewees agreed that it is crucial for an advocacy group to 
maintain some degree of relationship with both the central government and the local 
governments. It is crucial for following three reasons. First of all, maintaining good relationship 
helps advocacy group to get involved in the policy-making process. 
Second, it helps organizers to attain their goals. Third, in the context of a repressive regime, 
maintaining a good relationship with the government decreases governmental obstacles when 
working  with  third  parties.  For  example,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  once  had  a  project  
with GAP13, USA. This project is about building up a model that helps foreign companies to 
support NGOs in China. During their cooperation, the New York Times published an interview 
with Guo Jianmei, in which Guo Jianmei made some criticism of the government.  
Guo Jianmei recalled the reaction of GAP after reading  this  report.  “The  management  level  
of GAP was so nervous. They asked their office in Beijing to talk to me. They told me that the 
                                                 
12 In China, when the police department invites organizers of social groups to have some talks, they use the term 
“having  tea  together.” 
13 GAP, is an American multinational clothing retailer. 
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Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  should  not  have  any  problem  with  the  government.  Otherwise,  our  
tension with the government will  cause  problems  for  their  business  in  China.”  Guo  Jianmei  
further  stated  that  “the  Chinese  enterprises  are  even  more terrified of the government” 
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug.17, 2011).    
This one example also shows the difficulties of NGOs in surviving in a repressive regime, 
and furthermore, how figuring out the boundaries of the government becomes crucial for their 
survival. However, these boundaries are vague. Here are three examples. First, as previously 
cited, the same attempted visit of Hillary Clinton caused the cancellation of the registration status 
of  the  Maple  Center,  but  won  the  recognition  from  the  government  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center.  
Second, the same is true of international funding. The central authorities categorize 
international  foundations  based  on  the  government’s  evaluation  of  these  foundations’  level  of  
threat  toward  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  For  some  foundations,  those  that  are  categorized  as  having  
a political agenda, social groups are not allowed to accept their funding. A governmental official 
told  me,  “We  called  it  a  red,  yellow  and  green  light  system.  A  red  light  foundation  is  a  dangerous  
one, and social groups can only accept funding from a green light foundations” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011). 
However,  this  categorized  system  is  not  open  to  the  public,  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center experienced the exact opposite results when getting funding from the same international 
foundation. The funding from this one international foundation  helped  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center to host a conference with one local government, but became the main reason for the 
cancellation of another collaborative work between the Center and another local government.  
The third example is the vague attitude  of  the  governments’  response  towards  public  
gatherings. During my interviews, some organizers believe that the government is afraid to make 
a scene in public, because officials try to avoid angering the society. Therefore, these activists 
believe that the  government  won’t  use  violence  at  public  events.  But,  at  the  same  time,  some  
organizers believe that the government will interfere whenever there is a public gathering.  
There  are  also  some  activists  who  believe  that  the  governments’  attitude  depends  on  the 
judgment of officials about the degree of danger of particular activity. In general, most activists 
believe  that  there  is  no  boundary  of  government’s  interference.  In  other  words,  the  government  
will use any and all applicable force to intervene in a public gathering. 
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An organizer outside Beijing shared her experience. Her organization is based on one of 
major  cities  in  China.  She  recalled,  “We  were  planning  to  hold  a  flash  mob  activity  to  display  
our rainbow flag in one of the most crowed spots. However, the officer from the security 
department  went  to  our  volunteer’s  house  and  asked  her  to  cancel  this  event.”  She  then  shared  
their  discussion  and  strategy.  “We  thought  our  government  was  afraid  of  outdoor  gatherings,  and  
will stop these kinds of activity.  Afterwards,  we  held  most  of  activities  indoors” (interviewed by 
author, April. 19, 2013). 
Since the boundaries of government action are vague in every area, including funding, 
media reports, and public gatherings, advocacy groups have tried to learn as much as possible 
from each governmental intervention, and try to figure out the boundaries little by little. As Guo 
Jianmei  states,  “fumbling  for  fifteen  years  helps us develop some strategies”  (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, April. 26, 2011). 
Wang Xingjuan  stated  her  fundamental  strategy  for  negotiating  with  the  government.  “Even 
though the circumstances for survival was so difficult, I did not want to quit. From my point of 
view, if the central authorities found any wrong doings in us, they could ban the center. But, if 
they did not forbid the existence of our center, we would continue our work. In fact, I believe our 
work benefits the country” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug.15, 2011). 
Wang  Xingjuan’s  attitude  is  shared  by  many  women’s  activists. Activists believe that the 
existence of their organizations indicate the tolerance of the central government. And for most 
advocacy groups, the organizers have dedicated themselves to their missions as long as the 
government does not ban their organizations.  As  Anthony  Spires  well  put,  “Vagueness  and  
generalities are always safest, it seems” (2011, 29). 
Unlike  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  Common  Language  has  not  
yet built a communication channel with the government. Therefore, activists have tried very hard 
to  figure  out  the  boundaries  of  the  government.  Xu  Bin  shared  her  strategy.  “We  will  try  to  get  
involved in different kind of laws which are related to queers. We will work with other groups, 
including  women’s  groups,  AIDS groups and other advocacy groups. By building coalitions with 
different groups, we can create opportunities for our perspectives to be heard” (interviewed by 




4.2.2. Strategy 2. Building up communication channels 
When discussing their relationships with the government, one common conclusion of these 
three founders is the importance of establishing communication channels with the government. 
Instead of using confrontational strategies, these three founders believe that a communication 
strategy will increase their chances of getting involved in the policy-making process. 
Not only the founders, but also the organizers who were interviewed all addressed the 
importance of being able to communicate with the government. However, both founders and 
organizers believe that building up communication channels with the government brings more 
symbolic than real benefits. Because, even though these actions will help them to make 
connections with both the central government and local governments, it still depends on political 
will of the governments to decide to what extent a social group can get involved in 
policy-making process. 
For the founders and organizers, building up a communication relationship with the 
government  won’t  guarantee  their  organizations’  survival.  Nor  does  it  end  intervention  from  the  
government.  One  organizer  who  has  worked  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  for  more  than  
ten  years,  pointed  out  that  what  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  tries  to  get  is  some  “lip  
support”  from  the  government. She said that they could not imagine getting economic support 
from the government (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
Making as many connections as possible is the main approach of the three founders in 
building up communication channels with the government. This means the founders have spent a 
lot of energy expanding their connections with the society. Wang Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei 
share  this  similar  strategy.  Guo  Jianmei  states  her  own  perspective.  “As  an  NGO’s  leader,  we  
need to spend a lot of time building up connections, because our organizational work is lonely, 
marginalized, questioned, and without resources” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April. 
26, 2011).  
This strategy does help the Maple Center and the Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  building  up  
their organizational capabilities. Since both of their organizations are well known in their fields, 
the two founders are often invited to participate in both international and national events.  
Wang Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei both state that meeting other people is an important task 
for their organizations and helps them to make connections with the government. Furthermore, 
the  activists’  efforts  do  not  stop  after  meeting  people.  The  most  important  task  of  the  activists  is  
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to transform these societal connections into support for their organizations.  
As  Guo  Jianmei  indicated,  “there  are  some  important  figures  who  do  not  often  participate  in  
public activities, for example, the chairperson of Criminal Law Research Committee of China 
Law Society. However, he agreed to participate in our conference. The appearances of these 
important professional figures help us to build up our professional reputation in the society and 
with the government”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011).  
Compared  to  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  Common  Language  is  
a relatively young organization. Moreover, the queer issue is still viewed as sensitive in the 
society. In other words, Common Language has endured a double-marginalized status.  
Thus,  the  only  way  for  Xu  Bin  to  build  connections  is  through  networking  with  women’s  
organizations and other advocacy groups, which are much friendlier regarding queer issues. For 
example, Common Language applied to join a research project that was organized by the 
Anti-Domestic Violence Network. 
Organizers and volunteers of Common Language studied the situation of lesbians where 
there  was  domestic  violence.  Several  organizers  of  Common  Language  recalled,  “When  we  
presented our findings, some experts of domestic violence issues came to join us. They told us 
this is a new issue for them. They were not aware of the situation of lesbians in the past” 
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 9 & 12, 2011). Xu  Bin  added,  “We  told  them  
stories, which helped them to understand the situation. We had good working relationship with 
these women experts. They respect us too. This is quite a different experience compared to other 
collaboration project” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011). 
By  working  with  other  women’s  and  advocacy  groups,  Common  Language  has  created  
political space to get involved in the policy-making process. Based on interviews and analyses of 
secondary materials, this research also found that Common Language has increased its 
participation in various kinds of social activities since its transforming its organizational task in 
2008, when it switched its focus from community organizing to advocacy work.  
By  allying  with  other  women’s  groups,  Common  Language  has been able to introduce the 
situation  of  queers  to  experts  and  activists.  At  the  same  time,  women’s  groups  have  learned  from  
the  experiences  of  queers  and  deepened  their  perspectives  on  various  lesbians’  issues.    
This research has found that the activists of  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  all  make  
their own lists of governmental institutions that they will try to make connections with. The 
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activists believe that some governmental institutions play an important roles affecting their 
advocacy work.  
For example, for Common Language, making connections with ACWF is one of its major 
priorities.  Xu  Bin  states,  “One  of  our  goals  is  to  push  ACWF  to  include  lesbians  into  their  
various  kinds  of  services.  Compared  to  all  other  women’s  organization,  ACWF  reaches  the 
largest population of women and their services are extensive. I do not think we can have a 
cooperative  relationship  with  ACWF,  but  I  do  hope  that  by  our  efforts,  we  can  awaken  ACWF’s  
staff to an awareness about situation of lesbians” (interviewed by author, April. 16, 2013). 
 
4.2.3. Strategy 3. Submitting Professional Suggestions during the Law-Making Process 
In China, when a new law is drafted, the government department that is in charge of the 
content of the new law, will ask for suggestions from the public. Even though their suggestions 
are  rarely  taken  into  consideration,  both  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  the  Maple  Center  
grasp every opportunity to submit their own opinions. According to one lawyer of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  one  sixth  of  their suggestions will be taken into consideration by the 
government.  
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  the  Maple  Center  not  only  submit  their  suggestions  
to  the  lawmaking  process,  but  also  submit  their  own  drafts  of  new  laws.  Women’s  activists  will  
spend several years doing research and holding discussion groups on critical issues. After 
finalizing their suggestions, the organizers will sometimes submit them independently, and 
sometimes they will invite other organizations to jointly submit suggestions.   
For example, after conducting two-years of research on sexual harassment, the Maple 
Center  submitted  their  draft  of  “Preventing  Sexual  Harassment  in  the  Workplace  Act”  in  2009.  
The  Maple  Center  cooperated  on  this  project  with  two  other  women’s  study  centers, 
Zhejiang Women's Studies, and Women and Gender Study Center of Sun Yat-sen University. 
Not only do they submit their suggestions to the relevant departments, but the Maple Center 
and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  send  copies  of  their  suggestions  to individual 
members  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  to  lobby  on  critical  issues.  Organizers  of  the  Maple  
Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  share  the  same  perspective  regarding  this  strategy,  
saying,  “By  distributing  our  suggestions,  we  are  hoping more important people will read our 
opinions”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). And,  “We  are  always  trying  to  
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make our voice heard as much as possible”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug.15, 
2011). 
As a relatively young organization, Common Language has not participated in the 
lawmaking process yet. However, Common Language uses other strategies to exert influence on 
public policy. For example, Common Language has tried to build connections with the ACWF 
and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Both institutions are 
GONGOs.  The  ACWF  is  the  representative  of  women’s  voices  in  the  central  government  and  the  
CDC is the key organization for discussing health policies. 
My analysis has found that the strategy of Common Language in building up connections 
with  ACWF  is  to  join  the  projects  of  other  women’s  groups.  Since  many  women’s  organizations  
have  different  working  relationships  with  both  ACWF  and  local  women’s  federations,  by  
working  with  women’s  groups,  Common Language creates opportunities to introduce itself and 
lesbian  issues  to  both  ACWF  and  local  women’s  federations. 
As for building a relationship with the CDC, Common Language chose to grasp the 
opportunity to work with the CDC when the CDC had a research project about diseases and 
lesbians.  This  opportunity  was  created  by  Common  Language’s  effort  to  research  the  lesbian  
health situation in 2005. A female professor noticed this report and asked Xu Bin to give a talk to 
her class. One Ph.D student was inspired  by  Xu’s  speech  and  decided  to  choose  the  topic  of  
lesbian health issues as her dissertation, a topic which was sponsored by the CDC.  
Xu  Bin  explained  her  idea  about  this  cooperation.  “This  student  came  to  seek  Common  
Language’s  help.  We  agreed  for  two reasons. First, we wanted to be recognized by the CDC. 
Second,  we  also  thought  we  should  understand  the  health  situation  of  the  lesbian  population.”  Xu  
Bin  continued,  “We  became  this  project’s  sponsor.  We  introduced  this  graduate  student  to  
lesbian communities. In the end, she successfully gathered more than three hundred blood 
samples of lesbians” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
This cooperation created political opportunities for Common Language. As Xu Bin stated, 
“I  was  invited to talk about the lesbian health situation at the CDC. Furthermore, Common 
Language  got  the  chance  to  talk  about  the  ‘Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  on  Blood  
donation.’  We  always  wanted  to  revise  this  law,  because  this  law  forbade  homosexuals  from 
making blood donations” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
The  “Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  on  Blood  donation”  was  revised  in  2012,  and  
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since then, lesbians have been allowed to make blood donations.  
In conclusion, this research  found  that  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
and Common Language all emphasize the role of the law in making social changes. Therefore, 
the organizers have used various strategies to involve themselves the law-making process, and all 
three  women’s  advocacy  groups  have  successfully  participated  at  different  stages  of  the  
law-making process.  
 
4.2.4. Strategy 4. Building a Working Relationship with Local Governments 
Having connections has been viewed as an important factor in the context of the Chinese 
society. However, this research has found that it is even more significant for advocacy groups to 
build cooperative relations with local governments than with the central government. 
For  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  working with the local 
government is a strategy that has brought them two benefits. First, this is an alternative way to 
build up their relationship with the government. Second, working with local government 
provides them a platform to carry out their ideal model for a better society.  
My analysis has found out that working with local governments provide political 
opportunities for social groups to develop their social influence. For example, the Maple Center 
worked with the Tianjin city government to experiment with a zero-domestic violence 
community. My examination of this particular strategy has found that both the degree of 
autonomy and the degree of empowerment increased significantly when the Maple Center 
carried its collaboration project with Tianjin women’s  federation. 
Even before the establishment of the People Republic of China, local policy experiments 
had been encouraged by the central leaders to try out various ways to solve problems (Heilmann 
2011).  The  terms  “experimental  sites”  and  “model  experiences” are frequently used by local 
governments when they announce an innovative policy. Thus, local governments are willing to 
try out new policies that are presented by social groups if the local officers trust the organizers. 
Since Wang Xingjuan and Guo Jianmei both worked for the central government before they 
left  and  established  their  own  organizations,  they  have  good  connections  with  the  local  women’s  
federations, especially Guo Jianmei, who worked for the ACWF in the past. Both of them 




However, there are risks involved for social groups that work with local governments. 
Sometimes, once the innovative policy successfully wins praise from the public, it is possible 
that the local government will end the collaborative relationship with social groups, and try to 
gain all the credit for itself. This is the situation that happened to the Maple Center. When the 
model of the zero-domestic violence community gained nationwide attention and praise, the 
Tianjin  women’s  federation  asked  the  Maple  Center  to  leave.  This  model  is  still  considered  an  
important  political  achievement  of  Tianjin  women’s  federation.  As  a  result,  the  strategy  of  
working with the Tianjin women’s  federation  resulted  in  both  political  opportunity  and  political  
constraint for the Maple Center. 
However, Wang Xingjuan still believes that collaborating with local governments will 
benefit her organization. From her point of view, even though her organization lost the control of 
its model in Tianjin, the success of this model won credibility for the Maple Center. Wang stated, 
“Tianjin  is  a  municipality government, and yet, they chose to carry out a model which was 
designed by a small organization. This is of course an achievement” (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
Unlike  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  building  relationships  with  
local governments is an extremely tough task for the Common Language. The main reason is 
people’s  perspective  regarding  homosexuality.  Xu  Bin  recalls  a  conversation  with  a  staff  of  one  
local  women’s  federation,  who  suggested  that  homosexuality  was  viewed  as  a  sin  locally,  and  so  
it was not possible for them to help queers who are being abused by domestic violence. 
(interviewed by author, April 16, 2013).  
Based on interviews, this study has concluded that organizers of Common Language have 
deployed two strategies to build up a working relationship with the local government, namely, by 
collaboration  with  other  women’s  groups,  and  by  empowering  local  lesbian  groups.  One  example  
of  working  through  women’s  groups  is  Common  Language’s  participation  in  the  anti-domestic 
violence alliance. Joining alliances of women groups help the Common Language to build 
connections outside the queer community. Moreover, it provides Common Language a channel 
to build relationships with both the central government and local governments. 
Since 2008, when Common Language decided to focus on advocacy work, Common 
Language also began its preparation to empower local lesbian groups to participate in advocacy 
work. Since then, activists of Common Language have travelled to provinces and hold various 
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advocacy  workshops,  including  “knowing  CEDAW,”14 and  “how  to  work  with  the  media.”  By  
empowering local lesbian groups, Common Language has created the political possibility that 
these groups will eventually get involved in the local policy-making processes. 
As  Xu  Bin  states  her  goal,  “We  hope  Common  Language  can  first  build collaborative 
projects  with  the  Beijing  women’s  federation.  If  we  have  some  successful  experiences,  we  will  
introduce our experiences to lesbian groups in other provinces. After all, there are women’s  
federations everywhere” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
 
4.3.  Struggle  3.  Political  Forces  to  Marginalize  Women’s  Advocacy  Groups    
Fighting against marginalization by the government is one of the major struggles for social 
groups. The major factors which will cause marginalization of the Maple Center, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  are:  lack  of  financial  resources,  lack  of  human  
resources,  and  loss  of  society’s  recognition.    
If  social  groups  don’t  have  registration  status,  they  have  difficulty  getting  funding.  When 
discussing  this  issue,  an  organizer  of  the  Maple  Center  cites  the  government’s  current  policy  of  
subsidizing an NGO if this organization provides social services to people as an example of the 
importance of governmental recognition. She stated, 
“One challenge of the Maple Center is that we are not registered. Therefore, according to 
the current regulations, the governments cannot purchase our services. This causes blocks in our 
development. In fact, both the government and society have recognized the work of the Maple 
Center. But without registration status, we cannot grow. I think it is very important to know how 
to play the game of the government” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
In other words, official registration status is the prerequisite for social groups to receive 
government’s  subsidies.  However,  both  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
had their registration status revoked by the government, while Common Language has never 
obtained official registration status as an NGO. James Mittelman explains the significance of 
registration status for social groups,  “In  other  words,  these  organizations  must  be  officially  
endorsed in order to receive tax exemption, sponsorship from domestic enterprises, and 
preferential treatment in governmental purchasing policy” (2011, 180). 
Struggling for financial resources not only causes the founders to spend a lot of time 
                                                 
14  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, United Nations. 
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looking for financial resources, and thus leaves them less time for other organizational tasks, but 
it also makes other organizers worry about their own future. One senior organizer of Common 
Language, who has been an activist since the establishment of Common Language, admits that 
the lack of funding resources makes her worry about the sustainability of Common Language 
(interviewed by author, Feb. 8, 2011).  
Revocation of registration status is not the only approach that political forces have used to 
marginalize  women’s  advocacy  groups.  Based  on  my  field  research,  losing  office  space,  
monitoring of phones, cancelation of events by the police, and questioning by the security 
department are just several examples of problems caused by political forces. All these 
marginalized forces threaten the survival of social groups. As one organizer of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  stated,  “When  facing  severe  interference  from  the  government,  I  would  
sometimes worry that our organization could not sustain itself and that my job would not be 
secure”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011).  
The lack of funding resources  not  only  makes  a  women’s  advocacy  group  struggle  for  its  
own  survival,  but  also  causes  tension  between  women’s  advocacy  groups.  Gao  Xiaoxian,  the  
founder of Shaanxi Women Studies, describes the challenge of finding funding resources for the 
establishment  of  her  organization,  “The  Ford  (Foundation)  replied  quickly  that  as  they  had  
already  funded  a  women’s  legal  project  in  Beijing,  they  could  not  support  another  one  in  Xi’an.  
The Global Fund for Women replied in July 1995 and agreed to support us in establishing a 
women’s  hotline.  As  we  did  not  have  our  own  foreign  currency  bank  account,  this  source  of  
funds did not come through until April 1996” (Hsiung, Jaschok, Milwertz and Chan 2001, 200). 
The  Shaanxi  Women  Studies’  experience  is  only  one  example  of  the problems that lacking 
financial  resources  can  cause.  Women’s  advocacy  groups  compete  with  each  other.  My  study  
also found two other significant impacts caused by a lack of funding. First, sometimes the 
agenda  of  a  women’s  advocacy  group  might  be  changed  to  follow  the  donors’  agenda.  Second,  
the lack of funding resources can also cause a lack of human resources. 
 
4.3.1. Strategy 1. Encountering the Lack of Economic and Human Resources: Recruiting 
Volunteers and Extending Connections in the Society 
Organizations without registration status not only face the challenge of lacking financial 
resources, but also face the difficulty of recruiting organizers. The causal relationship between 
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losing registration status and a lack of human resources can be explained as follows:  
First, not having registration status causes a lack of funding resources, which then makes it 
difficult for a social group to recruit organizers. Moreover, with restricted financial resources, 
women’s  advocacy  groups  sometimes  cannot  recruit  staffs who are willing to dedicate 
themselves. An organizer of the Maple Center, who gave up her own career and joined the 
Center,  shared  her  observation.  “I think many people are impetuous nowadays. They want to 
make big money quickly, and do not want to do hard work. It also happens here. Some staffs do 
not work hard, because they think they do not get great pay. They just do what been asked and 
won’t  put  more  effort” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
Second, not having registration status means a lack of recognition from the government, 
which then causes a social group to lose credibility with professionals. As a result, it becomes 
tougher for social groups to recruit talented people. Furthermore, even for some talented people 
would like to join NGOs, the lack of recognition also makes for questioning by their relatives. As 
one  organizer  of  the  Maple  Center,  who  is  in  her  20s,  stated,  “My parents did not express their 
opinion regarding my work here. They are not against it, but they do not support it either” 
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
Based  on  field  research,  this  study  found  that  the  three  founders  of  the  women’s  groups  I  
studied  have  one  similar  “killing  two  birds  with  one  stone”  strategy  to  overcome  the  shortage of 
funding and human resources. These three groups all rely heavily on the women-power of 
volunteers of various professional backgrounds. 
To attract volunteers of different backgrounds, the founders have to seize every opportunity 
to meet people and  introduce  their  organizations.  As  Guo  Jianmei  stated,  “A  good  leader  of  an  
organization should spend forty percent of her/his time making connections”  (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011).  
As  Florini,  Lai  and  Tan  state,  “those  networks have value well beyond the immediate goals 
they set out to accomplish. In a society with an abundance of social networks, people interact 
repeatedly and thus know that doing someone a good turn now may be repaid by that person in 
the future” (2012, 92). 
Wang  Xingjuan  also  shared  her  strategy.  “Our center has a new development this year in 
that we established a department of public affairs. The establishment of this new department is to 
overcome the challenge of fund raising. In addition, we have a new director who was an 
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entrepreneur. . I met her at a gathering of female entrepreneurs. I was invited to give a speech. 
She said my speech touched her heart, and made her decide to make contributions to our center. 
At first, she was on the board, and this year, our board members nominated her to be our 
director” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
In addition to attracting talented people by presenting herself at social events, Wang 
Xingjuan has another strategy, namely, inviting people to join the board, or to become an 
advisory committee member, which also helps her organizations to build up connections. 
Currently the chairperson of the Maple Center, Huang Hauming, is the secretary of a GONGO, 
China Association for NGO Cooperation.  
An organizer, who has been a volunteer for the Maple Center for many years before she 
became  a  staff  member,  shared  her  evaluation  of  this  invitation.  “I think that Teacher Wang 
invited Huang to be our chairperson in the hope that Huang will bring his resources to the Maple 
Center. But, I do not observe chairperson Huang contributing anything here”  (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011).  
Even though, Wang Xingjuan has tried hard to bring both human and economic resources to 
the Maple Center, there exist a risk that people with resources might not be passionate enough to 
make a contribution. 
Therefore,  the  activists  of  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  use  another  strategy  to  
make sure that their recruits are passionate towards their missions, namely, recruiting and 
training volunteers. These three groups have created platforms for volunteers to learn from their 
organizations.  For  example,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  provides  internship  opportunities  
for law school students.  
One of my interviewees,  a  lawyer,  also  interned  at  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  before  
she  joined  the  center.  After  this  lawyer’s  graduation,  she  was  ambitious  to  promote  the  
transformation of the law field. But she soon found out that law firms are similar to the 
government and that these firms only follow the rule of money. She quit this position and joined 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.    
According  to  her,  the  training  program  at  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  is  quite  unique  
because law schools do not provide classes such as gender and law or legal aid. The learning 
process  does  not  end  after  these  volunteers  understand  the  organization’s  issues  and  the  
organizers’  skills.  In  fact,  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  aim  to  empower  their  volunteers  
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to become organizers.  
Xu Bin states that since 2011, Common Language has organized a steering committee to 
discuss the movement direction more deeply, and of the five members of this steering committee, 
four of them were volunteers before becoming organizers. The empowerment of volunteers is a 
crucial strategy to expand human resources for grassroots organizations.  
Based on my interviews with the organizers of Common Language, there is one common 
reason that they chose to become organizers after volunteering, namely, that they have learned a 
lot from their volunteer experiences. For example, almost all of them never heard about gender 
issues or social movements before they joined Common Language. One organizer of Common 
Language  stated,  “When  I  conducted  that  research,  I  felt  pressure and was tired. But I chose to 
stay at Common Language, because I felt that I have learned a lot” (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
Comparing  to  other  women’s  groups,  Common  Language  is  a  young  organization  that  is  
struggling for various resources. Recruiting volunteers has become one of their major strategies 
to overcome the challenge of a lack of resources. One significant achievement of these three 
women’s  advocacy  groups  is  that  their  volunteers  not  only  stay  for  a  long  time,  but also 
introduce other friends to join the movement.  
As  a  young  organizer,  who  is  at  her  20s,  told  me,  “I  came  to  Common  Language  because  of  
my ex-girlfriend.  She  hoped  we  could  learn  more  about  lesbian  issues…After  she  went  abroad  to  
study, she recommended our junior female schoolmate  to  join  Common  Language…and I also 
ask  my  current  girlfriend  to  volunteer  here” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 9, 
2011).  
Volunteers of Common Language do not only invite their friends to join Common 
Language, they also go to other provinces to establish lesbian groups. During my field trips, I 
learned  of  two  examples  of  this  kind  of  expanding  social  influence  among  Common  Language’s  
volunteers. One of the volunteers set up a lesbian group at her graduate school. The other one 
finished her study in Beijing and went home to work, and established a lesbian group in her 
hometown. 
In other words, once these volunteers have adopted the same beliefs as their grass-root 
organizations, many of them will dedicate their whole lives to promoting the organizational goals. 
Being empowered by grass-root groups has transformed the life experiences of volunteers in 
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many ways. Many volunteers of Common Language reported that they shared a unique 
life-altering process. 
Xu Bin and one of the senior organizers of Common Language recalled that many 
volunteers have learned the way to come out to their families after volunteering at Common 
Language. Some volunteers will claim that interest in research is the major reason for them to 
join Common Language, and that they are not interested in organizing. Nevertheless, most of 
them have become active organizers for advocacy issues.  
Furthermore, the life-altering experiences do not just happen to volunteers. This 
empowerment extends its influence toward friends and family members of the volunteers. As one 
organizer  shared  her  experience,  “I  did  not  know  any  other  lesbian  before  I  joined  Common  
Language. After I volunteered here, I decided to come out to my family. My parents used to 
discipline me  strictly…They  were  shocked.  But  my  parents  learned  to  accept  me.  This  New  Year,  
my  girlfriend  also  came  home  with  me…Common  Language  just  finished  producing  a  booklet,  
and my father also helped us with the design” (interviewed by author, Oct. 12, 2011).  
These human resources provide leverage for grass-root organizations to survive everyday 
struggles. As of this year, there have been more than two hundred and thirty volunteers at the 
Maple Center. There are six volunteers per day for the hotline. As for Common Language, there 
are more than forty volunteers and most of them are under thirty years old. There is one 
volunteer per day for the three-hour hotline. 
 
4.3.2. Strategy 2. Dissolving Governmental Pressure on Organizers: Train the Trainer 
Training organizers is crucial for social groups to build up their teams, especially when the 
government harasses organizers all the time. Almost every organizer who was interviewed 
mentions being questioned by the government individually or together with other colleagues. 
This  kind  of  interference  is  described  as  “having  tea  together.” 
A leader of one of organizations that I studied described this kind of harassment to me. 
“They  (the  governments)  know  xxx  and  yyy  are  two  of  our  major  organizers,  therefore,  they  
invited them individually to have tea and talk. The national security department and the police 
department asked them to talk several times. They (the governmental officials) threatened that 
they would be not allowed to rent in Beijing. And the harassment did not end. Their parents were 
also visited by their local police. The local police asked if the parents knew what kind of work 
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their children were doing” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011).  
She  continued,  “The  visit  of  the  police  made  their parents anxious. Their parents asked their 
daughters to quit. After all, both of them are the only children in their family. Furthermore, my 
colleague told me, the police said that if they wanted to stay at the center, they needed to 
document every activity  of  mine  and  report  it  to  them.”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
Aug. 17, 2011). As a result, both these two organizers quit their jobs. 
As  Guo  Jianmei,  the  founder  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  points  out,  the  frequency  
of governmental talks, including talks with her colleagues and the family members of her 
colleagues, has caused her organization a lot of difficulty not only in sustaining their daily 
operation, but also in recruiting. Compared to other social groups, the harassment by the 
government  causes  especially  severe  problems  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.    
This  is  so  because,  first  of  all,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  is  a  legal  aid  organization  
and so its human resource requirement is restricted to those with a law degree. Second, most 
legal  professionals  can  easily  to  find  a  decent  job,  and  won’t  risk  their  own  security  to  work  for  
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.    
Therefore, designing applicable training programs to build up the organizational beliefs of 
the organizers and volunteers has become an approach to fight back against political repressive 
forces.  As  one  organizer  of  another  women’s  legal  aid  center  stated,  “In  the  beginning,  I  did  not  
plan to stay here for too long. After all, this is not my professional. But I was encouraged by my 
colleagues to learn new things, and I was awakened by our organization. I began to feel 
sympathy  and  passion  towards  women’s  issues.  I  am  a  woman  too.  In  addition,  I  was  interested  
in  observing  different  social  contradictions  every  day.” (interviewed by author, China, April. 21, 
2013).   
The  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  all  have  well  organized  training  programs.  Moreover,  
gender issues and the idea of NGOs are two main themes of every training program. And most 
organizers revealed at our interviews  that  they  had  not  learned  about  women’  groups  or  issues  
before joining their organizations. 
As of 2011, the Maple Center has trained sixteen training cohorts and more than five 
hundred hotline counselors. The Maple Center provides a series of training seminars for both 
their volunteer counselors and their organizers and has designed multi-level program classes and 
each level includes the topic of gender mainstreaming.   
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The  organizers  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  noted  that  their  organization 
continually holds training seminars for the staff, and the gender perspective is always an 
important  topic.  One  lawyer  talked  about  their  training  program.  “From  my  point  of  view,  we  
pay the most attention to a gender perspective. Therefore, we have many training seminars that 
focus  on  gender  perspective.  It  is  also  a  requirement  of  the  lawyers  at  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center to analyze law cases from a gender perspective” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
Aug. 17, 2011). 
My study has concluded that  training  programs  do  improve  the  organizers  and  volunteers’  
understanding of gender issues as well as the idea of NGOs. Most organizers of these three 
groups admit that they had not heard about a gender perspective before joining the organizations. 
An organizer  from  the  Maple  Center  stated,  “What  we  have  learned  from  the  training  programs 
was an eye-opening experience” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011). 
And by participating in training programs, volunteers have a better idea about the aims and 
goals of NGOs. In addition, they have begun to understand the connection between their work 
and  social  change.  A  lawyer  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  talked  about  the  reason  why  
she decided to stay at the center after finishing her intern training,  “After doing an internship 
here, I found that my view has been widened. For the first time, I realize that there is a huge 
group of people who need our help, and that our justice and legislative systems are problematic. 
Moreover, I found that what we are doing can actually help people. I think this is very 
meaningful” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
As a lesbian group, Common Language has spent a lot of time in training its organizers and 
volunteers. Xu Bin explains this is because  “most  of  them  do  not  understand  the  concept  of  
NGOs.”  Organizers  also  say  that  they  had  not  heard  about  the  queer  movement  before they 
joined Common Language (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011).  
This is the reality in China. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first known queer organizing 
can be traced back to 1995. However, this wave of queer organizing was dismissed after the 
central government crushed an event, the Queer Cultural Festival, and arrested two major 
organizers in 2001. Therefore, most lesbian organizers who were born after 1980 did not hear 
about any lesbian organizations when they were teenagers.  
For Common Language, training the trainers is a key strategy in developing their 
organization, and this true not just for Common Language, but also for the whole lesbian 
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movement.  Xu  Bin  stated  that  “rather  than  be  concerned  with  finishing  a  project,  we  place  more  
emphasis on the growth of our volunteers. Therefore, we decide whether or not to finish a project 
based on evaluating whether it will benefit our volunteers. The ultimate goal for working on a 
project is to train the volunteers and to build up their capabilities” (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Aug. 2, 2011).  
Common Language uses its projects as platforms to train its organizers and volunteers. 
Hence, Xu Bin and other organizers are open to suggestions from volunteers about the project 
because they believe that volunteers learn more from the process than the results of a single 
project. 
A volunteer of Common Language,  who  is  in  her  20s,  talked  about  her  experience.  “My  
girlfriend introduced me to volunteering here. After finishing the first project, I decided to stay 
because I felt I had grown from the project. Furthermore, I wanted to start an oral history project. 
It  has  always  been  my  interest  to  do  historical  research  on  a  lesbian  group….I  started  the  project,  
and I finished it. This project demanded a lot of hard work, and I insisted on finishing it. And I 
learned a lot from this project such as how to organize volunteers, how to communicate and how 
to get the results I wanted” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011). 
Xu  Bin  further  stressed  that  “by  using  this  strategy,  Common  Language  hopes  that  every  
volunteer who is trained by us can contribute to the nationwide lesbian movement. We hope to 
train  every  volunteer  to  become  an  organizer.”  Xu  adds,  “it  does  not  matter  if  trained  volunteers  
stay  in  Common  Language  or  not.”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011). 
 
4.3.3. Strategy 3. Raise Recognition of Issues and Organizations: Build up a Relationship 
with the Media 
The loss of registration status and the lack of funding resources, as well as the cancellation 
of events all are results of repressive political forces which will further cause social groups to 
lose recognition from society. Using media power is a strategy employed by the Maple Center, 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  to  overcome  these  challenges.  The  
first priority of this strategy is to build a relationship with the media. 
The  founder  of  the  Maple  Center,  Wang  Xingjuan,  and  the  founder  of  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center, Guo Jianmei worked for the government before they left and established their own 
organizations. Wang was the chief editor of Beijing Publisher Inc., and Guo was a news reporter 
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for the Juridical Newspaper. Both Wang and Guo have good connections with the media. 
According to interviews with one organizer of the Maple Center, whose work is public 
relations,  “communication with the media is not a difficult work since we already have a good 
relationship  with  the  media.” However, most of the time, the news is reported under the charity 
section  and  the  length  of  the  articles  is  usually  short.  But,  she  further  pointed  out,  “If  the  Maple  
Center launches a ground-breaking service, it will immediately attract a lot of attention from the 
media.”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011). As an example, when the Maple 
Center launched a service to provide parental skills training programs for migrant workers, 
China Daily used one whole page to report this initiative.  
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  has  built  a  good  relationship  with  the  media.  In  
addition to the personal connections between the founder and the media, the uniqueness of their 
law  cases  also  attracts  the  media’s  attention.  The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  represented  
several noteworthy cases, and each case has gained them nationwide attention. One example is 
the Deng Yujiao incident15 which attracted both domestic and international attention. And the 
representation  of  this  case  helped  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  build  up  its  professional  
reputation as a legal aid organization. 
Besides attracting media attention for the recognition of their organizations, both Wang 
Xingjuan  and  Guo  Jianmei  also  use  the  media’s  influence  to  raise  the  society’s  attention  to  
gender issues. This is a significant strategy to help them extend their influence nationwide. As 
Guo  stated,  “We  knew  that  in  the  context  of  China,  even  if  we  could  help several tens, or 
hundreds, or thousands of cases, the fundamental problems would still persist…We  therefore  
developed three standards to guide our work. We handle cases of, first, exceptionally poor 
people whose rights have been violated and yet are unable to defend their rights; second, major 
                                                 
15 According  to  Wikipedia:  “The  Deng Yujiao incident ( Dèng  Yùjiāo  Shìjiàn) occurred on 10 May 2009 at a hotel 
located in Badong County, Hubei province, in the People's Republic of China. Deng Yujiao, a 21-year-old female 
pedicure worker, tried to rebuff the advances of Deng Guida, director of the local township business promotions 
office, who had come to the hotel seeking sexual services. She allegedly stabbed her assailant several times trying to 
fight him off, resulting in his death. Badong County police subsequently arrested Deng Yujiao and charged her with 
homicide and refused to grant her bail. This case came to national prominence through internet forums and 
chatrooms, where netizens were enraged by her treatment. The case resonated with the public anger over the 
corruption and immorality of officials, and garnered over four million forum posts across the country. Chinese 
authorities attempted to play down the incident by limiting its presence on Chinese web portals, and a large number 
of discussion threads were censored. Following groundswell of public protests and online petitions, prosecutors 
dropped murder charges, granted her bail, and charged her with a lesser offense of "intentional assault". She was 
found guilty, but did not receive a sentence due to her mental state. The two surviving officials involved in the 
incident  were  sacked,  also  ostensibly  in  response  to  public  pressure.”  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Yujiao_incident, access on April, 07, 2012. 
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cases  of  serious  abuses  of  women’s  rights,  which  usually  have  a  widespread  social  impact  and  
reaction; and finally, cases that are closely related to the reform, social transformation or 
economic transition of the country” (Hsiung, Jaschok, Milwertz and Chan 2001, 200). 
During  our  conversation,  Guo  Jianmei  cited  several  cases  that  failed  to  awaken  the  judges’  
awareness  toward  women’s  rights.  The  next  step  she  took  was  to  call  the  local  media  and  to  try  
to explain the significance of the case. Most of time, the cases she represented would be reported 
and would stimulate a fierce discussion among locals. Sometimes, the media reports would even 
change the opinion of the judges. 
Guo Jianmei also mentions another way to use the power of the media as leverage. She 
states  that  sometimes  she  and  other  lawyers  in  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  would  invite  
media reporters to sit in on a trial. Guo believes that the presence of media reporters puts 
pressure on judges and might remind judges to avoid any bias in their rulings. A lawyer of the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  stated  her  experience  in  the  courts,  “Director Guo always reminds 
us how to protect ourselves. For example, Director Guo will suggest we invite the media to come 
with us. In fact, this helps our cases. Because  the  local  people  won’t  try  to  stop  our  investigations  
with the presence of the media”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
Xu Bin also shared her strategy of using media reporting as leverage to  help  her  group’s  
advocacy  work.  “When  we  held  the  art  exhibition,  I  understood  there  existed  risk  that  our  event  
would be cancelled. I decided to use the language of the government to persuade local 
governments. I showed them the reports from last exhibition, and told them if China Daily 
reported our event, why would you choose to  end  this  event” (interviewed by author, China, 
April 16, 2013). 
Xu  added,  “I  don’t  use  any  confrontational  language.  I  choose  to  use  their  own  language  to  
make them understand that the society is changing and the government’s  attitude  is  changing  
too” (interviewed by author, China, April 16, 2013). Since  the  government’s  attitude  toward  
queer organizing is vague, the supportive reporting of the media has become one major tool for 
gaining recognition from local governments. 
However, whether or not to attract media attention is a dilemma for grass-root organizations. 
On the one hand, media reporting help them to establish an image and the credibility of their 
organizations with the public. On the other hand, media reports also attract governmental 
attention. My analysis has concluded that this is the reason why Common Language is very 
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careful about maintaining some distance between its organization and the media. 
Xu Bin shared her observation.  “From  my  point  of  view,  there  are  several  factors  which  will  
attract  the  government’s  attention,  namely,  media  reports,  public  activities,  and  huge  groups  of  
people. And if there are some news reports appearing in the international media, the government 
will definitely pay you a visit. Therefore, we will make a detailed plan before we hold an event. 
For  example,  we  won’t  let  the  media  report  our  plan  before  the  event  is  held,  and  we  limit  the  
number of participants. Furthermore, these participants need to be trustworthy. We will always 
visit the place where our event will be held several times during preparations” (interviewed by 
author, China, April 16, 2013).   
Several organizers pointed out that the first priority for Common Language is to avoid the 
cancellation of an event because they believe establishing a public image of lesbians is a very 
important  task  for  them.  As  He  Xiaopei  stated,  “Until  the  early  1990s  no  homosexuals  revealed  
his or her sexual orientation publicly to society or to the media” (2001, 41). 
To avoid news reports which might lead to the cancellation of events, Common Language 
chooses not to contact the media until the day before the events take place. Moreover, the 
organizers of Common Language only contact a few news reporters who have been friendly to 
lesbian groups in the past. Even though their caution might result in less media coverage of an 
event, sometimes there will be reports and interviews following events. 
In conclusion, the media play a crucial role in the agenda advocacy groups promoting social 
changes, especially in China, which has a vast territory and a large population. However, the 
media is controlled by the government. How to work with the media without attracting 
interference from either the central government or local governments is one of challenges for 
organizers. 
 
4.4. Struggle 4. Public Confrontations with Authorities are Not Permitted 
Public confrontation with the government is forbidden and it is the only matter of time 
before the leaders of a public confrontational movement will be taken away by the police. It is 
really tough to form a confrontational movement in China; therefore, many scholars argue that 
there  is  no  social  movement  in  China.  But  the  fact  is  that  these  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  
have tried very hard to work for social change in an authoritarian regime, and their efforts should 
qualify as a social movement.  
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As  Florini,  Lai,  and  Tan  state,  “the  space  for  associations  that  can  serve  as  autonomous  
counterweights to state authority or pose  challenges  to  the  party’s  position  through  advocacy  and  
criticism is extremely limited, although such associations do exit”(2012, 121). Indeed, the Maple 
Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  all  have  used  various  
strategies to actually confront and expand their restricted political space. Their confrontational 
movement  is  categorized  by  my  study  as  “soft  confrontation.” 
The confrontational movement of these three groups can be understood as follows. First of 
all, the three organizations aim for social change, not overthrowing the current regime. This 
point of view was stated several times during my interviews with organizers and volunteers. 
They  all  emphasized  that  their  organizations  won’t  join  with  any  force  to  overthrow  the  current 
regime. 
During  an  interview  with  a  lawyer  at  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  she  said,  
“admittedly,  there  are  some  legal  aid  lawyers  who  have  their  own  political  agendas.  From  this  
point of view, we can understand why the central government feels so nervous when a legal aid 
lawyer receives grants from international donors. However, our center is different from these 
legal  aid  lawyers.  We  do  not  have  any  political  agenda  regarding  regime  change” (interviewed 
by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2013). 
Second, in order to promote social change, these three groups have chosen a 
“non-confrontational-on-the-surface”  strategy.  As  Gao  Xiaoxian  points  out,  “It can be said, 
therefore, that ‘cooperation’ is  the  Association’s  strategy  and  the  reason  for  its  success.  One 
advantage  of  cooperation  is  that  it  strengthens  the  power  of  popular  women’s  organizations  and  
mobilizes more resources; another advantage is that it can push and influence more institutions 
and organizations into concern for the development of women” (Hsiung, Jaschok, Milwertz and 
Chan 2001, 207). 
Xu  Bin  also  stated,  “Regarding  our  relationship  with  the  government,  we  do  not  choose  to  
criticize directly, even though we will suggest some laws or requirements are unfair to the queer 
population. Our attitude  is  to  seek  communication  with  the  government.  We  won’t  choose  to  
point our fingers at the government because if we do so, the government will consider us to be an 
anti-government organization. The government would think Common Language is not a group 
for lesbian issues, but a group to overthrow the regime” (interviewed by author, China, April 16, 
2013).   
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For these three groups, a non-confrontational strategy is the best way for them to survive 
and to develop their organizations. Nevertheless, they do not give up challenging the government 
regarding public policies. They have developed three strategies to sustain their advocacy work 
while fighting for daily survival. These strategies are: building alliances, empowering other 
grassroots groups to do advocacy work, and building the community. 
 
4.4.1. Strategy 1. Build the alliance 
As  previously  noted,  women’s  activists  have  created  political  space  for  their  organizations  
to advocate for social change. Building alliances is one strategy of the organizers for combating 
their marginalizing status. But unlike social organizing in democratic countries, building 
alliances is viewed as confrontational by an authoritarian regime. 
There are three kinds of alliances which have been formed to promote social change. The 
first is an alliance with other groups that share the same concerns. For example, Guo Jianmei is 
the main leader of an alliance of legal aid lawyers in China, which is viewed as very dangerous 
by the government. And Xu Bin is the main organizer of an alliance of lesbian organizations 
across China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
The  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  have  also  collaborated  to  form  an  
alliance together, the Anti-Domestic Violence Network of the China Law Society, which then 
became the leading force in promoting the passage of the Anti-Domestic Violence Act. Wang 
Xingjuan recalled the history of this formation can be traced back to 1995, when several women 
organizers formed an anti-domestic  violence  task  force  during  the  Fourth  Women’s  Conference. 
Wang Xingjuan discussed the reasons why she and Guo Jianmei wanted to call for a 
network  on  domestic  violence  issues.  “Guo  Jianmei  and  I  worked  as  a  team  all  the  time.  At  that  
time,  we  thought  many  women’s  groups  were  working  on  domestic  violence  issues, but there 
was seldom cooperation among these groups. Therefore, we set up an alliance in 2001. In fact, 
we had prepared for this alliance since 1999. Both of us were the founders of the Anti Domestic 
Violence Network of the China Law Society. Later on, we invited Chen Mingxia (the first 
chairperson of Anti-Domestic Violence Network) to join us. She was the deputy chair of Mirage 
Law Committee of the China Law Society. We wanted to unite more people” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, April 25, 2011). 
Second, the founders formed alliances with other groups that shared goals for a better 
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society.  For  example,  before  the  Fourth  Women’s  Conference,  Wang  Xingjuan,  with  another  
fifteen organizers, including government officials, representatives of international foundations, 
professors,  and  others,  set  up  an  alliance,  the  “Chinese  Female  Health  Network.”  Even  though  
health issues were not the major concern of the Maple Center, Wang believes that this network 
will  benefit  women’s  rights  as  a  whole.  This  network is registered under the Department of Civil 
Affairs. 
Women’s  activists  have  also  built  alliances  across  women’s  and  lesbian  groups.  When  He  
Xiaopei shared her experience in organizing the First National Women Tongzhi (Mandarin, 
means queer) Conference, she stated, “We  invited  all  women  NGO  representatives…  [The]  All  
China  Women’s  Federation,  the  East  Meets  West  Feminist  Translation  Group,  the  Centre  of  
Women’s  Law  Studies  and  Legal  Services,  the  Women’s  Hotline,  and  the  Huaguang  Women’s  
College all participated” (2001, 54). 
Based  on  He  Xiaopei’s  statement  and  interviews  with  other  participants,  this  research  found  
that  there  was  some  communication  and  cooperation  between  women’s  organizers  and  lesbian  
organizers before 2001. However, lesbian organizing disappeared after the central government 
forced cancellation of the Queer Cultural Festival in 2001, and as a result, one main organizer 
left  the  country,  and  cooperation  between  women’s  organizers  and  lesbian  organizers  stopped. 
As mentioned before, Common Language also emphasizes the importance of cooperation 
with  women’s  groups  and  has  worked  with  women’s  groups  on  various  issues.  For  example,  
Common  Language  provided  lectures  for  the  Maple  Center‘s  training  programs  in  2008  to  
introduce issues of homosexuality to volunteer counselors. Also, Common Language has worked 
with  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  on  several  law  issues  regarding  lesbian  rights.    
My  study  has  found  that  Common  Language  has  viewed  cooperation  with  women’s  groups  
as a multi-functional strategy. First, it helps Common Language to make connections with some 
important experts who have participated in the governmental policy-making process, such as 
those involved with the research on lesbian domestic violence victims. Second, it provides 
Common Language with a chance to introduce the idea of homosexuality to scholars and 
governmental officials. Third, Common Language has been empowered by learning from the 
experiences  of  women’s  groups  with  the  government. 
For Common Language, building alliances is a major strategy to increase its political 
efficacy. It not only allies within nationwide lesbian communities, but also cooperates with gay 
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organizations. In 2008, Common Language along with other four lesbian and gay organizations 
set up the LGBT Center in Beijing for public education and conscious awareness. As Guo Yujie 
described  in  her  article,  “A  History  of  Lesbian  Organizing  in  China,  “This  was  a  new  platform  
and also a new co-development model for collaboration between gay and lesbian 
organizations.”16 
Not only do the founders emphasize the importance of building alliances, the organizers 
also view it as a crucial capability for an NGO. From example, one leader from the Maple Center 
addressed her worries regarding the decrease of cooperation between the Maple Center and other 
women’s  organizations.  She  stated,  “In my opinion, the Maple Center should increase its 
interaction with other organizations. You can benefit from these interactions with other 
organizations, by exchanging information and sharing resources”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, 
China, Aug. 15, 2011). 
She  added,  “I think the reason why the Maple Center has less interaction with other 
organizations is because it is an organization which buries itself in work. The Maple Center 
focuses on the work of psychological counseling, and does not pay much attention to other 
issues. But now, the situation has improved” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 
2011). 
The third approach to build alliances is to seek cooperation with social groups abroad. 
Several organizers of lesbian groups which are in other parts of China point out that the founder 
of Common Language, Xu Bin, is the one who introduced them to the idea of making 
connections with lesbian organizations abroad. For example, an activist whose organization is in 
the  middle  of  China,  told  me,  “I  was  invited  by  Xu  Bin  to  meet  with  other  organizers  of  LGBTI  
groups all over Asia. I think there were almost twenty of us, who were recommended by Xu Bin”  
(interviewed by author, China, Aug. 18, 2011). She pointed out that networks with social groups 
abroad can help local lesbian groups to seize opportunities to learn about international advocacy 
experiences. 
My research has found that building alliances has helped the Maple Center, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  to  involve  more  activists  into  their  agenda  of  
bringing about social change. There are two dimensions to building alliances. For the purpose of 
capacity  building,  allying  with  other  women’s  groups  and  queer  groups helps organizers and 
                                                 
16 http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/userfiles/2010Autumn.pdf, my translation. 
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volunteers to deepen their thinking regarding gender and queer issues. For the purpose of 
expanding social influence, making connections with other social groups provides organizers 
with a chance to introduce gender and queer issues to other social groups that share their social 
justice values. 
 
4.4.2. Strategy 2. Empower other Grassroots Groups to do Advocacy Work 
The  second  strategy  of  the  women’s  activists  is  to  empower  other  grass-roots groups to 
begin advocacy work. The Maple  Center  is  the  first  women’s  grass-root group in China that has 
developed a model for doing advocacy work, i.e. first doing research to better understand the 
whole picture of various issues. For its research, the organizers of the Maple Center will seek 
collaboration  with  local  women  groups  and  sometimes,  they  will  work  with  local  women’s  
federations. Wang Xingjuan pointed out that these collaborations help local groups to understand 
the connections between local issues and social change. 
Based on field research  at  a  remote  area  far  from  Beijing,  an  organizer  of  the  only  women’s  
legal  service  organization  in  the  whole  area  told  me,  “I  have  worked  here  for  more  than  eight  
years.  The  Maple  Center  was  the  first  women’s  group  that  I  learned  about  after  working  here 
because the Maple Center sent their newsletter to us. From these newsletters, I have learned 
more  about  women’s  issues.  Our  center  also  learns  from  Wang  Xingjuan  about  how  to  conduct  
counseling and how to do research”  (interviewed by author, China, April 20, 2013). 
One  lawyer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  mentioned  that  one  advantage  of  their  
Center  is  the  combination  of  legal  aid  services  with  the  promotion  of  women’s  rights.  From  this  
lawyer’s  point  of  view,  working  on  individual  cases  has  given  her organization leverage to 
advocate for legal reforms. Moreover,  the  legal  reforms  that  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
promotes are based on a gender perspective and the idea of gender mainstreaming. She said, 
“This  combination  presents the vision of our leader” (interviewed by author, Nov. 10, 2012). 
Since  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  advocates  for  social  change  by  presenting  law  cases,  
activists will collaborate with local communities and the local news media. Activists state that 
they feel women are empowered by this collaboration because this is the first time for them to 
understand  the  idea  of  rights.  In  other  words,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  action  has  
empowered women in a remote area. 
Common  Language’s  support  of  the  advocacy  work  of  grass-roots lesbian groups has had 
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some significant achievements. And most importantly, these efforts have also transformed 
Common  Language’s  organizational  focus.  Based  on  our  interviews,  Xu  Bin  shared  that  her  
original development plan for Common Language was to put the most effort into the formation 
of a nationwide lesbian grassroots community.  
This determination arose because of the lack of a nationwide lesbian community during that 
time period. Xu Bin told me that she originally planned to spend five years on this task. However, 
the formation of a nationwide lesbian community has been unexpectedly successful. And as a 
result, since 2008, three years after its establishment, Common Language has shifted its main 
direction toward advocacy work.  
The main reason for this quickening is because Common Language has fostered two 
alliances to share its task of building queer communities in China. The first alliance was the 
establishment of the LGBT Center in Beijing in 2008. Common Language collaborated with 
other gay and lesbian organizations to set up this center for the queer community in Beijing. And 
the second factor was the establishment of Chinese LaLa Alliance, which aims to provide 
support for lesbian groups in every city and town. 
Combing the efforts of the LGBT Center in Beijing and the Chinese LaLa Alliance, 
Common Language has designed and provided action plans for advocacy work for lesbian 
groups  nationwide.  One  example  was  Common  Language’s  support  of  many  LGBTI  groups  to  
hold  events  for  the  May  17  “International  Day  against  Homophobia  and  Transphobia.” 
The 517 Action plan created by Common Language was easy for any grassroots group to 
follow. Furthermore, this action plan was designed to need minimum financial help. Based on 
my interviews, I heard many stories of lesbian activists of how their participation in the 517 
Action altered their life experiences. Several activists mentioned that they were afraid to hold 
advocacy events at the very beginning. However, they gained confidence through participating in 
the 517 public event.  
Encouraging volunteers to participate in public events has been one strategy for Common 
Language to empower lesbian activists to join advocacy work. One interviewee stated that, she 
did not want to come out, neither did she want to hold any event in public. But the first time she 
joined an activity that was held by Common Language in a business area in Beijing and tried to 
show the pride of the gay community to everyone, she felt encouraged and empowered by 
walking with other lesbian friends. And since then, coming out and doing public education for 
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the society is no longer an issue for her (interviewed by author, Oct 10, 2011). 
 
4.4.3. Strategy 3. Building a Community 
The definition of building a community in this study means that grass-root organizations 
provide necessary support for the establishment of other similar-goal groups. The necessary 
support refers to funding resources, human resources, professional resources, and media 
resources. In addition to fostering other similar-goal groups, the crucial factor of building a 
community is to design action plans that work with each other. 
Wang  Xingjuan  of  the  Maple  Center  and  Guo  Jianmei  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
were  on  each  other’s  board  committees,  as  well  as  being  on  boards  for  other  women’s  
organizations.  They  also  called  for  meetings  of  women’s  organizations  to  discuss  current  
significant  women’s  issues.  Furthermore,  they  have  given  human  resources  to  each  other  if  they  
find that it will be in the best interest of both organizations. 
Common Language has the same strategy. Each year, Common Language calls for 
volunteers. Common Language will divide volunteers into two groups. The group whose interest 
is in advocacy work will stay with Common Language, and they will introduce the other group 
of volunteers to other lesbian organizations in Beijing. 
Several organizers of lesbian groups have addressed the role of Common Language in 
fostering lesbian groups in China. A  leader  of  lesbian  organizing  said,  “Xu  Bin‘s return from the 
U.S. has had a huge influence on the formation of the Chinese lesbian community” (interviewed 
by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 16, 2011). 
 In fact, Xu Bin has tried many approaches to get in touch with lesbian communities all 
over China. One illustration is that Common Language has not only financially supported the 
nationwide spread of the lesbian magazine Les+ since 2005, but Xu Bin has also volunteered to 
help with the distribution of this magazine.  
Les+ was founded by two lesbian couples. In a documentary file, the founder of Les+, Sam, 
stated that the reason why she wanted to create a lesbian magazine was that she could only learn 
about lesbian information from the internet at that time; however, the tone of most discussions on 
the internet was depressed and without a future. Therefore, she hopes that Les+ will spread the 
joyous part of lesbian life. 
Moreover, Common Language does not support lesbian groups only by itself; instead, it 
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tries to invite as many groups as possible to join the effort to empower lesbian groups all over 
China. One example is the China Queer Film Festival Tour. Common Language and Les+ 
collaborated with several independent film directors to organize this project that began in 2008, 
and has held more than one hundred film events with local queer organizations in more than 
twenty cities. 
As  one  film  director,  who  is  also  the  first  open  lesbian  on  TV  stated,  “This  film  tour  was  a  
direct challenge to the government, because homosexual images are forbidden in the media” 
(interviewed by author, Nov. 14, 2012). 
According  to  her,  the  film  tour’s  organizers  in  Beijing  provided  a  small  amount  of  funds  for  
local queer organizations, and local groups were responsible for the travel expenses of the 
panelists and for organizing the events. Moreover, local organizers could decide what kind of 
event they wanted to hold, as well as if the event would be free to the public. 
Several organizers shared that this organizing experience helped them to develop skills, and 
learn to communicate with the public. Sometimes, they also learned the way to deal with the 
police, since several of them had experienced a visit by the local police regarding their 
film-showing events. 
In  her  statement  after  the  revocation  of  her  group’s  registration  status,  “Farewell,  Beida!”  
Guo  Jianmei  and  her  team  wrote,  “In  2002,  a  legal  aid  collaboration  group  was  established  to  
enable more organizations and institutions to participate in the delivery of legal aid. In 2007, the 
Center  founded  the  Public  Interest  Lawyers’  Network  for  Women’s Rights, and in 2009, the 
name  was  changed  to  China  Public  Interest  Lawyers’  Network.  The  Network  currently  
comprises more than 300 brilliant lawyers from more than twenty provinces and cities, providing 
legal aid for thousands of poor and vulnerable people.  
The  statement  continued,  “I  still  remember  the  Network’s  launch  ceremony  on  15  March  
2009 at the Centennial Lecture Hall at Peking University, where leaders from authorities such as 
the  Ministry  of  Justice’s  Department  of  Legal  Aid,  the  Center  for  Legal Assistance, the 
All-China  Lawyers’  Association  and  the  Beijing  Lawyers’  Association  turned  up  to  show  their  
support. The speech given by Professor Zhu Suli, Dean of Peking University Law Department 
remains  vivid  in  my  mind.” 
The effort of the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  to  establish  a  nationwide  community  for  
legal aid work has shown significant achievement. However, based on interviews with Guo 
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Jianmei and her team, this effort also made the authorities suspicious if there was a hidden 
agenda, and the authorities asked Peking University to stop their affiliation with the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center. 
In other words, building a community is a strategy that can result in both political 
opportunity and political constraint. How to use this strategy has become an important capability 
for activists who have been devoted to advocacy work. The campaign against domestic violence 
is an example that used this strategy successfully and has expanded its political space. This study 
will further analyze this strategy in the following chapter. 
 
4.5.  Conclusion:  Raising  Both  Issues  and  Organizations’  Visibility  in  the  Public 
Facing repressive interference from the central government, the Maple Center, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  have  all  developed  some  similar strategies to 
sustain their organizational survival and to further expand their political space for advocacy work. 
However, my research has found that social groups are not the only actors that make changes in 
this state-social group relation dynamic. 
The central government has also changed its attitude toward certain social groups. In the 
past,  only  GONGOs  were  allowed  to  represent  people’s  opinions.  Recently,  the  central  
government has divided social groups into two categories, social groups for charity work and 
social group for social changes. 
For the first kind of social group, the central government has loosened its restrictions, and 
beginning in 2011, the government has purchased services from this kind of social group. In 
contrast, there has been severe scrutiny and interference from the government towards the second 
kind of social group. 
The three organizations that I have studied are categorized as the second kind of group. 
However, each group has chosen different strategies to deal with their marginalized status after 
being categorized as an advocacy group. For the Maple Center, regaining its registration status 
has become the first priority of its organizers.17 As  an  organizer  stated,  “Without  registration  
status, we (the Maple Center) are not qualified for governmental purchases” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 15, 2011). 
Even though Wang Xingjuan stated that the Maple Center would continue its efforts in 
                                                 
17 Interviews with Wang Xinjuan, M2 and M3. 
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advocacy  work,  she  also  reaffirmed  that  “our  advocacy  work will be based on our services”  
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 18, 2009). As  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  
Guo  Jianmei  stated,  “Our work is unique in the way that we are always looking for government 
mistakes. We are always looking for the errors in the system. Our mission is not just to help 
several  groups  of  people,  but  also  to  find  out  the  major  issues  in  women’s  equality  and  Chinese  
rule of law. In order to fulfill our goals, we always drip acid” (interviewed by author, Beijing, 
China, Nov. 17, 2009). 
As for Common Language, the best strategy to challenge its marginalized status has been to 
make it visible. Therefore, Common Language organizes several public events each year. 
Organizers and volunteers wear T-shirts that have queer slogans or images on them. One 
organizer talked of her experience at a public event. “There  was  one  lady  who  sells  flowers  on  
the  street.  When  we  conducted  our  activity,  she  told  me,  ‘I  never  met  any  homosexuals,  if  any  
homosexuals  showed  up  now,  I  would  send  her/him  a  flower.’  Even before her sentence was 
finished,  dozens  of  us  rushed  to  her  stall.”  (interviewed by author, Dec. 8, 2012).  
Discussions of homosexuality do not exist between governmental institutions in China, and 
neither do many other gender issues. In the past, gender issues have been marginalized. The 
representatives from the ACWF denied the existence of domestic violence during the UN Fourth 
World Conference on Women in 1995. Moreover, several interviewees mentioned a famous 
story that happened during this UN conference. In the Lesbian Issue Discussion Tent, a Western 
participant asked a Chinese volunteer if she knew any Chinese lesbians, and this volunteer 
replied  that,  “this  phenomenon  does  not  exist  in  China.”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
April 25, 2011). 
By  applying  various  strategies,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  
Common Language have fought back against the marginalizing forces of the state. Most 
importantly, the issues they are concerned about have been reported in the media, and their 
activities have attracted the young generation to participate. Since 1995, there has been the 
formation  of  more  and  more  lesbian  groups,  and  more  women’s  groups  focusing  on  advocacy  
work. 
My  study  has  concluded  that  these  three  women’s  advocacy groups  have  constructed  a  “soft  
confrontation”  to  advocate  their  issues.  The  founders  and  organizers  are  fighting  for  their  
survival and at the same time, they are expanding their political space for advocacy work. 
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Women’s  activists  have  learned  from  every backlash experience and developed their own 
organizing skills in raising the visibility of their organizations and issues in the public.  
These  successes  have  resulted  from  the  organizers’  confrontational  beliefs  and  strategies.  
The  efforts  of  women’s  activists not only increased their organizational degree of autonomy and 
empowerment, but have also expanded their organizational influence on the society. These three 
organizations have all contribute to create a new movement of rights awareness in China, which 
will have a significant impact upon the state-social group relationship. 
In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  analyze  the  organizers’  strategies  in  the  campaign  against  
domestic  violence  to  demonstrate  the  organizers’  strategic  choices  in  every  move  of  their  
organizational development. Most importantly, the next chapter will demonstrate the successful 
approach  of  women’s  activists  in  creating  a  public  sphere  for  issues  of  domestic  violence.  How  
organizers expand their political space and why government officials are willing to include 
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Groups in the Campaign against Domestic Violence 
 
The  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  presented  in  Chapter  4,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  
Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language,  have  continued  to  face  four  kinds  of  major  
struggles. Repressive government actions have imposed pressure to marginalize these three 
groups. My analyses have shown that activists have used various strategies to both fight back 
against this repressive interference, as well as to further expand their organizational political 
space. 
The conclusion of my examination of the activists’  strategies  is  that  activists  will  choose  a  
more  cooperative  strategy  if  the  organization’s  priority  is  to  increase  the  degree  of  its  autonomy18, 
but  will  choose  a  confrontational  strategy  if  the  organization’s  aim  is  to  increase  the  degree  of  its  
empowerment19. Cooperative or confrontational, strategies may lead to political opportunity, 
political constraint or both. Therefore, activists have continually struggled with organizational 
sustainability and tried to expand organizational political space.  
Despite the many challenges they face, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 has 
demonstrated the success of women activists in forming a confrontational movement and making 
their organizations and issues visible. In this chapter, I analyze the strategies of the three 
women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  in  order  to  further  elaborate  the  
phenomenon of interactive political liberalization, which, I will argue, is the best description of 
the state-social group relationship in China. 
In the campaign  against  domestic  violence,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center, and Common Language have chosen different strategies to expand their political space 
for  advocacy  work.  The  choice  of  different  strategies  reveals  the  organizers’  considerations  in 
moving their relationships with the central government forward. The Maple Center has chosen 
cooperative  strategies,  while  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  chosen  a  much  more  
confrontational strategy. As for Common Language, joining the campaign against domestic 
                                                 
18 For the definition of degree of autonomy, my study borrows the idea of Jude Howell, that an organization is 
autonomous if it meets the following conditions: first, it is able to set its own goals, determine its own priorities, and 
decide its own structures and principles of organization; second, it is able to appoint its own personnel and recruit its 
own members; third, it relies primarily on its own source of funding. (Howell 2000, 127) 
19 In my analyses, the degree of empowerment is defined as including gaining more popular support, raising more 
funds, increasing recruitment, generating attention from the media, and making connections with other social groups 
nationally and internationally. 
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violence has been a political opportunity to build up its organizational capabilities.  
The  organizers’  strategies  to  expand  their  boundaries  vis-a-vis the central authorities can be 
described as a process of interactive political liberalization. This research has concluded that 
organizers’  expectations  of  possible  reactions  by  the  central  government  is  one  of  the  major  
reasons behind each chosen strategy. This also indicates that an adaptive government is crucial in 
the changing state-social group relationship. In addition to anticipation of government response, 
other reasons for each chosen strategy indicate the different stages of development of the three 
organizations.  
For the Maple Center, maintaining steady financial resources in order to carry on their 
social service and advocacy work was the most significant factor when considering their 
relationship  with  the  central  authorities.  For  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  the  campaign  
against domestic violence was considered to be a moderate issue compared to other social justice 
issues that their organizers work on. Therefore, the main goal for these organizers has been to 
point out as many flaws in the legal system as possible in order extend their challenge for social 
reform. 
As a relatively young organization, Common Language developed quite a different strategy 
from  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  It  joined  the  campaign  against  
domestic violence to order to train their volunteers and to build up their connections with other 
women’s  groups. 
In the campaign against domestic violence, my analyses have identified five major actors 
who played a role affecting each chosen strategy: the central authorities, the organizers, the local 
governments, the international community, and the media. Facing challenges from the 
governance system, organizers choose to ally with different actors in order to transform these 
challenges into political opportunities. But sometimes, organizers may choose a strategy that 
accidentally leads to political constraint instead.  
The main purpose of comparing the strategies of activists in the campaign against domestic 
violence is to further explain the idea of interactive political liberalization. There are two aspects 
to the best explanation. First, the campaign against domestic violence has achieved significant 
progress in expanding the participation of women activists in the public policy field, and is a 
good example that demonstrates the adaptive interaction between the central government and 
women’s  advocacy groups. All of the previously mentioned five actors have had an influence on 
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this  major  expansion  of  the  influence  of  women’s  groups.    
The second aspect is that both activists and some governmental officials have been 
empowered by their participation in the campaign against domestic violence, and have learned a 
lot about gender issues and social organizing. My field research has observed the formation of 
networks and trust between activists and governmental officials that can make a contribution to 
the process of interactive political liberalization. 
This chapter will first briefly present the development of the campaign against domestic 
violence, and as my analysis points out, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 
created the main political opportunity for this campaign. This political opportunity bridged the 
gap  between  the  international  community  and  Chinese  women’s  groups.  Since  then,  Western  
terms, such as domestic violence, gender equity, and NGOs, as well as related resources have 
been introduced  and  provided  to  Chinese  women’s  groups. 
This is followed by a chronological analysis of the chosen strategy of each organization 
with the main focus on the resulting political opportunity or constraint. My examination has 
found that there are some strategies that create both political opportunities and political 
constraints.   
Furthermore, my analyses in this section have verified the hypothesis of Chapter 4 that there 
exists a causal mechanism between the choice of a cooperative strategy or a confrontational 
strategy and the state-social  group  relationship.  The  strategies  of  the  three  women’s  groups  in  the  
campaign against domestic violence confirms my argument that a cooperative strategy will result 
in an increase in the degree of autonomy, while a confrontational strategy will lead to an increase 
in the degree of empowerment. 
In addition, this research demonstrates the success of the campaign against domestic 
violence in breaking down the public/private distinction on issues of domestic violence. And 
finally, at the end of this chapter, a comparative analysis will be made between the strategies of 
the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  to  further  illustrate  
the process of interactive political liberalization. My examination has identified two main factors 
that  affect  the  available  strategies  of  activists,  that  is,  the  organizations’  developmental  stage  and  




5.1. The Development of the Campaign against Domestic Violence 
The cultural background and the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in 
1995  (the  1995  UN  Women’s  conference)are  two  major  factors  that  have  affected  the  campaign  
against domestic violence. The cultural background as used in this chapter to refer to the 
influence of Confucianism has created a political constraint for the campaign against domestic 
violence, while the 1995 UN conference provided a political opportunity for the formation of this 
campaign.  
There is an impression that Marxists pay a lot of attention to issues of gender equality. 
There are two famous figures behind this impression. In The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, Engels argued that oppressing women is a way for men to ensure their 
control of ownership of private property. 
In China, the most famous words on gender equality are from Mao Zedong when he said, 
“Women  hold  up  half  the  sky.”  In  fact,  the  first  law  enacted  by  the  new  People’s  Republic  of  
China was the Marriage Law (Judd 2002, 3). As a result, China has been viewed as a socialist 
country that has had a tradition of valuing women as workers.  
However, Confucianism still influences people to view domestic violence as a family matter. 
Even though the official state policy since 1949 has been supportive  of  women’s  rights,  the  
patriarchal  system  continues  to  structure  ordinary  lives.  As  Margaret  Woo  well  put  it,  “all  
Chinese women must face the common challenge of gender inequality” (2002, 311). 
Women in rural area suffer the most when living in patrilocal communities. As Ellen Judd 
describes  it,  “Such  communities  have  been  markedly  resistant  to  change that would give women 
rights in marriage,  divorce,  or  child  custody…and  also  resistant  to  women’s  fully  equal  
participation in the economic and political life of the communities” (2002, 5). 
In other words, one can conclude that Chinese women share with one another oppression 
based on the role of gender. This oppression is rooted in the deep influence of Confucianism, 
which  has  formatted  each  individual’s  role in a family. According to Confucian Analects, 
Chapter 11, Book XII: Yen Yûan, 
The duke Ching of Ch'î, asked Confucius about government. 
Confucius  replied,  “There  is  government  when  the  prince  is  prince,  and  the  minister  is  minister;;  
when the father is father,  and  the  son  is  son.” 
“Good!”  said  the  duke:  “if,  indeed,  the  prince  be  not  prince,  the  minister  not  minister,  the  father  
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not  father,  and  the  son  not  son,  although  I  have  my  revenue,  can  I  enjoy  it?” (Confucian 
Analects) 
The above article indicates that good governance is reached when each individual performs 
his own proper duties. In other words, a wife has her own duty to obey. One of the Four Books, 
The Great Learning (Dà Xué), which is believed to have been written by the students and 
followers of  Confucius,  stated,  “Wishing  to  order  well  their  States,  they  first  regulated  their  
families.” 
The  influences  of  these  doctrines  are  rooted  in  Chinese  culture  and  people’s  daily  lives.  
Family  matters  have  been  considered  private  and  “maintaining”  a  good  family has become a 
standard of judgment. It is also because of patriarchal dogma that incidents of domestic violence 
have  been  viewed  as  a  private  matter.  There  is  popular  Chinese  idiom,  “jia  chou  bu  wai  yang,”  
which means that family scandal should be kept inside the home. 
 
1992: The First Public Discussion about Domestic Violence 
It was not until 1992 that the first news reports about domestic violence appearing in the 
media.  A  female  lawyer,  Pi,  Xiaoming  wrote  “A  White  Paper  on  Domestic  Violence.”  After 
several failed attempts, the magazine Chinese Women finally  agreed  to  publish  “A  White  Paper  
on  Domestic  Violence.”  During  the  same  year,  the  Maple  Center  set  up  the  first  women’s  hotline,  
and began to receive inquires about domestic violence issues. 
As previously mentioned, before the 1995 UN Fourth  Women’s  Conference,  domestic  
violence was not considered as a type of violence against women.20 When  the  National  People’s  
Congress issued the Funu Quanli Baozhang Fa (Law  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  on  the 
Protection of Rights and Interests of Women) on October 1, 1992, neither the idea of domestic 
violence, nor a protective order to keep abuser from the victim was included.  
It has been the efforts  of  women’s  groups, both national and international, which have 
raised awareness of the severity of this problem, and as a result, there has been some progress on 
this  issue.  But,  the  1995  UN  Women’s  Conference  first  created  the  political  opportunity  for  
women’s  groups  to  learn  about,  and  to  build  the  campaign  against domestic violence. 
 
                                                 
20 http://big5.xinyu.gov.cn/content/2008/11/01/51910.htm, 2007/07/31, accessed on 2009/08/01, my translation. 
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5.1.1 The Political Opportunity for the Campaign against Domestic Violence: the 1995 UN 
Women’s  Conference 
Most researchers agree on the important role of the United Nations Fourth World 
Conference on Women on the development of the organizing of Chinese women (See for 
example Judd 2002).  The  Women’s  Conference  and  the  accompanying  Non-Governmental 
Organization  Forum  introduced  this  Western  term  “non-governmental  organizing”21 to Chinese 
society. At the same time, it also brought the  attention  of  international  donors  to  women’s  groups  
in China. 
Most  importantly,  this  Women’s  Conference  raised  governmental  awareness  about  
women’s  issues.  According  to  Margaret  Woo,  the  1992  Law  of  the  PRC  on  the  Protection  of  the  
Rights and Interests of  Women  was  enacted  “in  anticipation  of  the  1995  UN  World  Conference  
on  Women,”  to  serve  “as  what  might  be  called  ‘posterboard’  legislation” (2002, 315). 
Moreover,  it  was  not  until  this  women’s  conference,  when  the  Chinese  government  agreed  
to  recognize  “The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,”  (Hereafter,  BPFA)  which  was  
passed at the conclusion of the conference, that the issue of domestic violence was brought to the 
attention of the government and the media. Preventing violence against women is one of twelve 
agendas of the BPFA. 
In fact, based on interviews and field observations, this research has found that the 1995 UN 
women’s  conference  created  a  political  opportunity  for  activists  to  organize  against  domestic  
violence, not only by awakening governmental attention to this issue, but also by bringing in 
resources from the international community. The Ford Foundation is among many international 
donors  that  have  shifted  their  sponsorships  to  women’s  groups,  and  it  has  played  an  important  
role in the campaign against domestic violence. 
 
5.1.1.2. The Formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network 
The  most  crucial  development  for  women’s  organizing  to  fight  domestic  violence  has  been  
the formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network of the China Law Society (hereafter 
Anti-Domestic Violence Network). In 1998, the Ford Foundation sponsored four activists, 
including the founder of the Maple Center, Wang Xingjuan, to attend a conference in India. This 
                                                 
21 This statement does not indicate that the social organizing did not exist before the 1995 UN conference. Instead, 
this  statement  emphasized  that  the  term  “NGO”,  like  many  other  Western  terms  regarding social organizing and 
gender  issues,  was  introduced  to  Chinese  women’s  groups  on  this  conference. 
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conference called together representatives from women’s  NGOs  in  Asia  to  discuss  gender  
violence. Before their trip, the Ford Foundation reminded these four participants that they would 
be expected to work on this issue after returning home.  
According to two of the main founders of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, Chen 
Mingxia and Ge Yongli, they had discussed possible work to fight gender violence during the 
conference period. In fact, they decided to focus on domestic violence issues, and the 
Anti-Domestic Violence Network was established in June, 2000.22 Both of two founders of my 
case  studies,  Wang  Xingjuan  of  the  Maple  Center  and  Guo  Jianmei  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center, were also founders of this network. 
Wang  Xingjuan,  who  is  in  her  80s  and  has  fought  for  women’s  rights  for  more  than  twenty  
years, recalled the reason that she and Guo Jianmei initiated the formation of the Network,  
“Guo  Jianmei  and  I  have  often  teamed  up  together.  At  that  time,  we  found  that  many  
organizations worked on domestic violence issues. But they lacked cooperative work with each 
other. Therefore, we suggested we formed an alliance. We invited Chen Mingxia (who later 
became the founder of the Network) to join us because we knew the Network would need 
someone to help with registration and we want to unite more people to join this campaign against 
domestic violence” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 25, 2011). 
Wang  Xingjuan  explained  further  about  the  cooperation  between  women’s  groups  that:  “we  
have been working together on domestic violence issues since the 1995  UN  women’s  conference.  
Guo Jianmei, Xie Lihua (the founder of Rural Women), and I formed a task force on domestic 
violence issues. We included the contributions of NGOs and the government…In  fact,  it  is  
NGOs which work on domestic violence issues” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 25, 
2011). 
The formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network also relied on financial support from 
the international community, including UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), SIDA 
(Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), and Oxfam Novib (the Dutch 
Organisation for International Development Co-operation). 
 
5.1.2 The Success of the Campaign against Domestic Violence 
There is some research that discusses the factors that lead to the success of the campaign 
                                                 
22 Growing Stronger Along with the Network for Combating Domestic Violence, p.8. 
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against  domestic  violence.  Lu  Zhang  indicates  the  important  role  of  the  1995  UN  women’s  
conference, and Samantha Keech-Marx argues that the success of the campaign has come from 
the  strategy  of  women’s  groups  in  framing  their  argument  to  resonate with the discourse of the 
state. Keech-Marx  concludes  that  “these  women’s  organizations  are  legitimizing  their  activities  
in order to effectively engage with the state to bring about reform” (2008, 176). 
Based on interviews and field observations, this research has come to a different conclusion. 
Although the UN Fourth World Conference on Women and its effort to  “enlist  the  support  of  
powerful  officials  and  deputies  to  the  National  People’s  Congress  to  lobby  on  their  behalf” 
(Keech-Marx 2008, 180) do play an important role in the success of the campaign against 
violence,  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  studied  have  also  used  a  variety  of  strategies  to  
challenge and confront the practices of the central authorities, including the judicial system and 
police departments. Most importantly, these three organizations have all used the same strategy, 
namely, challenging the traditional view of domestic violence as a private family matter. 
Even  though  the  government’s  attention  to  domestic  violence  issues  was  awakened during 
the  1995  UN  women’s  conference,  the  culture  of  viewing  domestic  violence  incidents  as  dirty  
laundry prevented the society from raising awareness of this issue. It was only after the 
formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network that collaboration  between  women’s  groups  
started to undo this patriarchal phenomenon. 
After the formation of the Network, organizers set up fifteen task forces. With only two to 
three paid staffers, the Network has gathered more than fifty organizations to share the work 
load. Each task force has applied various strategies  to  awaken  the  public’s  awareness  of  domestic  
violence issues, as well as to lobby for changes in the law.  
In  addition  to  the  women’s  groups using familiar strategies, including writing media 
releases for legislative suggestions, submitting reports to governmental institutions, hosting 
public education events, and cooperating with local governments to practice intervention 
approach upon domestic violence incidents, the Network also launched a new initiative to bring 
the  issue  to  people’s  attention. 
Here  is  one  example.  The  TV  soap  opera,  “Do  Not  Talk  to  Strangers”  (Bùyào  hé  mòshēng  
rén  shuōhuà),  which  was  on  the  air  on  January  1st,  2001,  showed  many  families  nationwide  the  
severe damage caused by domestic violence. Many of my interviewees mentioned that they were 
not aware of domestic violence issues until they saw this TV soap opera.  
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Based on interviews with a long term participant of the Network, Feng Yuan, several 
members of the network participated in the production of this drama series. Feng Yuan was the 
founder and served as the director of the Network for three terms.  As  she  stated,  “The 
collective efforts of the Network have made significant progress in the campaign against 
domestic violence” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
One sign of progress is the revision of family law. The Standing Committee of the National 
People’s  Congress  announced  on  April  28,  2001  that  domestic  violence  was  prohibited  and  that  
the victims of domestic violence would be granted a divorce. However, there is no punishment 
for violation of this rule and there is lack of definition of domestic violence (Zhou 2006). 
 
5.1.2.1.  One  of  the  Successes:  Awakening  ACWF’s  Attention  to  Issues  of  Domestic  Violence    
Another sign of progress is the participation  of  the  All  China  Women’s  Federation  (ACWF), 
which is a GONGO and is the mass organization for women, in the fight against domestic 
violence. Women groups and the Anti-Domestic Violence Network have long tried to recruit 
ACWF’s  participation  in  the  campaign against domestic violence by using different strategies. 
For  example,  women’s  organizations  invited  high-ranking officers of ACWF to be advisors to 
their task forces, and organized several training programs on domestic violence issues with local 
women’s federations. 
A  director  of  a  provincial  women’s  federation  shared  her  learning  experiences  about  the  
issue  of  domestic  violence,  “Of  course  I  heard  about  the  issue  of  domestic  violence  because  I  
have some legal background. But I learned the whole picture about domestic violence incidents 
when I participated in the training program provided by the Anti-Domestic Violence Network”  
(interviewed by author, China, April 18, 2013). After joining this training program, this director 
has designed more training programs  that  invite  experts  on  women’s  issues  to  talk  to  leaders  of  
local governments in her province. 
In 2008, during a news interview, a department director of ACWF stated that ACWF will 
make a concerted effort to prevent domestic violence, and in addition to public education, 
ACWF will also begin the law-making process of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act 
(ACWF Website). In April 2009, ACWF released a survey showing that 30 percent of the 27 
billion families in China suffer from domestic violence (Xinhua Net 2009). During this news 
release, ACWF made promises to try to prevent domestic violence incidents. 
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As previously mentioned, in addition to legislative progress, the campaign against domestic 
violence also has participated in the implementation of domestic violence prevention work with 
the cooperation of local governments. As of April 28, 2013, there were 28 provinces that passed 
domestic violence prevention acts (Ido 2013). According to a news report in 2013, there were ten 
district courts that were chosen as experimental courts that can issue orders of protection to 
victims of domestic violence (Sina News 2013). 
 
5.1.2.2. One of the Successes: The Milestone Moment of the Campaign against Domestic 
Violence 
The first significant event in the law-making process occurred in 2003. In March 2003, the 
“Domestic  Violence  Prevention  and  Intervention  Law”,  was  submitted  through  30  national  
people’s  representatives  to  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC).  The  legislative  lobby  gained  
additional momentum in 2012 when the NPC announced its decision to include an anti-domestic 
violence law on its legislative agenda. 
Even though progress in the campaign against domestic violence has made significant 
changes politically and culturally, there still exist even more challenges  for  women’s  groups.  
Although both the police department and the justice system have joined the effort to prevent 
domestic violence, the situation has not improved much. According to a representative from the 
police department, this is because domestic violence is not illegal under criminal law (the 
Huanghekou Government 2007). In other words, the violator will not be punished by the law. 
In  conclusion,  women’s  groups  were  awakened  to  the  severity  of  domestic  violence  during  
the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Lu 2008, 70. See also Huang 2010). Since then, 
women’s  groups  have  made  significant  progress  in  forcing  the  state  to  recognize  the  issue  of  
domestic  violence.  Most  importantly,  the  progress  of  women’s  groups  in  their  legislative  lobby  
marked a unique  moment  in  the  history  of  China’s  legislation  because  this  was  the  first  national  
legal proposition prepared by nongovernmental organizations, and thus, represented a new 
relationship between the state and social groups. 
In the following sections, the strategies used to break down the public/private division, as 
well as the provision of institutionalized social services that were traditionally viewed as family 
matters in China will be analyzed. This research will also make use of discussions of political 
opportunity and constraints to analyze the different strategies chosen by each case study.  
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A  comparison  of  the  chosen  strategies  of  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  have  studied  will  
be used to further examine the dynamic shifts of the state-social group relationship. After 
revealing which factors  support  public  advocacy,  and  which  factors  help  women’s  groups  to 
participate in this legislative process, this chapter will then present the confrontational approach 
of the three organizations in challenging the boundaries of political space which is set by the 
central authorities.  
 
5.2. The Difference of Strategies Used and Their Results in Shaping Relationships with the 
Government 
The  main  finding  of  this  research  is  that  organizers’  chosen  strategy  will  result in political 
opportunity or constraint, and this will affect the dynamics of their relationship with the central 
authorities. However, there is no causal mechanism to indicate what kind of strategy will lead to 
political opportunity or to constraint.  
Instead, the chosen strategy combined with the actions of four driving forces will determine 
if social groups can expand their political space for social organizing. These four driving forces 
are: the central authorities, local governments, the media, and the international community. 
Over all, the Maple Center has chosen a more cooperative strategy, which leads to an 
increase  in  the  degree  of  autonomy,  while  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  chosen  a  more  
confrontational strategy and has enjoyed a higher degree of empowerment. This research argues 
that the choice of strategy is affected by both the anticipation of governmental responses and the 
different development stages of each organization.  
In the campaign against domestic violence, both the Maple Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center were founding members of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, and were the 
leading organizations that prepared the 2003 legal proposition that was presented to the Nation 
People’s  Congress.  The  Maple  Center’s  main  focus has been on social services and advocacy 
while  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  works  on  legal  reform  based  on  a  gender  perspective.    
Compared to these two groups, Common Language is a relatively young organization, and 
is a leading force of the lesbian movement in China. Therefore, the main focus of Common 
Language is to grasp every opportunity to build up its organizational capability. As a result, 
Common Language chose to join the Anti-Domestic Violence Network in 2006 and has brought 




In short, there are two kinds of domestic violence among lesbian population. The first kind 
of domestic violence is between the members of a lesbian couple. The second kind of domestic 
violence  is  caused  when  a  family  member  disapproved  the  lesbian’s  sexual  identity.    
In  this  section,  the  history  of  each  of  the  three  women’s  advocacy  groups  that  I  have  studied  
work on issues of domestic violence will first be briefly introduced. The  organizers’  strategies  in  
awakening the government and the society to the issues of domestic violence will be evaluated 
chronologically, with emphasis on the resulting political opportunity or constraint of each chosen 
strategy. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the position that resulted from the chosen strategy of the 
Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  in  the  campaign  
against domestic violence. In the following section, the changing relationship between each 
advocacy group and the state will be analyzed. 
 
5.2.1.  Analyses  of  the  Maple  Center’s  Chosen  Strategy  and  its  Results 
Based on interviews and field research, this study has concluded that the Maple Center used 
dynamic and cooperative strategies to interact with the four driving forces in the campaign 
against domestic violence to shift the boundaries of its political spaces, namely, submitting 
expert  suggestions  to  the  central  authorities;;  cooperating  with  local  women’s  federations;;  
attending training programs hosted by international communities, and working with the media. 
As a result of these efforts, the Maple Center has increased its degree of empowerment in my 
state-social group relationship. 
 
5.2.1.1  Background  of  the  Maple  Center’s  Involvement  in  the  Campaign  against Domestic 
Violence 
Since  the  first  women’s  hotline  was  set  up  in  1992,  there  have  been  inquires  about  domestic  
violence incidents. According to interviews with Wang Xingjuan, from 1992 and up to the year 
2011, the Maple Center received 2,600 phone calls regarding domestic violence. However, the 
Maple Center did not set up a task force to address issues of domestic violence. And because the 
whole society viewed domestic violence as a family matter, governmental institutions had not yet 
paid attention to the issues of domestic violence. 
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Wang Xingjuan recalled that it was a phone call one night in 1994 that awakened her to the 
serious situation of victims of domestic violence. Wang got a phone call from a staff of one 
government unit who asked if the Maple Center could shelter a woman who just ran away from 
her  family  and  visited  the  unit  to  complain  about  her  husband’s  physical  abuse. 
“The  Maple  Center  failed  to  give  a  hand  to  this  woman.”  Wang  Xingjuan  talked  in  a  
repentant tone (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 18, 2009). In fact, during that period 
of time, there were no shelters for domestic violence victims in all of China. This failure pushed 
Wang to start her work on domestic violence issues. The Maple Center began its task to fight 
against domestic violence by conducting research to learn about the various situations of 
domestic violence. 
Moreover, the Maple Center has applied dynamic strategies in interacting with the four 
driving forces in shifting the state-social group relationship, namely, the central authorities, the 
local  women’s  federation,  the  media,  and  the  international  community.  This  research  has  
concluded the following six major strategies of the Maple Center. 
 
5.2.1.2. Six Major Strategies 
From 1994 to 2012, there were six major strategies that the Maple Center used. First, 
organizers  conducted  research  based  on  the  findings  of  the  women’s  hotline,  and  presented  
research reports to raise awareness about the issue of domestic violence. Second, organizers 
constructed service models based on their research findings and carried out these models by 
cooperating  with  local  women’s  federations. 
Third, organizers submitted their legal suggestions to the central authorities, including the 
National  Committee  of  the  Chinese  People’s  Political Consultative Conference, on behalf of the 
Maple  Center.  Fourth,  organizers  worked  with  the  media  to  raise  society’s  interest  in  domestic  
violence issues. Fifth, organizers built up their organizational capabilities by participating in 
training programs on domestic violence issues provided by international communities, and at the 
same time, sought financial support from international donors for their tasks in preventing 
domestic violence. 
The sixth and very important strategy of the Maple Center was to build alliances with other 
women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence.  In  addition  to  the  example  that  both  
the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  set  as  leading  forces  in  the  establishment  
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of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, I learned, during field research in a remote area of 
China,  about  the  Maple  Center’s  effort  in  incubating  other  women’s  groups.    
An  activist  there  who  had  not  heard  about  women’s  groups  before  she  became  a  volunteer  
in  a  women’s  group,  talked  about  the  Maple  Center’s  effort.  “We  are  far  away  from  Beijing,  and  
did not have enough resources to attend meetings in Beijing. I remembered that I had learned 
about  all  kinds  of  women’s  issues  from  the  Maple  Center’s  newsletters.  The  Maple  Center  sent  
its newsletter periodically. I also learned about the idea of casework from its newsletter. And 
now  I  teach  at  the  Department  of  Social  Work.” (interviewed by author, China, April. 21, 2013). 
In  addition,  the  Maple  Center,  along  with  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  China  
Women’s  University,  and  Shaanxi  Research  Association  for  Women  and  Family  formed  the  
“Chinese  against  Domestic  Violence  Task  Force,”  in  2000  to  prepare  for  their  participation  in  the  
activities of Beijing+5, which was an UN conference that reviewed the progress made after the 
UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. 
On March 8, 2004, the Maple Center ran its first hotline for preventing domestic violence. 
For  this  service,  the  Maple  Center  worked  with  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  the  legal  
department of ACWF, and the Anti-Domestic Violence Network of China Law Society, to 
provide necessary assistance for victims of domestic violence. 
These strategies have resulted in both political opportunities and constraints for the Maple 
Center to negotiate its boundaries of political space that were set up by the central authorities. 
This research will analyze several significant strategies and results in detail in the following 
sections.  
 
5.2.1.3. Creating Political Opportunity through a Chosen Strategy 
There are five events that can be viewed as political opportunities for expanding political 
space for the Maple Center. These five events happened in the years 2001, 2004, and 2012. We 
can observe the increase in the organizational degree of autonomy and the degree of 
empowerment. 
The first political opportunity was created by the Maple Center in 2001, when the Maple 
Center successfully hosted a three-day training program for marital and family counselors in 
Beijing Normal University. There were more than one hundred and ten representatives from 
seventeen provinces joining this training program. Most of them were counselors of hotlines that 
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were set up by local governments. 
This  training  program  introduced  the  idea  of  “family  therapy”  to  the  practice  of  hotline  
counseling. Hosting this event helped the Maple Center to build its reputation as an experienced 
marital and family counseling organization. However, one point worth noting is that this political 
opportunity  was  created  by  the  Maple  Center’s  previous  effort.  Since  1997, when the Maple 
Center received funding from the British Embassy, it has hosted several nationwide training 
programs for hotline counselors. And it is based on these efforts that the Maple Center 
successfully invited counselors from seventeen provinces in 2001. 
The second political opportunity in 2001 was related to a TV soap  opera,  “Don’t  Respond  to  
Strangers  (Búyào  Hé  Mòshēngrén  Shuōhuà).”  Based  on  my  field  research,  many  interviewees  
who  work  for  women’s  and  lesbian  NGOs,  pointed  out  that  it  was  only  after  the  broadcast  of  this  
hit  TV  program  that  they  learned  the  term  “domestic  violence.”    
The hotline of the Maple Center appeared at the end of each episode, and an interviewee of 
women  activists  in  the  remote  area  commented,  “Of  course  the  Maple  Center  has  some  degree  of  
social influence nationwide. While most people had not  heard  the  term  ‘domestic  violence,’  the  
Maple  Center’s  hotline  number  was  shown  at  the  end  of  ‘Don’t  Respond  to  Strangers.’  Based  on  
this fact, I would say Wang Xingjuan is an icon in this field” (interviewed by author, China, 
April. 19, 2013). 
Two events that created new political opportunities happened in 2004. Five committee 
members  of  the  National  Committee  of  the  Chinese  People’s  Political  Consultative  Conference  
visited the Maple Center in March 2, 2004. This visit advanced the legislative process after the 
submission  of  a  legal  proposition  to  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC)  in  2003.  These  five  
members  submitted  Motion  Number  4072,  a  “suggestion  for  preventing  domestic  violence”  to  
the NPC, after listening to a presentation by the Maple Center regarding hotline counseling on 
domestic violence issues. 
On  March  25,  2004,  the  honorary  chairperson  of  All  China  Women’s  Federation,  Peiyun  
Peng, visited the Maple Center, and gave high praise to the work of the Maple Center. This 
recognition helped the Maple Center to promote its work in preventing domestic violence. 
Another visit by Peiyun Peng from October 12 to 14, 2004 to the cooperative project between the 
Maple  Center  and  the  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  to  create  a  “zero  domestic  violence  
community”  was  reported  by  the  newspaper  Chinese Women, a government newspaper. This 
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report marked further recognition from the central authorities that was crucial in the Maple 
Center work with local governments nationwide.  
Another example is the collaboration on a  conference  about  domestic  violence  and  women’s  
mental health hosted by the Maple Center and the newspaper, Chinese Women. By working with 
the government media, the Maple Center not only again gained recognition from the central 
authorities, but also brought  people’s  attention  to  the  Maple  Center’s  work  on  domestic  violence  
issues. 
The fourth event that created political opportunity occurred in September, 2012. This was a 
domestic  violence  incident  involving  a  public  figure,  the  founder  of  “Crazy  English,”23 Li Yang. 
This  incident  brought  people’s  attention  to  the  issue  of  domestic  violence  nationwide (The New 
Yorker 2011). A lot of media reported this incident, and when interviewed by China Daily, Li 
Yang  said,  “I  hit  her  (his  wife)  sometimes  but  I  never  thought  she  would  make  it  public  since  it’s  
not a Chinese tradition to expose family conflicts to outsiders” (2011). 
Kim Lee, the wife of Li Yang posted photos of her injuries on her micro blog. But it was the 
action of the organizers in the campaign against domestic violence that brought the attention of 
the public and the media to this incident. The Maple Center offered both individual and marital 
counseling. Li Yang only showed up once for the marital counseling. Wang Xingjuan was 
interviewed by the national and international media and an introduction to the Maple Center was 
also included in most news reports. This was yet another opportunity that won the Maple Center 
a nationwide reputation. 
These five events created two mainly political opportunities for the Maple Center. First, the 
Maple Center won recognition from the central authorities, and this has helped it to do advocacy 
work without obtaining registration status as a social group. At the same time, by gaining 
attention from the media, the Maple Center has gradually established its reputation in society, 
which is a challenge considering the population and the size of the state. 
 
5.2.1.4. Strategies Can Impact Both Sides of Results 
Sometimes the chosen strategies of organizers lead not only to political opportunities, but 
also to constraints on the boundaries of political space for advocacy work. This can be seen 
                                                 
23 Crazy English ( pinyin: Fēngkuáng  Yīngyǔ)  is  a brand name related to a non-traditional method of learning 




clearly  from  two  examples  from  the  Maple  Center’s  experience.  The  first  setting  was  becoming  
one of the host organizations of the NGO forum in  the  1995  UN  women’s  conference,  which  led  
to both an increase of degree of empowerment in 1995 and a decrease in autonomy in 1996.  
The  second  example  was  a  cooperative  project  with  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation,  in  2001.  
Although this project provided an opportunity for the Maple Center to increase its degree of 
empowerment,  Tianjing  Women’s  Federation’s  decision  to  end  this  project  in  2006  also  caused  a  
decrease in its degree of autonomy in 2006.  
The first example is the strategy chosen by the Maple Center to try very hard to win the 
chance to host a parallel NGO workshop during the United Nations Fourth World Conference on 
Women. According to Wang Xingjuan, the major reason that the Maple Center won this 
opportunity to host a parallel NGO workshop on domestic violence during the 1995 UN 
Women’s  Conference  was  because  of  the  Maple  Center’s  efforts  in  researching  the  seriousness  
of  domestic  violence  incidents.  The  Maple  Center’s  efforts  gained  the  attention  of  the  
international  women’s  groups,  and  it  was  agreed to allow the Maple Center to be the host of the 
workshop. 
This workshop gained a lot of attention and support from the international movement 
community as well as from representatives of several foreign countries. In other words, hosting 
this workshop created the political opportunity for the Maple Center to attract more support for 
its work on domestic violence and also to help the Maple Center in establishing its reputation as 
an expert regarding these issues.  
However, at the same time, this hosting opportunity also caused constraints from the ACWF. 
As Wang Xingjuan recalled, representatives from ACWF refused to attend this workshop and 
accused the Maple Center of damaging the image of the country. Officers of ACWF told Wang 
Xingjuan and representatives  of  international  women’s  groups,  “There  are  no  domestic  violence  
incidents  in  China” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Nov. 18, 2009). To be clear, this 
incident  led  to  the  political  constraint  since  ACWF  began  to  question  the  Maple  Center’s  
intention and to suspect if the Center attacked the regime on purpose. 
The second strategy chosen by the Maple Center that resulted in both a good and bad impact 
was  when  the  Maple  Center  chose  to  work  with  the  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  to  carry  out  an  
experimental  project  in  2001.  The  project’s  title  is,  “The  Community  Intervention  into  Family  
Problems  in  a  Tianjin  Municipal  Community.”  For  this  project,  the  Maple  Center  developed  
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three  programs,  a  “Women’s  Hotline”,  “Half-Sky  Homeland”  and  “Women’s  Legal  Service 
Station”  to  serve  local  women. 
Based on the interviews, Wang Xingjuan is very proud of this project. It was called 
“Half-sky  Homeland,”  which  was  taken  from  Mao  Zedong’s  famous  words  that  “women  hold  up  
half  the  sky.”  This  project  aims  at  decreasing  the number of domestic violence incidents. All the 
project  details,  including  the  women’s  hotline  and  women’s  legal  service  station,  are  based  on  
the  Maple  Center’s  research  and  service  experiences.    
This  cooperative  project  with  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  gave the Maple Center a chance 
to carry out a model for preventing incidents of domestic violence. 
It also created a political opportunity for the Maple Center to both implement its ideal model for 
preventing domestic violence in the community and to build up its reputation of its capability in 
involving public policy nationwide. 
However, this collaboration also caused political constraints for the Maple Center. In 
February  2006,  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  decided  to  end  its  collaboration  with  the  Maple  
Center,  and  to  continue  this  project  by  itself.  In  2007,  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  decided  to  
implement the same model that was designed by the Maple Center in every community in 
Tianjin.  During  the  opening  ceremony  of  the  citywide  “Half-sky  Homeland,”  the  chairperson of 
ACWF,  Xiulian  Gu,  praised  this  project  as  “the  outstanding  product  of  the  women’s  federations’  
service.”    
This collaboration project resulted in political constraint, too, because, in this last statement, 
Xiulian Gu obviously refused to acknowledge the role of the Maple Center in initiating and 
designing the project. The organizers of the Maple Center did not choose to release a 
clarification  statement,  so  after  2007,  whenever  a  news  report  has  mentioned  the  “Half-Sky 
Homeland,”  it  is  presented  as  a  project  of  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation. 
During  our  interviews,  Wang  Xingjuan  shared  her  evaluation  about  this  project,  “You  can  
observe our mission of influencing the lives of others by contributing our own lives, from the 
practice of the Tianjin project. Tianjin is a municipal city and yet, they were willing to carry out 
our project citywide” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April. 26, 2011). 
In other words, even though the leading role of the Maple Center in this collaboration 
project was erased by the governmental interference, Wang Xingjuan still felt satisfied since the 




5.2.1.5.  Evaluation  of  the  Maple  Center’s  Strategies:  Advocating  for  Policy  Positions  and 
Cooperating with the Government 
In addition to its advocacy work, the Maple Center chose another strategy that was different 
from  that  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language,  namely,  providing  social  
services for victims of domestic violence. This strategy effectively helps the Maple Center to 
increase its degree of empowerment, because, providing social services for people in need was 
welcomed  by  the  central  authorities.  However,  now  it  is  too  soon  to  evaluate  this  strategy’s  
impact upon the degree of autonomy. 
According to Kang Xiaoguang, and Han Heng,  “For an authoritative government, a social 
organization  has  “double  properties”:  On  one  hand,  it  is  a  challenge  for  it  represents  one  of  the  
most powerful carriers of collective behavior; on the other hand, it is an auxiliary power as well 
for social organizations offer public goods, which belongs to part of the governmental 
obligations” (2011, 100).  
The founders and organizers of the Maple Center have chosen the strategy of being a part of 
the auxiliary mechanism of the central authorities in providing public goods since the 
establishment of their organizations. However, based on interviews and field observations, this 
research found that the Maple Center also adopted the strategy of advocacy work after the 
revocation  of  its  registration  status  and  its  participation  in  the  1995  UN  women’s  conference. 
The  Maple  Center’s  development  strategies  have  been  discussed  in  Chapter  4.  Regarding  
the issue of domestic violence, the Maple Center adopted a similar path in choosing its strategies. 
First, founders and organizers established a hotline and provided counseling. And after 
participating  the  training  program  that  was  hosted  by  international  women’s  groups,  the  Maple  
Center decided to join the advocacy campaign based on its experience in counseling. 
From  1988  to  2013,  the  Maple  Center’s  strategies  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  
violence created five political opportunities for increasing its degree of autonomy and 
empowerment, and two strategies that resulted in both political opportunity and political 
constraints. 
As  the  first  women’s  NGO  in  China  that  has  been  struggling  for  more  than  twenty  years,  the  
first priority of the Maple Center is now to be able to register with the government and to offer 
social services that the government would purchase. There is one major reason behind these 
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decisions, namely, the sustainability of the Maple Center.  
Now in her 80s, Wang Xingjuan who worked for more than 25 years at the Maple Center, 
has stepped down from any official position, and has been trying to find a sustainable way for the 
Maple  Center  to  survive.  Being  recognized  by  the  government  could  ensure  the  Maple  Center’s  
legitimacy and its source of funding. 
As discussed in the Chapter 4, registration could provide a protection from sponsor agency 
for advocacy group. Based on interviews with Wang Xingjuan, regaining registration also means 
the  state  admits  its  mistake  in  revoking  the  Maple  Center’s  registration  status  in  1996.  It  is  too  
early to evaluate the possible results of this strategy.  
However, Wang Xingjuan and organizers of the Maple Center have carved out a certain 
political  space  for  their  work.  As  one  interviewee  from  a  remote  area  of  China  said,  “Wang  
Xingjuan has had a great influence upon me. Her life experiences have taught me that as an 
activist, I cannot yield to fate” (interviewed by author, China, April. 21, 2013). 
 
5.2.2  An  Analysis  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  Chosen  Strategy  and  its  Results 
Based on interviews and field research,  this  study  has  concluded  that  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center has taken advocacy as its major strategy in the campaign against domestic violence. 
Furthermore,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  advocacy  strategy  has  one  unique  characteristic,  
that of representing victims in lawsuits that challenge the prevailing culture, ideas and practices.  
One point worth noting is that, in the campaign against domestic violence, the major 
political  constraint  that  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  encountered  has  been  from local 
governments, instead of from the central authorities. The obvious reason is, that the strategy of 
representing symbolic cases puts most pressure on the local governments. 
As  previously  mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  shifted  its 
movement’s  approach  in  2002,  and  has  chosen  to  represent  cases  that  are  considered  
representative of serious social problems. Cases of domestic violence are no exception. Also 
during the lawsuits of representative cases, the lawyers of the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  have  
tried to set up pioneering models for the legal system in China. 
Citing one case of domestic violence as an example, in 2001, a woman in Mongolia killed 
her  husband  after  being  abused  by  him  for  a  long  time.  This  was  a  typical  “answering violence 
with  violence”  case,  which  was  prevalent  in  China.  However,  in  this  instance,  this  woman  was  
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sentenced to death.  
The  lawyer  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  Liu  Wei,  represented  the  woman  during  
the  appeals  trial.  Liu  used  the  theory  of  “battered  women  syndrome,”  which  was  introduced  to  
the  court  for  the  first  time.  Liu’s  argument  convinced  the  judge,  and  her  client’s  sentence  was  
changed to the death penalty with a reprieve. 
My  analyses  of  activists’  strategies  have  found  several  interesting  results. First, since 
comparing  to  the  Maple  Center  and  Common  Language,  the  activists  of  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center have chosen more confrontational strategies, the Center endures much more severe 
monitor from the central government and thus the organizational degree of autonomy has been 
steady low. 
Second, the confrontational strategies have led to the increase of organizational degree of 
empowerment. There is only one exception. The organizational degree of empowerment was 
decreased significantly in 2001 when the founder, Guo Jianmei suffered too much pressure and 
had to take a leave for a period of time. 
   
5.2.2.1.  Background  Introduction  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  Role  in  the  
Campaign against Domestic Violence 
According to interviews with the  founder,  Guo  Jianmei,  although  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center did not receive any inquiries about getting legal help for problems of domestic violence 
before 1998, since its establishment in December, 1995, the founders and organizers have paid 
attention to domestic violence issues. Guo Jianmei, who is in her 50s, and appears energetic all 
the  time,  stated  that  “the  main  reason  that  we  have  paid  attention  to  issues  of  domestic  violence  
was because of our participation in the  1995  UN  women’s  conference” (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Nov. 18, 2009). 
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  held  its  first  conference  focused  on  issues  of  domestic  
violence  in  August,  1996.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  
providing legal advice has been its major strategy in reaching out to grass-root people. But it was 
not until 1998 that the first inquiry regarding getting legal help for victims of domestic violence 
appeared.  
When Guo Jianmei was interviewed by China Daily on March 8, 2012, she mentioned that 
“the  center  has  recorded  roughly  1,000  domestic  violence  cases”  since  December  1995,  and  
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“almost  thirty  percent  were  the  result  of  a  man  becoming  upset  over  the  question  of  virginity.”  
For  these  one  thousand  victims,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  chose to provide legal advice 
for all and to represent several significant cases. 
The  reason  that  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  only  represented  several  significant  
victims  of  domestic  violence  is  because  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  uses  its  representation 
as a chance to introduce new theories in identifying victims and in judging the fairness of 
sentences given to abusers. This has been the major strategy of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
in the campaign against domestic violence.  
In addition to representing  several  symbolic  cases,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  
joined the effort to form an Anti-Domestic Violence Network and led one of the task forces on 
legal  reform.  In  other  words,  activists’  strategy  is  to  select  the  cases  that  can  make  the  biggest 
impact in law policy and national values. 
 
5.2.2.2. Creating Political Opportunities by its Choice of Strategies 
Seeking the reform of the legal system has been the major task for organizers of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center.  There  are  four  events  that  were significant in creating political 
opportunities  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  namely,  the  discussion  platform  in  1998,  the  
formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network in 2003, the Tong Shenshen incident in 2009, 
and the Li Yang incident in 2012. As a result, the organizational degree of its empowerment was 
increased. 
The  last  two  incidents  are  examples  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  strategy  of  doing  
advocacy work by representing symbolic cases in the legal system. The founders and lawyers 
adopted the same philosophy in the campaign against domestic violence. Unexpectedly, 
compared to other advocacy work, this strategy has created more political opportunities than 
constraints  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  in  expanding  its  political  space. 
In  addition  to  representing  symbolic  cases,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  also  made  
efforts  to  building  alliances  between  women’s  groups,  which  have  also  created  political  
opportunities  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  Representing  symbolic  cases  and building 
alliances  have  been  the  two  major  strategies  that  helped  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  
create political opportunity in expanding its political space for advocacy work. This research will 




Since its establishment, building alliances between groups with the same interests has been 
one  of  two  major  strategies  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  As  a  result,  the  Peking  
Women’s  Law  Center  has  hosted  meetings  periodically  for  women’s  groups  and  experts.  
Regarding the issue of domestic violence, the founders and organizers have adopted a similar 
strategy.  Building  alliances  created  the  first  political  opportunity  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center in 1998, which has led to the increase of the organizational degree of empowerment. 
As previously mentioned, there were four activists who were sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation to attend a training program in India. After this trip, these four activists all 
participated  in  one  of  the  periodic  gatherings  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  The  idea  of  
and the approach to forming an alliance to fight against domestic violence were initiated at this 
gathering, and resulted in the formation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network of the China 
Law Society.24 
In  other  words,  the  gathering  arranged  by  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  successfully  
provided  a  platform  for  collaboration  between  women’s  groups  and  feminist  experts  in  the  legal  
system. The strategy of building  an  alliance  between  women’s  groups  and  feminist  experts  also  
helped  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  establish  its  role  as  one  of  leading  forces  in  the  
campaign against domestic violence. 
Another political opportunity was created in 2003 when the Anti-Domestic Violence 
Network successfully submitted its legal proposition to the NPC. The founders and organizers of 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  realized  the  importance  of  collaborative  efforts  in  achieving  
participation in the law-making process on issues of domestic violence. In 2004, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  re-organized its work into three task forces, namely, domestic violence, 
female  labor  rights,  and  women’s  property  rights.    
 
5.2.2.3. The Impact of Reorganization 
Two lawyers from the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  pointed  out  that  this  reorganization  has  
played an important role in the campaign against domestic violence (interviewed by author, 
Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). Since members of the legal system, including judges, lawyers, 
                                                 




prosecutors, forensic workers, and other law enforcement officers, are crucial in the proactive 
intervention  in  domestic  violence  incidents,  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  is  the  only  
women’s  group  comprised  of  a  group  of  lawyers  and  experts  in  the  legal  system,  the  
concentration  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  efforts  has  contributed  to  gradually  creating  
more effective prevention and control measures in the fight against domestic violence. 
For  example,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  provides  training sessions for members of 
the legal system to increase their member’s  sensitivity towards victims of domestic violence. 
Furthermore,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  held  these  training  programs  with  the  
collaboration  of  local  women’s  federations  in  order  to recruit help in the enforcement of 
monitoring practices of the existing laws on domestic violence.  
As  one  director  of  a  local  women’s  federation  told  me,  “When  Guo  Jianmei  held  a  training  
program for our legal system, I helped her to invite all the leaders of the public security organs, 
procuratorial  organs  and  people’s  courts” (interviewed by author, China, April. 17, 2013). 
Representing symbolic cases has also created political opportunities for the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center.  Lawyers  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  have introduced the 
western idea of protecting victims of domestic violence into Chinese courts (People. cn), while at 
the same time they have used symbolic cases to bring the seriousness and severity of domestic 
violence as well as the work of the Peking Women’s  Law  Center  to  people’s  attention.  The  Tong  
Shenshen incident is one example of this process.25  
Tong Shenshen suffered domestic violence even before her marriage to her abusive husband. 
She sought police help and even successfully managed to run away from home. However, she 
was still beaten to death by her husband, and her husband was only sentenced to six years and six 
months at the first trial.  
Most media reports were angry about the sentence the abuser received and even the 
newspaper of the juridical system published a special report on this incident, and indicated that 
reluctance to enforce existing policies was the major cause of this tragedy (see for example East 
Day 2010).  A  lawyer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  represented  this  case.  During  my 
                                                 
25 Tong Shen-Shen, 26 years old, was beaten to death by her husband. Before her death incident, she and her family 
reported domestic violence incidents eight times within several months. But the polices cannot give much help. 
Tong Shen-Shen also tried to escape and lived by herself, but cannot saved her own life. Her husband stated in the 
court that he cannot remember how many kicks he made, and he just kept kicking her during the last domestic 
violence incident. However, the court only prosecuted him an abusive crime and the judge only sentenced him six 
years and six months. 
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interview  with  her,  she  recalled  that,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  used  this  case  to  
awaken judges and experts to the insufficient protection that the legal system offers victims. 
Another symbolic case is the Li Yang incident, which was previously mentioned in the 
discussion  of  the  Maple  Center’s  strategy.  Regarding  this  notorious  case,  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center chose to work with the Maple Center and introduced legal and counseling 
procedures for domestic violence victims and to the whole society (Hexun 2011). This action 
was reported widely by the news media and therefore, helped victims of domestic violence 
understand the complexity of the legal system. 
 
5.2.2.4.  Evaluation  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  Strategies:  Persistently  
Challenging the Legal System 
There  are  two  major  strategies  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  uses  when  participating  in  
the  campaign  against  domestic  violence,  namely,  building  alliances  between  women’s  groups  
and promoting reform of the legal system by representing symbolic cases. This latter strategy has 
also led founders and organizers to another strategy, the submission of suggestions by experts to 
the related central authorities regarding the law-making process on domestic violence. 
To expand the political space for  social  organizing,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  
put  effort  into  empowering  other  women’s  groups.  In  addition  to  joining  the  effort  in  establishing  
the Anti-Domestic  Violence  Network,  and  to  providing  a  platform  for  women’s  groups  to  discuss  
issues of  domestic  violence,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  also  contributed  to  building  
the capabilities other groups.  
An  activist  from  a  remote  area  in  China  emphasized  this  effort.  “Guo  Jianmei  helped  us.  
The thing that benefited us most was that she introduced international resources to domestic 
women’s  groups.  As  you  know,  we  are  far  away  from  the  center,  and  therefore,  resources  are  
scarce. Guo Jianmei helped me to learn where to find international foundations that share similar 
missions as our center” (interviewed by author, China, April. 20, 2013). 
 
5.2.2.5. Significant Changes Brought by Chosen Strategies 
The second strategy is to promote reform within the legal system. According to Guo 
Jianmei,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  was  the  only  organization  that chose to concentrate on 
lawsuits  about  incidents  of  domestic  violence.  Since  its  establishment,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
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Center has represented more than 200 cases in courts. This unique strategy has brought two 
significant changes. First of all, according  to  lawyers  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  
more  and  more  marginalized  women  are  willing  to  seek  the  help  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center. 
This  observation  corresponds  to  the  observation  of  Margaret  Woo,  “At  the  beginning  of  the  
twenty-first century, the assertion of rights to privacy by ordinary Chinese citizens is 
increasing…Where the courts can be a site in which problems are named and solutions 
determined,  women’s  litigation  presents  a  potentially  important  ‘bottom  up’  route  by  which  
public rights are determined and articulated” (2002, 328). 
The  second  significant  change  in  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  unique  strategy  is  that  
this strategy helped the founders and organizers to create opportunities to work with local 
governments. Teaming up with  local  governments  helps  women’s  groups  to  reach  out  to  
marginalized women. An activist from a remote area of China addressed the importance of 
working  with  local  women’s  federations,  “We  chose  to  work  with  women’s  federations  because  
their unit exits at the lowest level of governance organs. There exists a contact person of the 
women’s  federation  in  each  village” (interviewed by author, China, April. 21, 2013). 
Local  governments  choose  to  include  women’s  groups  in  their  tasks  in  order  to  establish  
their own reputation for good governance or in order to avoid possible criticism. As one director 
of  local  women’s  federation  stated,  “These  (women’s)  groups  are  doing  the  women’s  
federations’  jobs.  Hence  I  always  tell  my  staff  that  we  need  to  learn  from  women’s groups” 
(interviewed by author, China, April. 21, 2013). 
Specifically, the reason that local governments have sought collaboration with the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  is  because  officials  try  to  avoid  having  any  notorious  cases  from  
happening in their ruling  area,  like  Tong  Shenshen’s  case  which  might  give  them  a  bad  
reputation.  In  addition,  working  with  local  women’s  federation  also  helps  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center to build up its reputation of capably becoming involved in public policies. 
The strategy of  representing  symbolic  cases  also  has  also  led  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center to choose to adopt another strategy, namely, submitting suggestions for new laws that 
relate to the plans of the central authorities. In fact, this strategy has become possible because of 
reforms  that  were  adopted  by  the  National  People’s  Congress.  In  other  words,  the  reforms  of  the  
NPC created a political opportunity for social groups to participate in the law-making process.  
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According  to  Michael  Dowdle,  “In the early 1990s, the CLA adapted its public-input 
procedures to this aspect of its operations and began exhibiting greater aggressiveness in this 
review…After the NPC began publicizing its receptiveness to public input in its legislative 
drafting processes, other political actors in China began employing and publicizing similar 
procedural devices in an attempt to overcome their own legitimacy problems” (2002, 332). 
Compared to the strategy of representing symbolic cases, submitting expert suggestions has 
been much more welcomed by the central authorities. Thus, this strategy has also helped the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  build  its  professional  reputation  among  governing  institutions.  
This  can  be  observed  from  the  increasing  number  of  invitations  for  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center to attend law-reviewing conferences, especially on the issue of domestic violence. 
In  conclusion,  the  strategies  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  in  the  campaign  against  
domestic violence have successfully created political opportunities for its political space in 
advocacy work. More significantly, contrary to its involvement on other issues, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  has  experienced  less  repressive  interference  from  the  central  authorities  
regarding its chosen strategies.  
According to Guo Jianmei, the reason for the different governmental attitude is that, from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  central  authorities,  issues  of  domestic  violence  challenge  people’s  ideas  
of family matters as opposed to arguing for political or government changes. In other words, the 
campaign  against  domestic  violence  is  not  viewed  as  a  threat  to  regime’s  legitimacy (interviewed 
by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
Furthermore, since the central authorities agreed to work to prevent violence against women 
after acknowledging the conclusions of the Fourth World Conference on Women, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center’s  criticisms  of  the  legal  system  and  existing  laws  has  gained  a  lot  of  
ground. 
 
5.2.3.  Analysis  of  Common  Language’s  Chosen  Strategies  and  Their  Results 
Based on interviews and field research, this study has concluded that Common Language 
has successfully created additional political opportunities for itself by participating in the 
campaign against domestic violence. 
As a relatively young organization, and as a lesbian organization which confronts both 
pressures  from  the  government  and  the  society,  Common  Language’s  participation  in  the  
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campaign against domestic violence has helped its organizers to build alliances with other 
women’s  groups,  while  at  the  same  time,  enabling Common Language to bring the attention of 
women’s  groups  to  the  situation  of  lesbians.  Common  Language  has  simultaneously  used  three  
strategies in its campaign against domestic violence, namely, alliance building, bringing attention 
to  lesbians’  rights, and volunteer training.  
In addition, joining the campaign against domestic violence has provided its organizers and 
volunteers with the opportunity to be trained to conduct advocacy work. Common Language 
joined the campaign against domestic violence in 2007, and its three chosen strategies have 
helped Common Language to increase both its organizational degree of autonomy and degree of 
empowerment. 
 
5.2.3.1.  Background  Introduction  of  Common  Language’s  Role  in  the  Campaign  against  
Domestic Violence 
One of the most important and specific strategies of Common Language has been to 
combine the strongest  interests  of  volunteers  with  its  efforts  at  expanding  the  organization’s  
political space. Citing its project of researching lesbian health issues in 2005 as an example, the 
initial idea of volunteers was to understand the lifestyle of lesbians in Beijing. During that period 
of time, Common Language had just been established, and volunteers were eager to learn more 
about other lesbians. 
As recalled by one of the funding organizers of Common Language, the first task for this 
initiative was to seek funding. The group found possible funding with an AIDS research institute. 
As  a  result,  the  organizers  decided  to  combine  the  volunteers’  interest  in  learning  about  the  
lifestyle of other lesbians with its aim of organizational capacity building, and applied these 
goals to the project of researching lesbian health issues in Beijing. 
Their research into violent incidents among lesbian couples was also launched for similar 
reasons. After the establishment of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, this network 
developed a strategy to get more organizations involved in the campaign against domestic 
violence, namely, giving grant funding to other organizations which would work on this issue. 
Common Language applied for this funding in 2007, and asked to conduct research into 
incidents of domestic violence among lesbians. 
To work on this project, Common Language set up a website to recruit interviewees for its 
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investigation of incidents of domestic violence among the lesbian population, while at the same 
time introducing on its website legal actions that have been used to prevent and punish acts of 
domestic violence in Taiwan, the United States and Canada. In other words, Common Language 
introduced legislative policies and processes on issues of domestic violence to the lesbian 
population. 
There is also another strategy worth noting regarding this project. According to the founder, 
Xu Bin, and other organizers, the project aimed at awakening  the  awareness  of  women’s  activists  
towards the situation of lesbians. Xu Bin, who is at her 30s and has influenced many lesbian 
organizers  in  China,  stated,  “In  China,  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  is  organized  by  
social groups. However, most experts of domestic violence issues are not familiar with queer 
issues. There are only a few individuals within this campaign who will demonstrate their 
personal support toward lesbian situations” (interviewed by author, China, April. 16, 2013). 
Xu Bin further emphasized the role of participating in the campaign against domestic 
violence.  “I  think  this  project  (the  research  on  lesbian  victims  of  domestic  violence)  is  an  
important task. This is the first time that we have had the chance to discuss a common issue with 
other  women’s  groups.  Furthermore,  we  can  include  lesbian  situations  in  all  discussions.  These  
experts are willing to listen since they are concerned about violence against women” 
(interviewed by author, China, April. 16, 2013). 
Based on interviews  with  organizers  of  lesbian  groups  and  women’s  groups,  most  
organizers  indicated  that  they  were  not  familiar  with  the  issues  of  each  other‘s  campaigns.  In  
other  words,  many  organizers  of  women’s  groups  have  not  discussed  issues  related  to  the  queer  
population, while, many young activists of lesbian groups have not paid attention to gender 
issues.  This  research  will  examine  more  about  Common  Language’s  strategy  of  building  up  a  
communication  bridge  between  women’s  groups  and  lesbian  groups  in  the  following section. 
 
5.2.3.2. Creating Political Opportunities through Their Chosen Strategies 
Joining the campaign against domestic violence created significant political opportunities 
for Common Language. First, it provided Common Language with an opportunity to build 
alliances  with  women’s  groups.  Second,  the  investigation  into  incidents  of  domestic  violence  
156 
 
among  the  lesbian  population  attracted  the  media’s  attention.26  
In 2007, Common Language obtained funding from the Anti-Domestic Violence Network 
to do an investigation into incidents of domestic violence in the lesbian population. To begin 
cooperation  with  women’s  groups,  Common  Language  hosted  a  meeting  inviting  the  media,  
international foundations, and experts and organizers from the fields of gender issues, legal 
rights and the queer movements. 
During this gathering, Common Language invited He Xiaopei to introduce background 
information about lesbian lives and the queer movement in China. He Xiaopei has participated in 
the lesbian organizing since 90s, the younger generation of lesbian organizers often call her the 
“qián  bèi”  (antecessor).  Common  Language  also  reported  its  research  on  lesbian  health  issues  
that  it  had  conducted  in  2005.  Thus,  Common  Language’s  efforts  brought  the  attention  of  
women’s  groups to the status of lesbians in China.  
According to my interviews with Xu Bin and two other organizers of Common Language, 
after  this  meeting,  several  women  activists  and  feminist  experts  accepted  Common  Language’s  
invitation to be consultants on its research into the situation of lesbian victims of domestic 
violence  and  these  experts  also  made  efforts  to  contribute  to  Common  Language’s  project.    
As  Xu  Bin  stated,  “Several  experts  on  domestic  violence  issues  gave  us  a  great  deal  of  
support in our work. In addition to being our consultants, they also introduced other experts to 
participate in our research project. For example, they were invited to train our volunteers on how 
to conduct research and how to conduct interviews” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 
12, 2011). 
Xu  Bin  emphasized  Common  Language’s  strategy:  “The  experts  who  were  introduced  by  
other experts had not heard about lesbian issues before. By providing a training program for our 
volunteers, these experts learned more about the situation of lesbians, and were friendly to 
lesbian groups” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011). 
By participating in the projects of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network, Common 
Language expanded its political space for advocacy work by making connections  with  women’s  
groups. Another significant political opportunity resulted from making connections with 
women’s  groups  was  Common  Language’s  efforts  to  build  up  its  relationship  with  local  
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According  to  Xu  Bin,  “Compared  to  male gay groups, the lesbian population with AIDS is 
much smaller. Therefore, there is no government organ that will communicate with us directly. 
ACWF is the only government mechanism that Common Language can be related to (because 
lesbians should be included  in  the  women’s  population).  We  have  tried  very  hard  to  build  our  
connections  with  local  women’s  federations,  and  it  was  not  until  we  joined  the  Anti-Domestic 
Violence Network that we had made significant progress” (interviewed by author, China, April 
16, 2013). 
Another  organizer  of  Common  Language  shared  Xu  Bin’s  point  of  view:  “Compared  to  
other government organs, ACWF is not powerful. However, it is still a part of the governing 
system, and therefore, it has channels for working within the government system. Citing the 
Domestic Violence Prevention Act as an example, it was ACWF that pushed this act to be 
included into the government law-making process” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 
12, 2011). 
This  statement  also  reveals  organizers’  evaluation  in  considering  Common  Language’s  
relationship  with  ACWF.  In  addition  to  building  connections  with  women’s  groups  and  local  
women’s  federations,  there  is  a  third  political  opportunity  that  was  created  by  Common  
Language’s  research  into  incidents  domestic violence among lesbians, namely, that the findings 
of this research also brought media attention to the status of the lesbian population. 
One example is the January 11, 2010 news report of Legal Daily that covered several 
important findings of Common Language’s  investigation,  and  also  interviewed  Xu  Bin  and  the  
formal director of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network. Most importantly, the reporter indicated 
that incidents of domestic violence among the lesbian population was neglected, even by the 
staff of ACWF, which was the major organization set up by the state to be in charge of 
preventing domestic violence. Therefore, the report argued, incidents of lesbian domestic 
violence deserve the attention of the government when drafting the Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act. 
There were similar news reports that were also welcomed by the lesbian community, 
because these kinds of news reports represented recognition of the lesbian population. 
Furthermore, the organizers of Common Language hoped that the mention of ACWF in the news 
would awaken ACWF to the lesbian population. The organizers of Common Language 
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mentioned that, based on their discussions with some of the staff of ACWF, they believed that 
lesbian issues are viewed as a sensitive topic. As one organizer stated,  “I  believe  that  the  staff  of  
ACWF would like to avoid having a connection with lesbian organizations” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 9, 2011). 
 
5.2.3.3.  Evaluations  of  Common  Language’s  Strategies:  Confront  Double  Marginalized  
Status 
As a lesbian organization that fights for both lesbian rights and recognition from the society, 
Common Language has encountered pressure from the governance system and a stigmatized 
attitude from the society. However, Common Language, established in 2005, is a relatively 
young organization. In addition to building up its own organizational capabilities as a lesbian 
group,  Common  Language  also  needs  to  build  up  its  working  relationship  with  women’s  groups.    
Moreover, compared to the founders of the Maple Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center,  namely,  Wang  Xingjuan  and  Guo  Jianmei,  Common  Language’s  founder,  Xu  Bin  has  
less connection with both the central authorities and the whole society. Therefore, Common 
Language has chosen quite different strategies from the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center in its campaign against domestic violence.  
Because,  unlike  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  that  view  the  
formation of the campaign against domestic violence as one of their significant approaches to 
influencing the decision-making process of the central authorities, Common Language has taken 
its participation in the campaign against domestic violence as an opportunity to build up its own 
capabilities and expand its connections with the whole society. 
The three major strategies used by Common Language in its participation in the campaign 
against domestic violence were alliance building; volunteer training; and bringing the attention 
of  the  media  and  women’s  groups  to  the  issue  of  lesbian rights. Based on interviews and field 
research, this study has concluded that these three strategies have successfully created political 
opportunities for expanding political space for Common Language. My analyses have also 
observed a steady increase in the degree of empowerment of Common Language.  
Their major achievements included the following: training volunteers to become activists; 
bringing  the  media’s  attention  to  lesbian  groups;;  awakening  other  lesbian  groups  to  the  issue  of  
domestic violence and advocacy  work;;  and  building  relationships  with  women’s  groups,  
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women’s  experts,  and  local  women’s  federations.    
Several  senior  women’s  activists  and  experts  joined  the  advisory  board  of  Common  
Language’s  research  project  on  lesbian  domestic  violence  issues. Several of them even become 
supporters  of  many  of  Common  Language’s  events.  For  example,  Guo  Jianmei  and  Li  Yin  from  
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  participated  in  several  of  Common  Language’s  activities.    
In addition, by conducting research on domestic violence in the lesbian community, 
Common Language recruited and trained a group of volunteers with organizational skills. 
Common Language set up its first decision-making board in 2011, and out of the five members 
of this board, there are two members who joined Common Language because of their research 
project. 
As  to  evaluating  the  achievements  of  Common  Language’s  strategies  in  the  campaign  
against violence, this research has concluded that even though Common Language was not able 
to get the draft of the Domestic Violence Act to include domestic violence in homosexual 
couples,  Common  Language’s  strategy  brought  the  attention  of  some  experts  to  the  issue  of  
lesbian victims of domestic violence. 
For example, one organizer of Common Language, who has participated in the campaign 
against  domestic  violence  and  has  volunteered  since  she  was  a  college  student,  stated,  “The  
expert recommendations of Anti-Domestic Violence Network did include homosexual couples 
into  the  definition  of  domestic  violence.”  This  organizer continued,  “Law-making is only a part 
of the effort in preventing domestic violence; social services are crucial too. I also hope we can 
gain  the  attention  of  the  police  and  officers  of  women’s  federations  regarding  lesbian victims of 
domestic violence” (interviewed by author, Oct. 15, 2012). 
According  to  Xu  Bin,  “Common  Language  will  continue  our  efforts  in  mobilizing  ordinary  
people to the campaign against domestic violence, and at the same time, we will try to make 
more legislative representatives aware of  the  existence  of  the  lesbian  population.”  Xu  Bin  
continued,  “As  an  advocacy  group,  Common  Language  hopes  to  communicate  with  the  central  
government regarding public policies” (interviewed by author, China, April 23, 2011). 
Even though Common Language has created some political opportunity in the campaign 
against domestic violence, its double marginalized status has not improved much. Since queer 
issues are generally neglected by society, working on the campaign against domestic violence is 
only the first  step  to  bringing  the  public’s  attention  to  the  situation  of  lesbians.    
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In addition, the governmental staff also shares stereotypes and prejudices towards the queer 
population, and as a result, compared to other social groups, Common Language has encountered 
more challenges in building connections with the government. In other words, gaining inclusion 
in the policy-making process remains one of major tasks for Common Language. 
 
5.3. Creating Public Sphere for the Campaign Against Domestic Violence: Changes in the 
Court 
In  this  section,  the  achievement  of  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  in  breaking  down  the  
public/private distinction on issues of domestic violence will be presented, with the focus on 
changes in the legal system in China. Based on interviews, field research, and an examination of 
secondary  materials,  this  research  has  found  that  women’s  groups  have  successfully  created  a  
public sphere for domestic violence issues. 
The  joint  efforts  of  women’s  groups  in  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence  not  only 
help each organization to gain political space for advocacy work, but also break down the 
distinction between public and private matters, as society has long viewed domestic violence as a 
private family issue.  
There have been two significant achievements of this campaign, which can be considered 
evidence of creating a new public sphere for discussing issues of domestic violence. These 
achievements are changes in the legal system and the drafting of the Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act as part of the government agenda.  
Based on field research, I found that the legal system has been the conservative 
representation  of  the  whole  society  when  discussing  women’s  issues.  And  any  breakthrough  in  
the legal system could be considered a major achievement. This is why the effort of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  has  been  significant  in  promoting  gender  equality  in  China.  Furthermore,  
this is why most researchers have agreed that the Anti-Domestic Violence Network has made 
successful achievement. 
The law-making process of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act is now in its final stage 
before  being  submitted  by  the  government  to  the  People’s  Congress.  This  submission  is  evidence  
of  the  central  authorities’  recognition  of  domestic  violence  issues.  In  addition  to  gaining the 
recognition  of  the  central  authorities,  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  have  also  raised  the  
awareness of the legal system. 
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One of major changes can be observed in the courts. In the past, although the issue of 
domestic violence was sometimes mentioned during a divorce trial, the domestic violence 
incident  wasn’t  treated  as  evidence  or  a  critical  factor  in  the  lawsuit.    
According to a report from Chen Ming, an associate researcher of the China Institute of 
Applied  Jurisprudence  of  the  Supreme  People’s  Court of China, among all the divorce lawsuits 
in  the  Basic  People’s  Court27 from 2001 to 2007, fewer than 10% of divorce trials recognized 
incidents  of  domestic  violence.  Moreover,  as  Chen  points  out,  there  were  Basic  People’s  Courts  
that have never recognized any domestic violence incident. 
During my several discussions with Chen Ming, I could imagine how difficult it has been to 
awaken the attention of the legal system (interviewed by author, April 27; Aug. 14; Dec. 7, 2011). 
Chen Ming who has dedicated her life and career to victims of domestic violence, learned about 
domestic  violence  issues  when  she  studied  for  her  master’s  degree  in  Canada.  She  has  worked  in  
the  legal  system,  and  she  is  the  one  who  introduced  the  idea  of  “battered  victim  syndrome”  to  
Chinese society and to the legal system. 
When Chen Ming came back to China and began her work to fight against domestic 
violence, she could find barely any support in the juridical system. There are several crucial 
challenges. The first challenge of awakening the  legal  system’s  attention  towards  issues  of  
domestic  violence  is  people’s  attitudes  towards  gender  issues.  Even  though  China  hosted  the  
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, most people are not aware of 
gender issues. The prevalence of domestic violence incidents is significant evidence of this 
problem. 
The ignorance of gender perspectives also affects the attitude of law enforcement agents, 
including police officers, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges. More importantly, the legal education 
system does not include any training in gender issues.   
One  lawyer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  who  graduated  from  Beijing  University  
pointed out that there is no class about gender issues in any law school. It was not until her 
internship at the Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  that  she  began  to  realize  that  domestic  violence  
should not be treated only as a family matter. This ignorance about gender issues among law 
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scholars  has  generated  damage  to  women’s  rights. 
This lawyer has been fighting for women’s  rights  in  the  legal  system.  During  our  interview,  
I could always feel her sympathy towards marginalized women. However, she sometimes 
expressed her sense of powerlessness when facing backlash within the legal system. She cited 
the issue of domestic violence as an example.  
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  organized  a  discussion  panel  about  the  Tong Shen-Shen 
incident. When she phoned a leading law scholar to invite him to join this panel, she could tell 
from his response that he did not think domestic violence was a worthy issue to be discussed, and 
he eventually suggested she find someone else.  
This lawyer indicated that most experts in the government share the same view with this 
scholar when discussing gender issues. As a result, the central authorities do not pay enough 
attention  to  women’s  rights.  This  lawyer  believes  people  are  influenced  by  traditional  thinking  to  
view domestic violence as just an issue between the members of a couple.  
She shared her experiences in courts, where on several occasions, when a husband admitted 
his physical abuse towards his wife, the judge still refused to include domestic violence as one of 
the causes of the divorce. She remembered one case when the judge kept asking her to explain 
why the husband could have beaten his wife  to  death,  since  the  husband  looked  “so  in  love  with  
his  wife?”(Judge’s  words) (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
Guo Jianmei also pointed out that, based on her observations, there are only three law 
experts nationwide who can discuss law issues from a gender perspective. The ignorance of 
gender  issues  by  law  enforcement  agents  is  so  prevalent  that  one  director  of  a  local  women’s  
federation, who is in charge of its law-making  process,  stated  that,  “I  did  not  support  the  
enactment of any legal documents for preventing domestic violence because I believed this 
action was useless. From my point of view, I would rather spend time educating our prosecutors 
and judges about gender issues”  (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
The above mentioned quotations are only several examples that demonstrate how difficult it 
is  when  women’s  organizations  try  to  create  a  public  sphere  for  domestic  violence  issues  and  try  
to promote the transformation of the legal system. However, even though there are so few law 
experts  who  pay  attention  to  women’s  rights,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  along  with  other  
women’s  groups  still  try  both  to  make  experts  aware  of  gender  issues,  and  to  join  in  the  fight  
against domestic violence with these few experts.  
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Chen Ming is one of these experts who has played an important role in changing the whole 
legal system in its dealing with incidents of domestic violence. In an interview with a female 
judge,  she  stated,  “On  domestic  violence  issues,  we  (the  judges)  are  all  Chen  Ming’s  students”  
(interviewed by author, Dec. 7, 2011). Beginning in 2008 and up to 2013, ten of the Basic 
People’s  Courts  have  voluntarily  joined  the  effort  of  the  China  Institute  of  Applied  Jurisprudence  
of  the  Supreme  People’s  Court  of China, and have applied the Trial Guide for Cases that Involve 
Domestic Violence and Marriage to strongly intervene in incidents of domestic violence.  
At  the  end  of  2011,  the  number  of  Basic  People’s  Courts  that  applied  to  be  experimental  
courts for domestic violence trials was more than one hundred, and there have been more than 
200 protective orders issued. Chen Ming analyzed media reports and discussions on the Internet 
from 2010 to September 2011. She concluded that the efforts of experimental courts to combat 
domestic violence have gained attention and praise from the society, and these efforts have not 
resulted in any criticism.  
In  addition  to  Chen  Ming’s  efforts,  the  Anti-Domestic Violence Network also works very 
hard with the legal system. Before the end of its affiliation in 2011, the Network was under the 
China Law Society, which is a CONGO that represents people in the legal system. The Network 
and  women’s  groups  have  held  a  series  of  training  programs  for  police officers, prosecutors, and 
judges. 
The  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  also  held  training  programs  on  
issues of domestic violence for law enforcement agents. Both organizations chose to work with 
local  women’s  federations  to  host  these  training  programs.  As  a  director  of  a  local  women’s  
federation  in  a  remote  area  of  China  stated,  “I  helped  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  to  host  
the training programs for law enforcement agents and asked all the leaders of the legal system to 
participate in these training workshops” (interviewed by author, China, April 17, 2013). 
As a social group that promotes gender issues and needs to be recognized in the legal 
system,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  does  more  than  hosting  training  programs.  The  lawyers  
of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  are  also trainers whenever they represent a legal case. As a 
lawyer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  pointed  out,  the  lawyers  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center grasp every opportunity to introduce a gender perspective to law enforcement agents 
when representing legal cases that involve domestic violence issues. In other words, the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  views  the  court  as  a  platform  to  educate  law  enforcement.    
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In fact, trying to awaken the awareness of as many people as possible to the issues of 
domestic violence  has  been  one  of  women’s  groups’  major  strategies  in  the  campaign  against  
domestic violence. Training programs, panel discussions, and conferences are only some 
examples of this effort at public education. 
Chen Ming also puts a lot of effort into introducing the ideal legal management of issues of 
domestic violence to all level of judges. Combining her dedication with the efforts of some 
women’s groups, significant progress in reforming the legal system vis-a-vis the issue of 
domestic violence has been made. There are now fewer law enforcement agents who view 
domestic violence as family matter, and there are more lawyers and judges who recognize the 
existence of domestic violence. 
 
5.4. Comparing Different Strategies in Raising Awareness about Domestic Violence Issues 
The campaign against domestic violence has achieved several significant changes including 
the  creation  of  a  public  sphere  for  discussion  of  issues  of  domestic  violence;;  changing  people’s  
perspective regarding domestic violence incidents, and establishing new institutions with local 
governments to provide services for victims.  
However, each achievement has been a process of negotiation with the central authorities. 
In  the  campaign  against  domestic  violence,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s Law Center, 
and Common Language have chosen different strategies to expand their political space. Because 
of  their  different  stages  of  organizational  development,  and  because  of  organizers’  anticipation  
of  governments’  response,  the  Maple  Center  has  chosen a more cooperative strategy, while the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  used  a  more  confrontational  strategy.    
As a relatively young organization, Common Language took the opportunity of joining the 
campaign against domestic violence to build up its connection  with  women’s  groups.  This  
approach  was  the  first  step  for  Common  Language  to  introduce  lesbian  issues  to  women’s  groups,  
and at the same time, an opportunity to learn about strategies for negotiating with the central 
authorities  from  several  women’s  groups.  
One  can  observe  changes  in  the  various  groups’  relationships  with  the  central  authorities  as  
a  result  of  their  chosen  strategies.  Compared  to  other  women’s  issues,  the  campaign  against  
domestic violence has made significant progress in shifting the traditional discourse and creating 
public space for domestic violence issues. The success of getting the Domestic Violence 
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Prevention Act to be included in the law-making process of the central government is one piece 
of evidence that demonstrates the existence of a public sphere for issues of domestic violence.  
There is other significant evidence that shows the transformation of cultures regarding 
incidents of domestic violence. For example, there have been more media reports that ask the 
government to pay closer attention to the seriousness of the issue of domestic violence, and there 
have been more public advertisements that ask people to stand up to stop incidents of domestic 
violence.  
Furthermore,  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  have  led  to  collaboration with local 
governments in establishing new institutions for victims of domestic violence. The Maple 
Center’s  collaboration  project  with  Tianjin  Women’s  Federation  in  2001,  “Half-Sky  Homeland,”  
is one example. This project aimed to promote a community model that prevents incidents of 
domestic violence. Even though the Maple Center was forced to leave this project in 2006, the 
Tianjin  Municipality  has  continued  using  the  Maple  Center’s  model.    
In conclusion, this research has found significant results from the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  
to create a public sphere for the discussions of issues of domestic violence. Keech-Marx shares a 
similar  observation,  “What  is  clear  is  that  Chinese  popular  women’s  groups  are  actively  
engaging with the state, and are achieving significant gains to  the  benefit  of  China’s  women” 
(2008, 199). 
Based on discussions with women activists, this research has concluded the following 
reasons  for  this  successful  movement.  First  is  the  hosting  of  the  1995  UN  women’s  conference.  
Feng Yuan, the chairperson of the Anti-Domestic Violence Network pointed out that because of 
this  women’s  conference,  the  international  communities,  central  government  and  the  media  
began to pay attention to domestic violence issues in China. As Lu Zhang stated,  “Domestic 
violence remained a culturally and politically prohibited topic until the hosting of the Beijing 
Conference in China” (2009). 
Based on our interviews, Guo Jianmei added three more reasons. First, the central 
authorities do not view the campaign against domestic violence as a threat to regime legitimacy. 
Second, many families have personally experienced incidents of domestic violence. Along with 
the  elevation  of  women’s  economic  status,  more  and  more  women  have  started  to  stand  up  for  
their own rights.  Third,  compared  to  other  women’s  rights  issues,  the  campaign  against  domestic  
violence  has  gained  more  support  among  women’s  groups (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
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Aug. 17, 2011). 
Based on field observation and material evaluation, this research reached the conclusion 
that  it  has  been  the  efforts  of  women’s  groups  that  have  awakened  people’s  awareness  to  the  
issue  of  domestic  violence.  In  other  word,  the  hosting  of  the  1995  UN  women’s  conference  
brought the concept of domestic violence to some governmental  officers  and  women’s  activists.  
But for most of society, the idea of domestic violence as a social problem remained unknown 
until the year 2000. 
Several  organizers  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  
Language stated that they had never heard about issues of domestic violence before they joined 
their  organizations.  Some  organizers  indicated  that  watching  the  TV  soap  opera  “Do Not Talk to 
Strangers”  (Bùyào  hé  mòshēng  rén  shuōhuà) was the first time that they learned about the issue 
of  domestic  violence.  According  to  one  organizer  from  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  
Chinese society had never been aware of the issue of domestic violence until the year 2000, 
when this popular TV soap opera about an abused wife was on the air.  
However, these organizers who only learned about the issue of domestic violence after 
joining their organizations also share the belief that nowadays, most people in China have heard 
about the issue of domestic violence. From the point of view of this research, the effort of 
women’s  groups  to  work  with  the  media  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to  this  awareness.    
There are several examples of their efforts. First, the Maple Center, the Peking  Women’s  
Law Center, and Common Language all have networked with journalists to provide them with 
information about the laws and policies on  domestic  violence.  At  the  same  time,  women’s  and  
lesbian groups have assisted the media in reporting about the seriousness of several domestic 
violence incidents, by providing expert perspective and some case details.  
In  addition,  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  all  
host or participate in training programs which were designed to help media reporters learn more 
about gender issues and to learn appropriate ways to report on incidents of domestic violence. In 
other  words,  organizers  of  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  
Language all view the media as an important channel for public education, and have designed 




5.4.1. Chosen Strategies Reflect Different Stage of Organizational Development 
Although a number of strategies are shared by these three organizations, the Maple Center, 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  have  each  adopted  different  strategies  
in  their  campaigns  against  domestic  violence.  The  Maple  Center’s  strategies  have  been  more  
cooperative with the governance  system,  while  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  adopted  some  
more confrontational strategies to seek reform in the legal system. 
Based on interviews and field research, this study has concluded that there are two main 
reasons why each strategy was chosen. The first reason is to choose a strategy that will help the 
organization to develop its organizational capability, and the second is to choose a strategy that 
will create political opportunity for advocacy work. 
For example, Common Language chose to conduct research about domestic violence among 
the lesbian population. This strategy helped Common Language to train its volunteers. Also, by 
inviting experts to organize the advisory board of this research, Common Language began to 
build its connections with  women’s  groups.    
These chosen strategies reflect the fact that, compared to the Maple Center and the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center,  Common  Language  is  a  relatively  young  organization  which  lacks  
resources.  While  analyzing  women’s  organizing  in  Beijing  between 1995 and 2001, Cecilia 
Milwertz observed a similar strategy. “One  of  the  principal  modes  of  action  employed  by  the  
new organizations is based on utilizing personal networks that cut across institutions regardless 
of their structural links to the party-state” (2002, 7). 
Citing  Common  Language  as  an  example,  and  comparing  it  to  most  women’s  groups  in  
Beijing, the founder and organizers have less personal connection with the central government. 
As a result, Common Language has developed one unique strategy to overcome this challenge, 
and this strategy did contribute to the development of its organizational capabilities. First of all, 
by training volunteers, Common Language was able to form its executive committee in 2008. 
Then,  by  working  with  women’s  groups, Common Language also began to build up its 
connections  with  local  women’s  federations.  As  a  result,  both  its  degree  of  autonomy  and  degree  
of empowerment have increased steadily. 
As  for  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  their  organizers have chosen 
strategies based on their expectation of maximizing their political space for organizing. The 
organizers have chosen both cooperative and confrontational strategies in their campaign against 
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domestic violence. The cooperative strategies include holding collaborative projects with the 
local governments, and hosting training programs for government officials and law enforcement 
agents.  
There  are  also  examples  of  activists’  “soft”  confrontational  strategies,  including  holding  
press conferences for victims of domestic violence, organizing gatherings and conferences on the 
issue  of  domestic  violence,  and  making  accusations  to  the  media  about  the  government’s  
irresponsible actions on incidents of the domestic violence. 
  
5.4.2. Choosing Strategies with  the  Anticipation  of  the  Government’s  Reaction 
Why  did  some  women’s  groups  choose  to  act  cooperatively  and  confrontationally  at  the  
same time? Based on interviews and field research, this study has found that organizers will 
choose strategies based on their predications of possible reactions of the governments. Moreover, 
these concerns of the organizers have been built on their past experiences interacting with the 
central authorities.  
It is because the central authorities have positioned each self-organizing group in a different 
category  that  the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  Common  Language  have  
build different strategies to respond to the interference from the central authorities. According to 
Kang  Xiaoguang,  and  Han  Heng,  “Facing social organizations with a different degree of power 
for challenging or ability for launching collective behavior, the government selects different 
control  method…The  government  takes  different  actions  for  controlling  social  organizations  in  
line with the properties of the goods they offer” (2011, 101). 
Even  though  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  have  both  used  
cooperative and confrontational actions in their campaigns against domestic violence, their major 
emphasis has been different. Based on field research and interviews, this research has concluded 
that in the campaign against domestic violence, the Maple Center chose a more cooperative 
strategy, for example, providing counseling services for victims of domestic violence and 
building up a new mechanism to serve victims with the help of the local governments.  
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  chose  a  more  confrontational  strategy,  including  
representing symbolic victims of domestic violence, and holding press conferences to make 
accusations about the damage caused by incidents of domestic violence . For the organizers of 
the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  representing  symbolic  cases  of  domestic  violence  not  only  has  
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helped them to build their reputation as an advocacy group, but has also helped them to be 
invited as experts in the law-making process.  
The  organizers’  reasons  behind  each  chosen  strategy  indicate  organizer’s  evaluation  of  
possible reactions from the central government. For example, from the point of view of the 
Maple  Center’s  organizers, providing social services for victims of domestic violence has made 
the Maple Center eligible to be listed on the governmental subsidy list, while, at the same time, 
providing social services has allowed them to collect additional information about the 
seriousness of domestic violence. 
In other words, the organizers have learned from their previous experiences regarding the 
boundaries of the central authorities. The organizers anticipated possible results of their actions, 
and made plans to expand their political space accordingly. Citing the submission of a draft 
proposal in 2003 as an example, the campaign against domestic violence which was led by the 
Network, learned about the open channel of NPC before the organizers decided to put in the 
effort required for their submission. 
The law-making process of NPC has evolved during these years. According to Michael 
Dowdle,  “Since the mid-1980s,  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC)  has  played  a  key  role  in  
catalyzing the development of normative notions of political citizenship in China” (2002, 330). 
“This  fragmentation  of  the  NPC’s  institutional  structure  provides  emergent  social  interests  with  a  
greater variety of potential points-of-entry into the NPC political decision-making process” 
(2002, 341-342). 
This  is  the  reason  why  women’s  organizations  made  a  great  effort  to  partner  with  30  
national  people’s  representatives,  and  successfully  submitted  the  “Domestic  Violence  Prevention  
and  Intervention  Law”  to  the  National  People’s  Congress.  Only  with  the  passage of a law that 
clarifies its commitment to define domestic violence as a criminal action, can units of law 
enforcement really combat domestic violence. 
 
5.5. Interactive Political Liberalization: Changes of the Society and the Governance System 
This successful submission of the draft law represented the break up of the distinction 
between public and private spheres, which had viewed domestic violence as a family matter for a 
long time. In addition to their efforts to create a new public sphere for issues of domestic 
violence, there was another important contribution made by the campaign against domestic 
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violence, namely, the awakening of the awareness of rights. 
Based  on  the  observations  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  lawyers,  the  number  of  
domestic violence victims who have sought legal help increased dramatically after 2002, and 
2002 was also the year that lawyers experienced the most requests for help since the 
establishment  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  in  1995. 
The increasing number of women who seek legal advice demonstrates the transformation of 
the  idea  of  rights,  and  this  achievement  of  women’s  groups  may  also  have  contributed  to  the  
formation of civil society in China. History has shown that Chinese people are used to obeying 
rulers. According  to  Kevin  J.  O’Brian,    
“There  is  little  evidence  that  villagers  consider  rights  to  be  inherent,  natural, or inalienable; nor 
do most claimants break with the common Chinese practice of viewing rights as granted by the 
state mainly for societal purposes rather  than  to  protect  an  individual’s  autonomous being” (2001, 
426). 
Therefore, it was impossible for victims of domestic violence to claim their own rights, 
especially when most of society viewed domestic violence as a dishonorable family matter. 
Based on the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center’s  lawyers’  observations,  more  and  more  victims  are  
willing  to  reveal  the  “dirty  laundry”  of  their  households  and  to  fight  for  their  rights,  which  
demonstrates a new movement of rights awareness.  
Meanwhile, the situation of the  lesbian  population  is  much  more  unveiled  than  women’s  
population.  In  addition  to  awakening  the  media’s  awareness,  Common  Language  also  has  
successfully  built  its  connection  with  women’s  groups,  and  lawyers  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  
Center began to represent lesbians in the courts. In other words, more and more people have 
learned about lesbian victims of domestic violence incidents. Furthermore, lawyers of the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  are  willing  to  provide  legal  services  for  these  victims. 
Most importantly, in addition to the transformation of the whole society, the strategies of 
each group have also affected their own development. Common Language chose to join the 
campaign against domestic violence as a strategy to build the recognition of lesbian groups in 
society and by participating in this campaign, both its degree of autonomy and empowerment has 
increased. 
Organizers of Common Language continue to fight for the lesbian population to be included 
in the protection of victims that is provided by the government. Whether their efforts will be 
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successful is a crucial element in the evaluation of their chosen strategies. As for the Maple 
Center, their cooperative strategy has been its major strategy. The next question for the Maple 
Center is whether under a cooperative strategy, they will decrease their degree of autonomy in 
exchange for a gain in their degree of empowerment. 
The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  chosen  a  much  more  confrontational  strategy,  and  as  
a result, organizers also face the most interference from the government. To balance government 
interference,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  has  chosen  to  team  up  with  the  media.  It  is  worth  
questioning whether the media will continue their support if the government intervenes in the 
media. 
In conclusion, this research shares a senior women’s activist’s evaluation of the 
contributions  of  the  Maple  Center.  The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  in  
the campaign against domestic violence. This women’s activist is one of the founders and a 
three-term director of the Anti-Domestic  Violence  Network.  She  stated,  “The  Maple  Center  
provided the fundamental research data for the campaign against domestic violence. Its analyses 
of one hundred cases provide a better understanding of domestic violence incidents. The Maple 
Center’s  research  benefits  both  prevention  work  and  policy advocacy to move forward” 
(interviewed by author, China, March 18, 2013). 
“The  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  plays  a  critical  role  in  reforming  the  legal  system.  
Without the understanding of domestic violence issues and without the gender perspectives, law 
enforcement could cause more harm to abused victims. As to the role of Common Language, it is 
Common  Language’s  report  on  lesbian  domestic  violence  victims  that  fulfills  our  shortage  in 
prevention  work.  And  at  the  same  time,  Common  Language’s  research  provides  most  people  in  
China with the first opportunity to learn more about sexual minorities”  (interviewed by author, 
China, March 18, 2013). 
In other words, each organization has chosen its unique strategy based on its organizational 
development stage and their anticipation of governmental response. Based on field research, the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  which  picked  a  more  confrontational  strategy,  has  increased  its  
degree of autonomy, while the Maple Center, which chose a more cooperative strategy, has 
increased its degree of empowerment. And Common Language as a relatively young 
organization has taken the opportunity of joining the campaign against domestic violence to 
increase both its degree of autonomy and degree of empowerment. 
172 
 
In addition to the changes of social groups, another dimension worth noting is to evaluate 
changes of the governance system. In this chapter, I have conclude the following changes of the 
governance system toward  issues  of  domestic  violence,  namely,  local  governments’  cooperative  
projects  with  women’s  groups  to  fight  against  domestic  violence;;  ACWF’s  attention  to  issues  of  
domestic  violence;;  NPC’s  willingness  to  include  Anti-Domestic Violence Act into the 
law-making process, and most importantly, changes in the legal system. 
These changes of the state-social group relation point out the expansion of governmental 
boundaries for social organizing, and also demonstrate a public sphere for issues of domestic 
violence. Moreover, these changes indicate that an adaptive governance system could result in 
political  liberalization,  when  the  issue  does  not  threat  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
“Chinese  NGOs  grow  in  crevices;;  wherever  there  is  even  a  hint  of fertile ground, out pops a 
social  group.”   
Wang Xingjuan, the Founder of the Maple Center 
 
The  second  wave  of  women’s  organizing  appeared  in  China  after  it  hosted  the  UN  Fourth  
World  Conference  on  Women  in  1995,  a  time  when  the  regime’s  legitimacy  was  buttressed by 
rapid economic growth.28 Lacking  confrontational  experience,  women’s  groups  have  developed  
their  advocacy  ability  with  the  international  community’s  support  and  through  each  of  their  
interactions with the repressive state. 
In this dissertation, I  have  examined  three  women’s  groups  and  seen  their  organizers’  
similar strategies in facing interference from the central government as well as their different 
strategies in working against domestic violence. No matter whether organizers choose a similar 
with  or  different  strategy  from  each  other,  the  chosen  strategy  represents  the  organizers’  effort  to  
expand their political space. These strategies support my argument that Chinese women's 
advocacy groups are forming a confrontational movement. This argument differs from current 
social movement theory that has been examining Chinese NGOs. 
The school of social movement theory rests on the connections between confrontational 
performance  and  the  existence  of  social  movement,  and  suggests  that  the  term  “state  
corporatism”  is  the  best  fit  in  describing  the  relationship  between  the  central  government  and  
social groups in China.  
In line with recent analyses of social groups in China, the evidence presented in this 
dissertation acts as a corrective to these views, cautioning that we should not assume that all 
advocacy  groups  are  working  toward  challenging  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  I  have  also  argued  that  
the  evolution  of  both  the  organizers’  strategies  and  the  government’s  response  demonstrates  the  
emergence of interactive political liberalization.29 
                                                 
28 In this dissertation, the  first  wave  of  women’s  organizing  appeared  in  the  1980s,  when  women’s  studied  centers  
formed in several colleges. 
29 This  dissertation  borrows  Linz  and  Stepan’s  (1996)  definitions  of  liberalization,  that  :  “In  a non-democratic 
setting, liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat 
greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards 
for individuals such as habeas corpus, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhaps 
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At  the  macro  level,  the  strategies  of  women’s  advocacy  groups’  in  expanding  their  political  
space  can  be  regarded  as  a  “soft”  confrontational  challenge  toward  the  authoritarian  regime.  In  
Chapter 3, we have seen in the case  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  China  that  political  space  
for social change did not exist. It is created and expanded by women’s advocacy groups. 
The next question we asked was why some strategies successfully expanded organizational 
political space, while others failed. Only by answering the central puzzle of Chapter 3, can we 
begin to examine the driving forces in expanding governmental boundaries. In that chapter, I 
identified and analyzed the four factors that can be leveraged by organizers. They are: ensuring 
the  regime’s  legitimacy,  cooperative  relationships  with  local  governments,  pressure  from  the  
international community, and funding from international donors.  
At the macro level, it is well known that in China, social groups are under strict control. 
Much  less  is  known  about  the  organizers’  confrontational  strategies.  In  this  dissertation,  I  have  
conducted two comparisons in order to demonstrate the multiple strategies  of  women’s  advocacy  
groups for both survival and social reform purposes. 
First, in  Chapter  4,  I  have  summarized  the  four  struggles  that  are  shared  by  the  women’s  
groups, despite the differences in their missions, organizational capabilities, and societal and 
governmental connections. This comparison illustrates the similarities of the organizers’  chosen  
strategies. 
The four meso and micro types of repressive interference are expressed as: revoking an 
NGO’s  registration  status,  exclusive  policy-making process, marginalizing self-mobilized groups, 
and oppression to any possible confrontational movement. For each challenge, the organizers 
have developed three to four strategies to fight back.  
After  a  thorough  exploration,  the  evidence  of  Chapter  4  shows  that  the  three  women’s  
advocacy groups have successfully expanded their political space and have raised their public 
visibility. More importantly, the social groups are not the only actors that make changes. The 
central government also adjusts its governance approach. This is the reason why I have 
introduced  the  idea  of  “interactive  political  liberalization”  to  describe  the  interactions  between  
advocacy groups and the central government. 
The current success of the campaign against domestic violence in the public policy area 
                                                                                                                                                             
measures  for  improving  the  distribution  of  income,  and  most  important,  the  toleration  of  opposition.”  (Linz  and  




strengthens this argument. The inclusion of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in the 
agenda  of  National  People’s  Congress  was  the  result  of  negotiations  between  women’s  advocacy  
groups and the central government. 
Because of this success, the second comparison of my dissertation focuses on the different 
advocacy strategies  of  the  three  women’s  groups  in  the  same  campaign  against  domestic  
violence. Indeed, as Andrew Mertha (2009) has observed, NGOs in China have increasingly 
shaped policy outcomes in China. The evidence in Chapter 5 shows the shifting attitude of 
society, local governments, governmental officials in the central government, and the All China 
Women’s  Federation. 
The  main  focus  of  Chapter  5  was  to  explain  the  factors  that  led  to  the  organizers’  choice  of  
different strategies. If providing social services gained  the  most  political  space,  why  don’t  all  
three  women’s  groups  devote  their  efforts  to  it?  Only  by  answering  this  question,  can  we  
maximize  our  understanding  of  the  organizers’  strategic  movement. 
In Chapter 5, I identified two main factors that swayed the  organizers’  choice  of  strategies  
in  promoting  the  same  agenda,  namely,  the  stage  of  their  group’s  organizational  development  
and  the  organizers’  anticipation  of  governmental  response.  On  the  one  hand,  as  demonstrated  in  
that chapter, providing social services  helped  women’s  groups  to  build  their  working  relation  
with local governments and move one step closer to being included in the local governance 
system. 
On the other hand, providing social services gives the government greater access to learning 
about the internal operations of women's groups, and thus, organizers will need to expend greater 
effort  to  maintain  their  organization’s  independence. 
A main finding of Chapter 5 is that organizers face the dilemma of losing their degree of 
autonomy or decreasing their degree of empowerment. Although my research observed several 
strategies that led to increases of both autonomy and empowerment, the win-win situation rarely 
happened, and organizers often struggled to balance their organizational autonomy and 
empowerment.  
Overall,  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  studied  achieved  their  goals  in  the  campaign  
against domestic violence. All three groups have further developed their relationships with local 
governments, which can be viewed as leverage in negotiating with the central government. Most 
significantly, organizers have successfully created a public sphere for domestic violence issues. 
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In conclusion, my dissertation argues that the key to explaining possible political changes is 
to look more closely at the interaction between advocacy groups and the central government. 
When  neither  political  space  nor  confrontational  tactics  are  available  for  women’s  activists,  both  
the survival of their organizations as well as their success in achieving their goals depend mainly 
on their chosen strategies.  
This argument does not negate the crucial and decisive role of the state. My findings show, 
rather,  that  both  the  state  and  women’s  advocacy  groups  are  adaptive  and  strategically  learn  from  
each other. I propose that the confrontational  movement  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  the  
central  government’s  adaptive  governance  are  emblematic  of  interactive  political  liberalization  in  
contemporary China. 
 
Interactive Political Liberalization 
The traditional view of the state-social  group  relationship  as  a  “state  corporatism”30 model 
does  not  reflect  the  whole  picture  of  the  advocacy  movement  of  women’s  groups.  The  successful  
expansion  of  the  political  space  of  women’s  groups  and  the  adaptive  governance  of  the  central  
government indicate a possible beginning of the interactive political liberalization process. 
The main supporting evidence of this contention lies in the increased participation of 
women’s  groups  in  the  public  policy  area.  As  Charles  Tilly  stated,  “The  fundamental  processes 
promoting democratization in all times and places… consist of increasing integration of trust 
networks  into  public  politics” (2007, 23).  
The  interactions  between  women’s  groups  and  the  central  government  is  similar  to  Tilly’s  
description  of  Renshou’s case that ‘A  famous  series  of  struggles  in  Renshou,  Sichuan,  during  
1992 and 1993 incorporated a mobilization—repression—bargaining cycle of this sort’” (2007, 
144). 
I have designed the following two-by-two matrix to demonstrate the dynamics and the 
fluidity of the relationship between the central government and the three organizations that I 
have  studied,  the  Maple  Women’s  Psychological  Counseling  Center  (the  Maple  Center);;  the  
Peking  University  Women’s  Law  Studies  &  Legal  Aid  Center  (the  Peking  Women’s  Law 
Center), and Common Language, a lesbian/gay rights advocacy group. 
                                                 
30 “(I)n  which  the  state  allows  hierarchically  ordered  and  controlled associations to play limited roles as a way to 
reconcile  large  numbers  of  divergent  interests.”  (Florini, Lai, and Tan 2012, 95. See also Unger 2008). 
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There are at least four types of relationships. They are described as shown in the following 
matrix. To be clear, instead of pointing the exact position of each women’s advocacy group, the 
main purpose of this matrix is to show the dynamic relationships. In other words, the spots on the 
matrix should not be measured. 
 







Autonomy/ Institutionalized Independence: 
0: women’s groups are forbidden by the state 
1: women’s groups are controlled by the state and carry out state policy 
2: women’s groups are monitored by the state but enjoy some degree of autonomy31 
3: women’s groups are institutionalized and enjoy full independence 
 
Empowerment 
0: women’s groups do not have any influence in the policy-making process 
1: women’s groups bring key issues to the public domain 
2: women’s groups participate in the policy-making process 
3: women’s groups have nationwide influence 
 
Cell A represents a group of women’s organizations which enjoy little autonomy and are 
not involved much in public policy. Cell B refers to women’s groups that also are monitored by 
                                                 
31 This  research  project  applies  Howell’s  definition  of  autonomous  to  define  the  degree  of  autonomy. According to 
Howell, an organization is autonomous if it meets the following conditions: first, it is able to set its own goals, 
determine its own priorities, and decide its own structures and principles of organization; second, it is able to 
appoint its own personnel and recruit its own members; third, it relies primarily on its own source of funding. (Jude 
Howell, 2000. p. 127) 
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the government. However, these groups manage to get involved in public policy. Cell C 
represents embedded groups. The government aligns itself with these women’s groups, and at the 
same time, these organizations participate in the policy-making process. Cell D describes a 
situation where social groups enjoy a great deal of autonomy and also have influence on the 
policy-making process. Women’s  groups  in  this  matrix  are  mobile  and  shift  their  positions  
according to their changing relationship with the state. 
Based on my field research, I position the relationship between these three organizations 
and the state in the year 2012 in this matrix. Number 1 is represented by the Maple Center; 
number 2 by  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  and  number  3  by  Common  Language.  All  three  
organizations began their journey from area A. This research project aims to analyze what 
factors are the driving forces behind each critical move by applying the concept of political 
opportunity32 and political constraint. 
The hypothesis of this research project is that facing similar governmental interference, 
women’s  groups  that  can  transfer  interference  into  political  opportunity  in  order  to  develop  their  
organizational capabilities33 will expand their political space.  
My research has found that each chosen strategy may result in changes in organizational 
autonomy  or  organizational  empowerment.  For  example,  an  organizer’s  strategy  may  cause  a  
decrease in the degree of organizational autonomy, while, at the same time, leading to an 






                                                 
32 This  research  applies  Jack  Goldstone  and  Charles  Tilly’s  definition  of  political  opportunity  as  “the  [perceived]  
probability that  social  protest  actions  will  lead  to  success  in  achieving  a  desired  outcome”  (Goldstone and Charles 
Tilly 2001, 182). 
33 In this research, capability-building is defined as including gaining more popular support, raising more funds, 
increasing recruitment, generating attention from the media, and making connections with other social groups and 
funders nationally and internationally. 
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Figure 6.2.  The  Dynamic  Relationship  between  the  Central  Government  and  Three  Women’s  


















Autonomy/ Institutionalized Independence: 
0:  women’s  groups  are  forbidden  by  the  state 
1:  women’s  groups  are  controlled  by  the  state  and  carry  out  state  policy 
2:  women’s  groups  are  monitored  by  the  state  but  enjoy  some  degree  of  autonomy 
3:  women’s  groups  are  institutionalized  and  enjoy  full  independence 
 
Empowerment 
0:  women’s  groups  do not have any influence in the policy-making process 
1:  women’s  groups  bring  key  issues  to  the  public  domain 
2:  women’s  groups  participate  in  the  policy-making process 




The curvy trajectory indicates the struggle  of  women’s  advocacy  groups.  The  increases  in  
the degree of autonomy or the degree of empowerment reflect the successful expansion of 
political space. This expansion is evident in three aspects: achieving inclusion in the public 
policy area, building a national  reputation,  and  strengthening  the  organizers’  belief  in  their  
advocacy efforts. 
My analyses show that these three aspects should catalyze the process of interactive 
political liberalization politically, culturally and organizationally. First, the flexibility of the 
government  in  the  public  policy  area  reflects  the  ways  in  which  women’s  advocacy  groups  
creatively negotiate political power. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, I showed that participating in 
the public policy area is significantly correlated with organizational capability. 
In fact, this flexibility benefits both sides. The central government has relied on the role of 
social groups in fulfilling societal needs. In addition, the strategies analyzed in Chapter 4 reveal 
that social groups can play a symbolic function for the central government in polishing its 
international  reputation.  The  crucial  challenge  for  women’s  advocacy  groups  has  been  how  to  
use this political opportunity to expand their political space while sustaining organizational 
autonomy.  
The second expansion is cultural. Multidimensional strategies that were discussed in 
Chapter 5 have successfully constructed a public sphere for issues of domestic violence. The 
prevailing cultural pattern of viewing domestic violence as a family matter has been altered by 
women’s  advocacy  groups.  More  importantly,  the  public  education  that  was  delivered  by  
women’s  groups  has  had  a  big  impact  on  the  younger  generation’s  beliefs. My analyses in 
Chapter 5 demonstrate that the younger generation appears to be more confrontational in 
challenging the patriarchal society. 
Third, this expansion has an organizational dimension. Activists have attained greater 
confidence in continuing their advocacy work. This confidence is evident by different attitudes 
of organizers toward advocacy groups in two ways. First, activists have become more willing to 
hold public protest events. As my interviews with organizers in Chapter 4 show, most organizers 
are hesitant to challenge the government on the street since they have been taught to keep their 
distance from politics. However, this attitude is changing. 
Second, activists have shifted their emphasis of advocacy work from results to process. For 
example, most interviewees from the campaign against domestic violence indicate that they 
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won’t  push  for  the  passage  of  the  Prevention  of  Domestic  Violence  Act.  Instead,  they  believe  
that  including  this  act  in  the  National  People’s  Congress’  agenda  has  provided  opportunity  for  
them to continue public education, which will promote long-term social change. 
No matter whether the expansion is political, cultural or organizational, this expansion is 
associated with the process of interactive political liberalization, and most importantly, it 
involves and depends on the adaptive attitude of the central government. As I noted in my 
analyses,  the  strategies  of  the  organizers  have  shaped  officials’  attitudes  toward  gender  politics,  
and have contributed to the adaptive governance system of the central government.  
The basic point here is that as supporting  resources  enable  women’s  advocacy  groups  to  
develop new strategies, so new opportunities for state actors to refine their methods of 
governance have also been developed. This is an ongoing process of interactions between 
organizers and state actors. The adaptive nature of the contemporary Chinese government has 
created a greater sphere for advocacy groups to generate social changes. 
In addition, after years of public education, the awareness of their rights is rooted in the 
younger generation of organizers. The growing sense of movement identity discussed in Chapter 
4 suggests that the younger generation is increasingly willing to join advocacy groups for social 
change.  As  long  as  these  conditions  remain,  the  expansion  of  social  groups’  political  space will 
continue.  
But as my analysis also shows, the central government learns from the interaction with 
advocacy  groups  and  adjusts  their  tactics.  The  central  government’s  inclusion  of  advocacy  
groups in public policy discussions is partially a reaction against this expansion. In the 
short-term, this is a one-stone-for-two-birds tactic. Including advocacy groups in the public 
policy  area  will  not  only  fulfill  social  needs  but  will  also  sustain  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  How  to  
maintain organizational independence  has  become  a  major  challenge  for  women’s  activists 
 
Achieving Inclusion in the Public Policy Area 
In addition to the analysis in Chapter 5, the evidence in Chapter 3 reveals a vibrant 
expansion  of  women’s  groups  in  the  public  policy  area.  In  an  authoritarian regime, this 
expansion  signals  the  political  will  to  include  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  the  governing  system.  
Furthermore,  this  expansion  is  created  by  women’s  advocacy  groups’  initiative  action.  The  




Andrew Mertha points out that along with marginalized officials and the media, organizers 
of  social  groups  that  were  excluded  from  the  public  policy  process,  “have successfully entered 
the political process precisely by adopting strategies necessary to work within the structural and 
procedural constraints of the fragmented authoritarianism framework” (2009, 996). 
The expansion of the public policy area has new features significant enough to merit 
inclusion for their contribution to the process of interactive political liberalization. The first new 
feature is the construction of platforms for advocacy groups to carry out their vision, as I 
discussed in Chapter 4. The second feature is the sphere for public education.  
A  female  professor  who  has  participated  in  women’s  organizing  for  many  years  discussed  
one  similarity  of  these  three  groups’  participation  in  the  public  policy  area,  “Instead  of  results,  
these three groups emphasize the policy making process. I have observed that they utilize the 
process as public educational channels to convey their ideas” (interviewed by author, Nov. 25, 
2012). By  working  with  local  governments,  gender  ideas  have  become  visible  in  people’s  daily  
lives. 
The third feature is the empowerment of the organizers in negotiating with state actors. All 
three  women’s  advocacy  groups  have  been  involved  in  the  public  policy  area  both  locally  and  
nationally, although their roles are different in each case. Most of the time, organizers provide 
their expertise in the policy-making process, but sometimes, organizers join the effort or act as 
consultants in implementation. 
As I addressed in Chapter 4, the organizers decide on their strategies based on their 
anticipation of  governmental  responses  as  well  as  on  the  stage  of  their  organization’s  
development.  There  is  one  similarity  of  these  organizers  with  the  first  wave  of  women’s  
organizing,  namely,  the  organizers’  connection  with  the  state. 
As a female professor who has participated  in  women’s  organizing  for  years  stated,  
“Compared  to  other  social  groups,  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  have  
better relationships with the central government. After all, they were inside the central 
government.”  This  female  professor  explained  her  observation  that,  “Both  Wang  Xingjuan  and  
Guo Jianmei have good connections with All-China  Women’s  Federation  (ACWF).  They  are  
often invited by ACWF to participate in all kinds of conferences and panel discussions. 
Sometimes, their organizations will be chosen by ACWF to be introduced to foreigners” 
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(interviewed by author, Nov. 7, 2011). 
However,  for  the  younger  generation  of  women’s  organizations,  participating  in  the  public  
policy making process will be their first opportunity to learn the game rules of the government. 
The fourth feature of this expansion is the acquisition of resources for building up a 
confrontational  movement.  As  my  analysis  in  Chapter  4  has  shown,  these  women’s  advocacy  
groups have stressed to overcome their lack of resources is one of the major struggles of, and 
participating in the public policy area helps them to obtain the resources to build up their 
movements.  
A  female  professor  who  also  works  for  the  governmental  think  tank  stresses  that,  “They  
(Guo Jianmei and Wang Xingjuan) are very smart to work with the system. They choose to 
cooperate  with  the  local  women’s  federations  and  introduce  gender  perspectives  to  local  officials.  
This  is  a  smart  move,  because  you  will  know  how  to  use  the  system’s  resources” (interviewed by 
author, Nov. 25, 2012). 
The  participation  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  the  public  policy  area  reflects  a  profound  
political  transformation.  New  interactions  between  women’s  groups  and  the  government  afford  
new channels for the organizers to develop their political skills. As I have discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5, organizers have gradually chosen political strategies in responding to repressive 
interference. 
 
Building up the National Reputation of the Three Groups 
The second evidence of the expansion  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  their  political  space  
lies in the successful construction of a national reputation. China is the most populated country 
and this feature along with the scrutiny and control over social groups makes it extremely 
difficult  for  women’s  groups  to  be  recognized  nationwide. 
However, with the strategic involvement of international and media resources, several 
women’s  advocacy  groups  have  enjoyed  a  nationwide  reputation.  I  present  two  examples  in  this  
section. The first one involves recognition from the central governance system. 
A ministerial officer of ACWF indicated that there are some NGOs which have more social 
influence  than  ACWF.  She  cited  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  as  an  example.  She  told  me  
that she believes a woman would  seek  the  help  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  rather  than  
ACWF’s  help  when  facing  a  situation  involving  a  lawsuit. 
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This official also points out that nowadays, when there are foreign visitors, ACWF will 
provide introductions for them to visit some grass-root  women’s  groups,  including  my  two  cases,  
namely,  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center.  A  female  professor  who  also  
works  for  a  governmental  think  tank  agrees  with  this  official’s  observation  that,  “our  society  has  
recognized the work of the Maple Center and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center” (interviewed by 
author, Beijing, China, Aug. 13, 2011). 
The second evidence for the construction of an organizational reputation lies in the 
organization’s  international  recognition.  As  I  have  documented in Chapter 3, the founder of the 
Peking  Women’s  Law  Center,  Guo  Jianmei  and  the  founder  of  the  Maple  Center,  Wang  
Xingjuan, have received numerous international awards praising their accomplishments. The 
awards that were reported domestically helped Guo Jianmei and Wang Xingjuan build up their 
professional reputations. 
However, there has always been a backlash for receiving international awards. Some awards 
cross government boundaries. A female professor who also works for the government explains 
the logic,  “When  Guo  Jianmei  accepted  the  ‘Secretary  of  State’s  International  Women  of  
Courage  Award’  from  the  U.S.  government,  she  touched  two  sensitive  issues.  First,  what  does  
‘Women  of  Courage’  mean?  Does  it  imply  that  our  government  is  terrible  and  that  only a woman 
with much courage can challenge the government? Second, why did you accept an award from 
Hillary  Clinton?” (interviewed by author, Nov. 25, 2012). 
Compared  with  women’s  groups,  lesbian  organizing  manifests  a  different  trajectory.  As  I  
discussed in Chapter 3, lesbian organizing appeared during the hosting of the UN Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995. However, this first wave of organizing was dissolved by the 
repressive forces of the central government in 2001. Even when lesbian organizing was active in 
Beijing during this period of time, the society was used to associating the term homosexuality to 
the male gay population. 
My  analysis  of  the  Common  Language’s  development  has  shown  that  it  took  three  years  of  
effort by Common language to build the nationwide lesbian community and to support the 
establishment of other lesbian groups before organizers could focus on advocacy work in 2008. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 explained that by successfully reconstructing the political identity of 
lesbian groups, Common Language became the leading force in the new wave of lesbian 
organizing.  Furthermore,  as  discussed  in  chapter  5,  by  allying  with  women’s  groups,  Common  
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Language has gradually built up its reputation within the local governance system. 
 
Strengthening  the  Organizers’  Belief  in  Organizational  Advocacy  Efforts 
The  third  aspect  of  the  expansion  is  the  significant  changes  in  organizers  of  women’s  
advocacy groups. An important feature of a confrontational movement is its ability to recruit and 
to keep organizers.  The  organizers’  commitment  to  advocacy  work  is  the  vehicle  of  social  
change, especially in a repressive regime.  
James Scott has used public transcripts and hidden transcripts to describe the resistance of 
subordinate groups. My analyses in Chapters  3,  4  and  5  observed  the  increase  in  the  organizers’  
belief in their advocacy efforts, and, as a result, the gradual resistance in both public transcripts 
and hidden transcripts. The shifting attitude of organizers both reflects and leads larger trends of 
women’s  organizing. 
I  will  cite  the  development  of  Common  Language’s  advocacy  event  as  an  example  here  
since their double marginalized status makes it hard for the LGBTI population to join public 
events. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, it took Common Language two years to build up its 
organizational capability before organizers started their outreach activities in 2007.  
When Common Language held its first public event that challenged the society and the state, 
most participants were hesitant and cautious. The documentary director of this event recalled, 
“They  were  afraid  and  they  didn’t  want  to  be  filmed.  (Talk  with  a  smile)  Most  of  them  were  
trying  to  cover  their  faces  as  much  as  possible.”    
However, as the director stated, this younger generation was empowered by this public 
event and by the solidarity of going out together. Many of them joined the next event and did not 
refuse to be seen in front of the camera. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, training the trainer has 
been one of the major strategies  to  confront  repressive  forces.  The  efforts  of  women’s  advocacy  
groups have achieved two significant changes. 
First, there are more young women who are willing to choose a job in an NGO. A 
ministerial officer of ACWF said that currently, the younger generation would rather choose a 
NGO job than a governmental job in Beijing. She points out two reasons behind this change. 
First, the younger generation feels that working for an NGO could make a difference for the 




Her observation is verified by several of my interviews. The young generation of activists 
of these three organizations provided the same answer without prior consultation with each other 
that they would rather choose a NGO job than working for the government. They expressed the 
opinion that a sense of achievement is the reason why they want to be involved with NGOs. 
This is a unique phenomenon among the younger generation. One organizer of the Maple 
Center, who joined the NGO after her retirement from an enterprise states that, compared to 
working for a company, she has to work three-times  harder  in  a  women’s  NGO;;  however,  she  
also gains three-times the empowerment. A volunteer from the Common Language also 
indicated that she believes society can be changed through their efforts. As a ministerial officer 
of  ACWF  states,  “These  three  groups  have  all  established  their  power  of influence in their 
communities” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 16, 2011). 
Most significantly, as I noted in chapter 4 and 5, it requires strategic effort to build up the 
organizers’  belief  in  organizational  advocacy  work  since  advocacy  work  is  considered  a  potential  
challenge  to  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  I  observed that the three organizations have gradually 
adjusted  their  attitude  and  strategy  in  advocacy  work  in  order  to  strengthen  their  organizers’  
confidence in advocacy work.  
Citing Common Language as an example, organizers have shared with me that their first 
priority for one public event was to avoid being cancelled by the government. There were two 
major considerations. First, holding a public event would be an important training experience for 
their organizers and volunteers. Second, a cancellation would reaffirm the scrutiny and control of 
the  security  department,  which  could  affect  the  organizers’  confidence  in  the  work  of  NGOs. 
In fact, the three founders have adjusted their advocacy strategies over the years. A 
women’s  movement  leader  shared  her  observation  that,  “As  a  lawyer,  Gua  Jianmie  used  to  pick  
more confrontational approach. Her attitude remains the same, however, currently; the Peking 
Women’s  Law  Center  does  more  cooperative work with the government” (interviewed by author, 
March 18, 2013). 
“The  Maple  Center  has  moved  from  another  direction,”  she  continued,  “and  its  members  are  
more willing to express a confrontational point of view. I think Common Language has shifted 
their focus to advocacy work. They did not emphasize it (advocacy) in the past” (interviewed by 
author, March 18, 2013). My research in Chapter 3 has concluded that these adjustments have 
created political opportunity for their advocacy work. A major achievement in this respect is the 
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expansion of their political space. 
Furthermore, a  new  trend  of  women’s  organizing  has  been  observed,  namely  the  recent  
confrontational  nature  of  advocacy  work.  As  an  organizer  who  has  participated  in  women’s  
organizing  since  the  1980s  points  out,  “Recently,  the  voice  of  civil  society  which  challenges  or 
criticizes the authorities has grown louder” (interviewed by author, July 16, 2012). How this new 
trend affects the relationship between social groups and the state will be an interesting question 
for further analysis. 
 
Challenges Ahead 
Women’s  advocacy  groups have shaped state politics and have expanded their political 
space for advocacy work. Furthermore, their advocacy work has contributed to the rise of a 
grassroots movement that raises challenges on gender issues. These achievements are significant 
considering the political culture of China. 
As Chinese scholars who research civil society stated, “Civil society and the public sphere 
in modern China did not exist as the opposite of the state, but got involved in complex and 
interdependent interactions with  the  state…. Chinese society did not have a tradition of being 
independent, and society had no intention to break away from the state” (Yu and Zhou 2012, 112 
& 115). 
In such a system, it is dependent on organizers beliefs and strategies to carry forward their 
mission for social change. My analyses in Chapter 3, 4, and 5 have shown the vivid movement of 
the  Maple  Center,  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  in  creating  political  
opportunities for the expansion of their political space whenever organizers encounter repressive 
interference. 
A point worth noting is that the government also adopts different strategies to control social 
groups. I have found that the central government will loosen its tight control if social 
organizations can help to provide public goods or do only charity work. Chinese scholars, 
including Kang Xiaoguang, argued that “the new administrative strategy could eliminate 
challenging forces and satisfy social needs. But due to such a strategy, it was impossible for a 
civil society to develop” (Yu and Zhou 2012, 117). 
Here is one example of new administrative strategies. In  2011,  Beijing’s  municipal  
government announced that social organizations that provide social services could apply directly 
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to the civil affairs department for registration. Guangdong Province made a similar 
announcement on July 1, 2012, stating that social organizations can apply directly to the civil 
affairs department for registration. 
However, compared to the loosening up of control of charity groups, the central government 
in fact maintains severe scrutiny of advocacy groups. Several organizers have observed that the 
central government has increased its degree of scrutiny and interference after the 2008 Olympic 
Games. And the situation has been more severe for advocacy groups since the establishment of 
Xi’s  administration. 
In  addition  to  facing  the  gradually  adjusted  governance  tactics,  women’s  advocacy  groups  
also are wrestling with two internal challenges, namely, the sustainable development of their 
organizations and the decline of international donors. The possibility of continuing the expansion 
of  organizational  political  space  will  heavily  hinge  on  the  organizers’  ability  to  overcome  these  
two challenges. 
The first challenge for organizers is the recent trend of the withdrawal of international 
donors. The rapid development of the Chinese economy along with the Western recession have 
driven international donors to reconsider their support for charity and social justice in China. 
Based on my interviews with  women’s  activists,  there  has  been  a  significant  cut  of  international  
funding. 
For  example,  the  Ford  Foundation  has  been  one  of  the  major  supporters  of  women’s  groups  
in Beijing. However, after the economic crisis in 2008, the Ford Foundation cut the number of 
grantee groups from eleven to six, and also reduced the number of staff members in their Beijing 
office.  
The challenge of funding resources is severe. For the three organizations that I have studied, 
finding economic resources has been their founders’  major  task  since  their  establishment.  Even  
after forming a board committee, the board members still cannot help much with fund raising 
since it is difficult for NGOs to gain financial support from the society. The experience of Wang 
Xingjuan, the founder of the Maple Center, is a noteworthy example that demonstrates this 
severity. 
Wang Xingjuan is in her 80s, and has chosen to step down from the position as the director 
of the organizer. She is entitled to the position of honorable chairperson. However, when I 
interviewed her in 2012, she mentioned that she is still responsible for obtaining the financial 
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resources for the Maple Center. As my analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate, the founders of the 
three  women’s  organizations  have  been  swamped  with  the task of finding financial resources, 
which leaves them less time to focus on advocacy work. 
The second serious challenge to the three organizations that I have studied is whether the 
organizers can construct their organizations for sustainable development. There are two major 
aspects, namely, the institutionalization of their organizations, and the lack of number two 
leaders.  For  most  women’s  groups  in  China,  the  organizers  formed  their  groups  without  concrete  
knowledge about the way to construct a NGO.  
Several  leaders  of  women’s  groups  have  received  training  in  organizational  construction  
from international donors. However, the Western idea of building up an organization does not fit 
well into Chinese culture. Here is one example. The Maple Center set up its board committee 
twenty  years  after  its  establishment,  while  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  
Language have chosen not to establish board committees34. 
Instead,  both  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  and  Common  Language  formed  advisory  
committees. My interviews with the founders of these two organizations indicated that leaders 
believe setting up an advisory committee35 will be more helpful for them since they will need 
comrades to discuss advocacy strategies with them, while not adding too much burden on other 
activists’  shoulders  with  fundraising  issues.    
Based on my field observation, I argue that Chinese NGOs have faced quite unique 
challenges compared to NGOs within a democratic system. Therefore, it is not useful to apply 
the Western idea of functional NGOs or to use the definition of a confrontational movement to 
judge the efforts of Chinese advocacy groups. Different types of regimes have a significant 
influence on the political space of advocacy groups. However, lacking discussions on 
organizational construction will result in the second question regarding the organizational 
sustainability, namely, the succession issue. 
The  founders  of  the  three  women’s  groups  that  I  have  studied  are  all  very  charismatic,  
energetic and well-connected. Each of them is the leading figure of their own field. However, the 
lack of number two leaders will be a challenge to the sustainability of their organization. One 
                                                 
34 Both  the  Maple  Center  and  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  set  up  their  board  committee  by  the  encouraging  of  
the Ford Foundation. The board committee will meet regularly and provide help with organizational operations. 
35 Different  from  the  board  committee,  the  advisory  committee  won’t  meet  together.  Members  of  the  advisory  
committee will be consulted occasionally by organizers.  
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women  activist  shared  her  observation  regarding  the  succession  issue,  “She  (one  of  the  founders)  
views her  organization  as  her  own  child.  Which  mother  will  give  up  her  child?” (interviewed by 
author, March 18, 2013). 
There have been several examples that some staff members established similar 
organizations after they leave. Both the Maple Center and the Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  
share this experience. The founder of the Maple Center, Wang Xingjuan, calls this situation a 
duplicated organization. This is based on her experience where an organizer set up a similar 
organization and tried to get other organizers to join this new organization.  
Wang thinks this issue has resulted from the problem of a lack of mature organizers in the 
Maple Center. An organizer indicated that the one who formed a similar organization was the 
second  in  command  of  Wang  Xingjuan;;  “She thought she could not be the leader if she stayed in 
the Maple Center” (interviewed by author, March 18, 2013). Lacking a second in command 
leader  is  not  a  unique  situation  to  the  Maple  Center.  Based  on  my  field  research,  most  women’s  
organizations share this worry.  
The hosting of UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 created a great political 
opportunity  for  the  emergence  of  the  second  wave  of  women’s  organizing.  The  founders  of  these  
newly formed groups were energetic and full of ambitions. However, for most of them, this was 
the first time they worked in an NGO, and they did not have experience organizing a social 
group. 
The  growth  of  the  number  of  women’s  NGOs  has  been  stagnant.  Compared  to  other  NGOs,  
for example the bloom of AIDS and environmental protection NGOs, the increase in the number 
of  women’s  NGOs  has  been  extremely  slow.  Wang  Xingjung  indicates  that  the  main  problem  is  
funding.  Women’s  issues  are  too  marginalized  and  international  donors  are  not  interested  in  
supporting  women’s  organizations. Based on my field research, I would argue that the lack of a 
training plan for a successor is another cause of this problem. 
I  have  observed  the  high  turnover  rate  of  organizers  of  women’s  groups.  The  salary  is  not  
the major reason for this high turnover rate since most organizers choose to work for NGOs in 
the first place. Based on my interviews with organizers, the lack of the possibility of a future 
promotion in their careers is the main factor that leads them to leave. However, because of the 
tension  with  the  organizations’  founders  caused  by  their  leaving,  most  organizers  did  not  
continue to work in the NGO field. As a result, there is a lack of mature organizers to form new 
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women’s  groups.       
 
Evolution  of  Women’s  Organizing 
This study has argued that Western idea of social movements is not applicable to evaluate 
the  expansion  of  confrontational  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  China.  Furthermore,  a  
comprehensive understanding of the state-society  relation’s  dynamic  requires  attention  to  the  
evolution of  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  their  confrontational  strategies.  After  all,  a  change  in  
the relationship between the state and social groups is one noteworthy criterion to predict future 
political possibilities. 
Even though my field research has observed several  challenges  of  women’s  organizing,  the  
more  exciting  fact  is  the  evolution  of  women’s  advocacy  groups.  In  addition  to  these  three  pieces  
of  evidence  of  the  expansion  of  women’s  advocacy  groups,  I  also  have  observed  two  significant  
developments of women’s  advocacy  groups.  The  first  one  is  the  increase  number  of  women’s  
advocacy  groups.  Even  though  the  number  of  women’s  groups  has  not  increased  much,  there  are  
more  and  more  women’s  organizations  that  have  shifted  their  focus  toward  advocacy  work.  The  
Maple Center is one good example. 
 
More  Women’s  Advocacy  Groups  and  Changes  of  Bureaucrats 
As I analyzed in Chapter 3, the Maple Center was set up for research purposes. Organizers 
provide  counseling  services  in  order  to  better  understand  women’s  situations and to further form 
recommendations  on  women’s  issues.  However,  after  being  a  service-oriented group for several 
years, the organizers noted the importance of advocacy work. As Florini, Lai and Tan state, 
“Service  providers  often  morph  into advocates and rights defenders” (2012, 121). 
In a repressive regime, it takes more time and effort for a social group to begin its advocacy 
work. Organizers have to build up their own supporting allies before they can take a more 
confrontational strategy. As a lesbian group without many comrades, Common Language took 
three years to build up a nationwide lesbian community before the organizers shifted their focus 
toward advocacy work.  
The growth of women's advocacy groups has also contributed to the expansion of women's 
groups  into  the  public  policy  area.  More  women’s  groups  focus  on  advocacy  work  and  have  
allied  with  each  other  to  create  increased  pressure  on  the  governance  system  to  include  women’s  
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voices.  As  I  discussed  in  Chapters  4  and  5,  women’s  advocacy  groups  used the strategy of 
working with local governments in order to negotiate more space involving public policy.  
My analyses have also found significant changes among bureaucrats. There are more and 
more officials within all levels of government willing to work with  women’s  advocacy  groups.  
These cooperative relations are formed by two major reasons. First, some officials have learned 
from  past  experiences  that  collaborating  with  women’s  advocacy  groups  would  benefit  their  
working performances. Second, and more importantly, there are some officials have identified as 
feminists  and  are  willing  to  work  with  women’s  advocacy  groups  in  any  kind  of  formation. 
 
An Emergence of a Young Generation of Activists 
Second, there has been an emergence of a young generation of activists. As I noted in 
Chapter 4, young generation activists have been awakened by rights consciousness and thus pay 
much more attention to their citizenship rights.  
One  organizer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  states  her  observation, 
“I found that women become more and more aware of their own rights. There are several reasons 
behind the increasing sense of rights. In general, there are more and more people who receive 
education, and when people do not need to worry about food and cloth, they will pay attention to 
issues of rights. Moreover, advances of internet technology and the promotion of rule of law also 
contribute to people’s  awareness  of  their  rights” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, April 26, 
2011). 
Furthermore, my study has also found that there is a shift in attitude between younger 
generations toward advocating their civil rights. A senior activist of Common Language has 
observed the growth of volunteers who state that the main force driving them to volunteer at 
Common Language is advocacy work. She tells about one example, 
“One  volunteer  recently  joined  our  organization.  Mostly,  her  work  was  in  charge  of  fund  raising  
parties. She felt bored about her work until she participated in queer film festival. She was on 
behalf of Common Language to help the preparation of this festival, and as always, this festival 
was cancelled by the police department at the last minute. Our volunteer was so excited about 
this experience (the cancellation of the event). She felt this is revolutionary work, and this is the 
reason why she wants to volunteer for lesbian organizing” (interviewed by author, Beijing, China, 
Aug. 16, 2011). 
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Xu Bin and this senior activist analyze that there are several reasons behind this 
phenomenon. First, in general, younger generation is more aware of rights issues. Second, the 
internet has become a platform to let people learn how to express their own opinions 
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 12, 2011). One  organizer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  
Law Center shares these observations  that,  “I  found  that  there  is  more  and  more  younger  
generation  who  is  interested  in  women’s  issues,  and  who  is  much aware of his or her own right”  
(interviewed by author, Beijing, China, Aug. 17, 2011). 
In addition, changes in the political circumstance also have nurtured the increase awareness 
of  one’s  own  right.  In  1990,  the  Administrative  Litigation  Act  was  passed,  and  this  milestone  law  
grants  citizens’  right  to  sue  governmental  institutions (Florini, Lai and Tan 2012, 18). Along 
with the reform of National  People’s  Conference  and  the  establishment  of  letter-and-visit system, 
there exist some channels for ordinary people to voice for their own rights. 
However, in a repressive regime, the question if above mentioned mechanisms are 
functional lies on people’s  awareness  of  rights.  Social  groups  have  become  one  of  important  
facilitators  to  awaken  people’s  awareness.  This  is  the  reason  why  all  these  three  groups  have  
worked so hard to nurture other groups. 
A  lawyer  of  the  Peking  Women’s  Law  Center  stated  that she believes the internship 
program of her center, which has continued for more than fifteen years, has provided a platform 
for young generation to learn about gender issues and civil rights (interviewed by author, Beijing, 
China, July 8, 2011). The more knowledge these young activists have learned, the more 
determination they will grow in promoting gender equality. 
A senior activist of Common Language also shares the same observation that the younger 
generation has learned more about the idea of sexual identity, and as a result, they are more 
willing to reveal their sexual identity to the public and to volunteer at the Common Language. 
Most  importantly,  recently,  there  is  a  new  wave  of  women’s  organizing  which  has  
emphasized on intended confrontational movement. A group of younger activists called 
themselves lesbian feminist activists. Since their first gathering in 2012, they have organized 
several public protests that attracted both the domestic and international media. 
Here are two examples. They occupied male restrooms to demonstrate the problem of the 
lack  of  a  sufficient  number  of  women’s  restrooms.  And  they  protested  on  the  subway  against  
incidents of sexual harassment. The protest against sexual harassment was held in several cities, 
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and several activists even protested in the nude. Based on my interviews with several activists, 
they all stated that they are just fighting for their nature rights.    
Most of them attended the annual training camps that were co-hosted by Common 
Language and lesbian organizations in Taiwan, Hong Kong and New York. However, the major 
effort of this annual training camp is to build up a nationwide lesbian community and to provide 
support for lesbian groups in second-tier and third-tier cities. Confrontational strategies or action 
plans were not included. Therefore, these young activists who plan to do advocacy work turned 
to  working  with  several  women’s  activists  who  have  tried  to  initiate  a  more  confrontational  
movement. 
The  evolution  of  women’s  advocacy  groups  and  their expansion of political space manifest 
the incipient yet confrontational character in China. The evidence of this dissertation has led to 
the  conclusion  that  the  hidden  script  of  a  confrontational  strategy  of  women’s  groups  has  
successfully expanded their political space for advocacy work. Because the analytic focus of this 
dissertation  is  upon  the  strategies  of  women’s  activists,  I  have  not  discussed  much  about  the  
adaptive character of the governance system. However, the state has played the major role in the 
dynamic of state-social group relations. 
As  Florini,  Lai  and  Tan  state,  “While  formal  regulations  on  civil  society  organizations  
continue to be strict, with crackdowns taking place occasionally, all manner of local, 
international, and government-owned NGOs are de facto operating in China and engaging with 
state authorities on a range of problems, revealing deep-seated contradictions within the 
party-state about how to act on this issue” (2012, 35). 
As  I  have  argued,  women’s  advocacy  groups  evolve.  The next analytic focus will be on 
answering the question of how the state responds to this evolution? There are two important 
dimensions that provide critical information to this question. First, will the participation of 
women’s  activists  in  the  public  policy  area  strengthen  the  regime’s  legitimacy  or  will  this  
participation create a more inclusive political culture? Second, will the young generation 
activists use more confrontational strategies? How will the state respond to an emerging 
confrontational movement? 
Women’s  advocacy  groups  have  negotiated  for  more  space  for  younger  activists  to  form  a  
much more confrontational movement. The above-mentioned two questions will be worth noting 
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